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24 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1909–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hobbs v. Hobbsgreen2 sentences2011See Hayes v. Hayes, 16 So.3d 117, 120 (Ala. Civ.App.2009) (quoting Armstrong v. Armstrong, 550 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989), citing in turn Hobbs v. Hobbs, 423 So.2d 878 (Ala.Civ.App.1982)) ("`a trial court's oral divorce decree is unauthorized and ineffective'"). 2011See Hayes v. Hayes, 16 So.3d 117, 120 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (quoting Armstrong v. Armstrong, 550 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Ala.Civ.App.1989), citing in turn Hobbs v. Hobbs, 423 So.2d 878 (Ala.Civ.App.1982)) (‘“a trial court’s oral divorce decree is unauthorized and ineffective’ ”). | 2 | 2 |
Hayes v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2011See Hayes v. Hayes, 16 So.3d 117, 120 (Ala. Civ.App.2009) (quoting Armstrong v. Armstrong, 550 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989), citing in turn Hobbs v. Hobbs, 423 So.2d 878 (Ala.Civ.App.1982)) ("`a trial court's oral divorce decree is unauthorized and ineffective'"). 2011See Hayes v. Hayes, 16 So.3d 117, 120 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (quoting Armstrong v. Armstrong, 550 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Ala.Civ.App.1989), citing in turn Hobbs v. Hobbs, 423 So.2d 878 (Ala.Civ.App.1982)) (‘“a trial court’s oral divorce decree is unauthorized and ineffective’ ”). | 2 | 2 |
Armstrong v. Armstronggreen2 sentences2011See Hayes v. Hayes, 16 So.3d 117, 120 (Ala. Civ.App.2009) (quoting Armstrong v. Armstrong, 550 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989), citing in turn Hobbs v. Hobbs, 423 So.2d 878 (Ala.Civ.App.1982)) ("`a trial court's oral divorce decree is unauthorized and ineffective'"). 2011See Hayes v. Hayes, 16 So.3d 117, 120 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (quoting Armstrong v. Armstrong, 550 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Ala.Civ.App.1989), citing in turn Hobbs v. Hobbs, 423 So.2d 878 (Ala.Civ.App.1982)) (‘“a trial court’s oral divorce decree is unauthorized and ineffective’ ”). | 2 | 2 |
Underwood v. Alabama State Board of Educationgreen1 sentence2017However, despite the Judicial Inquiry Commission’s contention, that is not the end of the analysis. “ ‘Alabama courts do not give opinions in which there is no longer a justiciable controversy; yet, Alabama has recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: questions of great public interest and questions that are likely of repetition of the situation.’ ” Underwood v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 39 So.3d 120, 127 (Ala. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Goodengreen1 sentence2017We now turn to whether this issue of the automatic suspension provided in § 159 is a question of great public importance. “‘The criteria for applying the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine include the. public nature of the question, the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers, and the likelihood that the question will generally recur.’ However, this ‘exception is construed narrowly ... and a clear showing of each criterion is required to bring a case within its terms.’ ” Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So.2d 972, 989 (Ala. 2007)(internal | 1 | 1 |
Wagner v. Stategreen1 sentence2015P.” Wagner v. State, 197 So.3d 511, 516 (Ala.Crim.App.2015). | 1 | 1 |
Mahone v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2009In Dozier v. Farrior, 187 Ala. 181 , 65 So. 364 (1914), the Alabama Supreme Court observed that the rule “arises out of ‘the reasonable presumption ... that such *1150 property’ ... ‘will produce more when sold in parcels, because the sale is thus accommodated to the probable wants of purchasers,’ ” 187 Ala. at 185 , 65 So. at 366 (quoting Mahone v. Williams, 39 Ala. 202, 217 (1863)), and stated that, “if such property is sold en masse and brings a fair price, the mortgagor will not be heard to complain.” 187 Ala. at 186 , 65 So. at 366 . | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Central of Georgia Ry. Co.green2 sentences2008In response, the Welches argued that under the principle enunciated in Ex parte Central of Georgia Railway, 243 Ala. 508, 513 , 10 So.2d 746, 750 (1942), the right to a change of venue is individual to each defendant, and one defendant may not waive the right on behalf of another. 2008In response, the Welches argued that under the principle enunciated in Ex parte Central of Georgia Railway, 243 Ala. 508, 513 , 10 So.2d 746, 750 (1942), the right to a change of venue is individual to each defendant, and one defendant may not waive the right on behalf of another. | 1 | 1 |
Knight v. Stategreen2 sentences1990See Knight v. State, 160 Ala. 58 , 49 So. 764, 765 (1909) (“It is the duty of an attorney, in the trial of causes, to aid the court, to the end that error in the course of the trial may be avoided, and, when called upon by the court, to state the ground upon which a contention is rested or a ruling is invoked. 1990See Knight v. State, 160 Ala. 58 , 49 So. 764, 765 (1909) (“It is the duty of an attorney, in the trial of causes, to aid the court, to the end that error in the course of the trial may be avoided, and, when called upon by the court, to state the ground upon which a contention is rested or a ruling is invoked. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vrocher v. State
