end bar in Alaska

2023Servs., 260 P.3d 1072, 1081 (Alaska 2011) (rejecting, without mentioning Underwood, application of constitutional ex post facto prohibition in civil matters). -6- 1958 repair wells causing waste.” He argued that including the additional items in the revised regulation19 — most of which actually were added by the 1999 regulation amendment20 — “exceed[ed] the authority of the Commission.” At the end of the hearing, Alaskan Crude’s attorney was asked to provide the status of Alaskan Crude’s three wells and its plans for them.

2022These instructions were recorded and are not in dispute. 59 Id. at 427. 60 Id. at 421. 61 Id. 62 Id. at 418-19. 63 Id. – 17 – 2724 Based on the immediacy of the showup and the fact that Jenkins received neutral pre-identification instructions, the superior court found that the showup identification that occurred in Brigman’s case was “the type the Supreme Court had in mind when it said [that showups] can be reliable.” But, as the superior court recognized, finding that the showup was conducted in an appropriately neutral form is not the end of the analysis under Young.

2022These instructions were recorded and are not in dispute. 59 Id. at 427. 60 Id. at 421. 61 Id. 62 Id. at 418-19. 63 Id. – 17 – 2724 Based on the immediacy of the showup and the fact that Jenkins received neutral pre-identification instructions, the superior court found that the showup identification that occurred in Brigman’s case was “the type the Supreme Court had in mind when it said [that showups] can be reliable.” But, as the superior court recognized, finding that the showup was conducted in an appropriately neutral form is not the end of the analysis under Young.

2018Rather than simply invalidating the entire initiative by reversing the superior court’s decision and upholding that of the Lieutenant Governor, we must evaluate whether the offending provisions can be severed from the initiative.65 64 Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 64 (Alaska 1996); see also id. at 64 n.15 (“[W]here the legislature retains a broad range of freedom to make allocation decisions, an appropriation will not be found.

2018Rather than simply invalidating the entire initiative by reversing the superior court’s decision and upholding that of the Lieutenant Governor, we must evaluate whether the offending provisions can be severed from the initiative.65 64 Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 64 (Alaska 1996); see also id. at 64 n.15 (“[W]here the legislature retains a broad range of freedom to make allocation decisions, an appropriation will not be found.

2003See infra at 752-753. [2] See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Higgins, 754 P.2d 745, 748 (Alaska 1988) (appellate court may uphold lower court's ruling on any ground that is apparent from the record and that supports the decision as a matter of law). [3] The court's opinion creates a straw man when it observes that the superior court's comments at the October hearing "are inconsistent with concluding that the court had already resolved the issue when it dismissed the complaint." (Opinion at ___, n. 12) This dissent does not contend that the superior court had already resolved the issue whe

1995See Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987) ("[W]hen the superior court acts as an intermediate court of appeal, no deference is given to [its] decision."). [5] NSB asserts that the superior court's award of back pay to Barraza for the period from the end of her hearing to the date of the hearing officer's issuance of his final decision constitutes a "windfall" and unjust enrichment.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1995Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to Alaska’s agree that the victim’s mere understanding of the physical act of sex is not equivalent to an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the victim’s conduct: *592 Although the victim ... apparently knew what an act of sexual intercourse entails, had some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity, and knew “where babies come from,” that is not the end of the inquiry of whether ... the victim is capable of “understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.” People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 187 , 46 Ill.Dec.

1982We have held that unambiguous language releasing all tortfeasors is effective to release only named tortfeasors, Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889 (Alaska 1969); and that unambiguous language releasing a tortfeasor from all injuries “known and unknown” can be set aside if the releasor at the time of signing the release did not intend “to discharge the disability which was subsequently discovered.” Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Alaska 1978).

1969In Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949), tactical circumstances of the military in the field were held to justify the withdrawal of a court-martial proceeding and the subsequent constitution of another court-martial proceeding. [14] 9 Wheat. 579 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). [15] See the following state authorities which have either adopted the "manifest necessity" standard or have employed criteria substantially similar to that of "manifest necessity." State v. Lanier, 205 So.2d 671, 673-674 (Fla.Ct.App. 1968); People v. Anglin, 6 Mich. App. 666 , 150 N.W.2d 532, 538 (196

1969In Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949), tactical circumstances of the military in the field were held to justify the withdrawal of a court-martial proceeding and the subsequent constitution of another court-martial proceeding. [14] 9 Wheat. 579 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). [15] See the following state authorities which have either adopted the "manifest necessity" standard or have employed criteria substantially similar to that of "manifest necessity." State v. Lanier, 205 So.2d 671, 673-674 (Fla.Ct.App. 1968); People v. Anglin, 6 Mich. App. 666 , 150 N.W.2d 532, 538 (196

1969After remand from this court, the superior court again denied appellant's motion to dismiss. [5] 406 P.2d 181, 186 (Alaska 1965). [6] Id. (footnote omitted) [7] Selman v. State, 406 P.2d 181 , 186 n. 18 (Alaska 1965), cited Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 205 (1957), where the Supreme Court of the United States said: At the same time jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those cases where `unforeseeable circumstances * * * arise during [the first] trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of

1969Selman v. State, 406 P.2d 181 , 186 n. 18 (Alaska 1965), cited Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 205 (1957), where the Supreme Court of the United States said: At the same time jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those cases where ‘unforeseeable circumstances * ⅞ * arise during [the first] trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.’ . 336 U.S. 684, 688-689 , 69 S.Ct. 834, 837 , 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949). .

1969Selman v. State, 406 P.2d 181 , 186 n. 18 (Alaska 1965), cited Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 205 (1957), where the Supreme Court of the United States said: At the same time jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those cases where ‘unforeseeable circumstances * ⅞ * arise during [the first] trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.’ . 336 U.S. 684, 688-689 , 69 S.Ct. 834, 837 , 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949). .

1969Selman v. State, 406 P.2d 181 , 186 n. 18 (Alaska 1965), cited Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 205 (1957), where the Supreme Court of the United States said: At the same time jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those cases where ‘unforeseeable circumstances * ⅞ * arise during [the first] trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.’ . 336 U.S. 684, 688-689 , 69 S.Ct. 834, 837 , 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949). .

1969In Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949), tactical circumstances of the military in the field were held to justify the withdrawal of a court-martial proceeding and the subsequent constitution of another court-martial proceeding. [14] 9 Wheat. 579 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). [15] See the following state authorities which have either adopted the "manifest necessity" standard or have employed criteria substantially similar to that of "manifest necessity." State v. Lanier, 205 So.2d 671, 673-674 (Fla.Ct.App. 1968); People v. Anglin, 6 Mich. App. 666 , 150 N.W.2d 532, 538 (196