green
1 sentence2025In Vrocher v. State, 813 So. 2d 799 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Wells v. Wells
green
2 sentences2017In Wells , supra , this court reversed a judgment that had been entered in favor of the deceased wife, who was the defendant. 376 So.2d at 751 . 2017In Wells , supra , this court reversed a judgment that had been entered in favor of the deceased wife, who was the defendant. 376 So.2d at 751 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ex Parte Devine
green
1 sentence2015This court acknowledges that a best-interests inquiry encompasses consideration of “the characteristics of those seeking custody, including age, character, stability, mental and physical health [and] the capacity and interest of each parent to provide for the emotional, social, moral, material and educational needs of the children,” 398 So.2d at 696-97 , all of which are factors relating to the fitness of a parent; however, the GVA still does not require a court to end its inquiry upon finding that a parent is fit to exercise custody of a child. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Dean v. Dean
green
1 sentence2012Under McLendon, the mother was not only required to demonstrate a material change in circumstances, she was also required to show “that the child’s best interests will be materially promoted by a change of custody, and that the benefits of the change will more than offset the inherently disruptive effect resulting from the change in custody.” Dean, 998 So.2d at 1065 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Dozier v. Farrior
green
2 sentences2009In Dozier v. Farrior, 187 Ala. 181 , 65 So. 364 (1914), the Alabama Supreme Court observed that the rule “arises out of ‘the reasonable presumption ... that such *1150 property’ ... ‘will produce more when sold in parcels, because the sale is thus accommodated to the probable wants of purchasers,’ ” 187 Ala. at 185 , 65 So. at 366 (quoting Mahone v. Williams, 39 Ala. 202, 217 (1863)), and stated that, “if such property is sold en masse and brings a fair price, the mortgagor will not be heard to complain.” 187 Ala. at 186 , 65 So. at 366 . 2009In Dozier v. Farrior, 187 Ala. 181 , 65 So. 364 (1914), the Alabama Supreme Court observed that the rule “arises out of ‘the reasonable presumption ... that such *1150 property’ ... ‘will produce more when sold in parcels, because the sale is thus accommodated to the probable wants of purchasers,’ ” 187 Ala. at 185 , 65 So. at 366 (quoting Mahone v. Williams, 39 Ala. 202, 217 (1863)), and stated that, “if such property is sold en masse and brings a fair price, the mortgagor will not be heard to complain.” 187 Ala. at 186 , 65 So. at 366 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Goodley
green
1 sentence2006Under the Fifth Amendment, where a non-waivable defect, such as an illegal verdict, prevents a jury from delivering either a conviction or acquittal at a defendant's first trial, that defendant, cannot avail himself of the plea of double jeopardy.' " Goodley , 423 So.2d at 651 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Tolbert v. State
green
1 sentence2003"When reviewing a claim questioning the voluntariness of a statement we apply the standard articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court in McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 727 (Ala.), on remand, 718 So.2d 731 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 929 , 118 S.Ct. 2327 , 141 L.Ed.2d 701 (1998). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
McLeod v. State
green
1 sentence2003"When reviewing a claim questioning the voluntariness of a statement we apply the standard articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court in McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 727 (Ala.), on remand, 718 So.2d 731 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 929 , 118 S.Ct. 2327 , 141 L.Ed.2d 701 (1998). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Dixon v. United States
green
1 sentence2003"When reviewing a claim questioning the voluntariness of a statement we apply the standard articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court in McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 727 (Ala.), on remand, 718 So.2d 731 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 929 , 118 S.Ct. 2327 , 141 L.Ed.2d 701 (1998). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Cross v. City of Newark
green
1 sentence2003"When reviewing a claim questioning the voluntariness of a statement we apply the standard articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court in McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 727 (Ala.), on remand, 718 So.2d 731 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 929 , 118 S.Ct. 2327 , 141 L.Ed.2d 701 (1998). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Davis v. Florida
green
1 sentence2003"When reviewing a claim questioning the voluntariness of a statement we apply the standard articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court in McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 727 (Ala.), on remand, 718 So.2d 731 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 929 , 118 S.Ct. 2327 , 141 L.Ed.2d 701 (1998). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997It is a well-understood principle of law that the trial court is vested with the authority "to manage its affairs in order to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So.2d 82 (Ala.1989). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Ex Parte Branch
green
2 sentences1995"In Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987), the Alabama Supreme Court set forth guidelines for considering a Batson motion. 1995"In Ex parte Branch , 526 So.2d 609 (Ala. 1987), the Alabama Supreme Court set forth guidelines for considering a Batson motion. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
McCovery v. State
green
1 sentence1992As we stated in McCovery v. State , 365 So.2d 358 , 362-63 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978): "Remarks by the trial judge may be open to criticism, but they are not [reversible] error unless they may have affected the result of the trial. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Norris
green
2 sentences1986It ignores the fact that the oath administered to the witness calls on him freely to disclose the truth in the first instance and not to put the court and the parties to the disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by cross-examination, by extraneous investigation, or other collateral means.” 300 U.S. at 573-4 , 57 S.Ct. at 539 . 1986It ignores the fact that the oath administered to the witness calls on him freely to disclose the truth in the first instance and not to put the court and the parties to the disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by cross-examination, by extraneous investigation, or other collateral means.” 300 U.S. at 573-4 , 57 S.Ct. at 539 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Armstrong v. State
green
2 sentences1985On appeal, appellant asserts that he was not given adequate notice or disclosure under the minimal due process requirements as set out in Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100 , 312 So.2d 620 (1975). 1985On appeal, appellant asserts that he was not given adequate notice or disclosure under the minimal due process requirements as set out in Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100 , 312 So.2d 620 (1975). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Alabama Gas Corp. v. ALABAMA PUBLIC SERVICE COM'N
green
1 sentence1982Com'n., 425 So.2d 430 (1982), this Court specifically addressed the issue of adjustments to test year expenses for charges occurring more than six months after the end of the test year. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State Ex Rel. Utilities Commission v. Duke Power Co.
green
2 sentences1982Utilities Commission v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 1 , 287 S.E.2d 786 (1982), the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed this very issue: "In reducing Duke's rate base by the addition to the accumulated depreciation account of $3,879,000 the Commission acted within its statutory power. 1982Utilities Commission v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 1 , 287 S.E.2d 786 (1982), the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed this very issue: "In reducing Duke's rate base by the addition to the accumulated depreciation account of $3,879,000 the Commission acted within its statutory power. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.
green
2 sentences1975It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts;’ 320 U. S. 591 , 64 S.Ct. 281 , 88 L.Ed. 333, 345 .” As stated in appellants’ brief: “The Commission order adjusted the revenues of GT of Alabama so as to give effect to ‘an additional $248,724 in intrastate toll revenues as a result of the South Central increase.’ * * * The Commission then added the return portion of this revenue adjustment ($122,347) to income available for return at the end of the test period. * * * ” It appears that of the $248,724 found to be due GT of Alabama by virtue of “tracking” South Central’s rates, th 1975It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts;’ 320 U. S. 591 , 64 S.Ct. 281 , 88 L.Ed. 333, 345 .” As stated in appellants’ brief: “The Commission order adjusted the revenues of GT of Alabama so as to give effect to ‘an additional $248,724 in intrastate toll revenues as a result of the South Central increase.’ * * * The Commission then added the return portion of this revenue adjustment ($122,347) to income available for return at the end of the test period. * * * ” It appears that of the $248,724 found to be due GT of Alabama by virtue of “tracking” South Central’s rates, th | 1 | 1975–1975 |
West v. State
green
1 sentence1975He denied bail, announcing at the end of the hearing: “THE COURT: Well, in view of the Grand Jury notes, and in view of the three felonies of rape and two robberies, and in view of the past record, no bond.” Ex parte Bynum, 294 Ala. 78 , 312 So.2d 52 , is probably the latest decision on the right to bail before conviction, as guaranteed by our constitution, § 16. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Ex Parte Bynum
green
1 sentence1975He denied bail, announcing at the end of the hearing: “THE COURT: Well, in view of the Grand Jury notes, and in view of the three felonies of rape and two robberies, and in view of the past record, no bond.” Ex parte Bynum, 294 Ala. 78 , 312 So.2d 52 , is probably the latest decision on the right to bail before conviction, as guaranteed by our constitution, § 16. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Agee v. Medlock neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Henderson neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Sanders v. Knox neutral | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.