end hearing in Kansas

2024As his authority states: "It is only when the trial court makes no attempt to provide a meaningful response . . . ." that the statute is violated. 41 Kan.

2024As his authority states: "It is only when the trial court makes no attempt to provide a meaningful response . . . ." that the statute is violated. 41 Kan.

2025In Morton, 286 Kan. at 649 , the Kansas Supreme Court held that "[u]nwarned inculpatory statements obtained through noncustodial interrogation, although not barred by Miranda, may nevertheless be inadmissible if they were obtained in violation of the due process voluntariness requirement." Meaning, even though "'the Miranda standard is the first line of inquiry in every case, . . . [c]onformity with Miranda . . . triggers the second line of analysis—the voluntariness standard.'" Morton, 286 Kan. at 649 (quoting 3 Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 24:5 [2d ed.1993]).

2025In Morton, 286 Kan. at 649 , the Kansas Supreme Court held that "[u]nwarned inculpatory statements obtained through noncustodial interrogation, although not barred by Miranda, may nevertheless be inadmissible if they were obtained in violation of the due process voluntariness requirement." Meaning, even though "'the Miranda standard is the first line of inquiry in every case, . . . [c]onformity with Miranda . . . triggers the second line of analysis—the voluntariness standard.'" Morton, 286 Kan. at 649 (quoting 3 Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 24:5 [2d ed.1993]).

2021State v. Lane, 262 Kan. 373, 386 , 940 P.2d 422 (1997).

2021State v. Lane, 262 Kan. 373, 386 , 940 P.2d 422 (1997).

2021But Magee was not imprisoned based on her debt—instead her probation was extended after the court found she was financially able to pay. 4 The Kansas Supreme Court addressed a comparable issue in State v. Gordon, 275 Kan. 393, 410 , 66 P.3d 903 (2003), where it held that the district court is not constitutionally required to hold a hearing before extending a person's probation after the person has failed to pay restitution.

2021But Magee was not imprisoned based on her debt—instead her probation was extended after the court found she was financially able to pay. 4 The Kansas Supreme Court addressed a comparable issue in State v. Gordon, 275 Kan. 393, 410 , 66 P.3d 903 (2003), where it held that the district court is not constitutionally required to hold a hearing before extending a person's probation after the person has failed to pay restitution.

2020Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515 , 31 S. Ct. 279 , 55 L.

2020Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515 , 31 S. Ct. 279 , 55 L.

2020At the end of the hearing, the district court referred to the case of State v. Ritchey, 56 Kan.

2020App. 2d 530 , 432 P.3d 99 (2018), which it suggested may be "on point." Also, before taking the issue under advisement, the district court noted: "Obviously, the search of the car itself and what was found in the car was within the exceptions and proper.

2011No amount of compensation can authorize such action.” (Emphasis added.) Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 .

1999I got a problem, counsel, with this photo ID.

1991Under Leon , it appears this would be the end of the analysis and the evidence would not be suppressed, but the court went on to quote some preliminary probable cause language from earlier in the Leon opinion and concluded that, if the magistrate erred in applying the totality of the circumstances test in finding probable cause, the evidence must be suppressed. 244 Kan. at 503 .

1980Although Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 218 Kan. 670 , 544 P.2d 1396 (1976), did not involve CWIP, the Supreme Court gave some indication of the meaning of “used or required to be used” by stating at 674: “This is not to say that a unit or segment of a facility that has become obsolete or whose production is far in excess of present or near future needs, or for any valid reason, is not used or required to be used and can be setoff or separated from a facility otherwise used, cannot be excluded from rate base under the statute.” If the property is CWIP to be complete

1980Although Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 218 Kan. 670 , 544 P.2d 1396 (1976), did not involve CWIP, the Supreme Court gave some indication of the meaning of “used or required to be used” by stating at 674: “This is not to say that a unit or segment of a facility that has become obsolete or whose production is far in excess of present or near future needs, or for any valid reason, is not used or required to be used and can be setoff or separated from a facility otherwise used, cannot be excluded from rate base under the statute.” If the property is CWIP to be complete

1980That rationale was advanced by the Commission and rejected by the Supreme Court in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. KCC, 224 Kan. 86 .

1980The court noted that on appeal KG&E suggested five approaches to alleviation of attrition: “(1) a projected, or budgeted, test year; (2) an historic test year with a year-end rate base and pro forma adjustments with increased rates effective at or very near the end of the test year; (3) a replacement cost rate base; (4) an aggressive, promotional approach to ‘marketing’ energy; and (5) an attrition allowance.” 5 Kan.

1911Co. v. Comm’rs of Chase Co., 42 Kan. 223 ; The State v. Miller, 54 Kan. 244 ; Railway Co. v. Love, 61 Kan. 433 .) The juris diction of the district court, regularly acquired by the service of notice, could not be wrested from it by any action of the probate court, and its right to proceed' to the end of the inquiry could not be thwarted or impeded by any intermeddling process issued by the probate court.

1911Co. v. Comm’rs of Chase Co., 42 Kan. 223 ; The State v. Miller, 54 Kan. 244 ; Railway Co. v. Love, 61 Kan. 433 .) The juris diction of the district court, regularly acquired by the service of notice, could not be wrested from it by any action of the probate court, and its right to proceed' to the end of the inquiry could not be thwarted or impeded by any intermeddling process issued by the probate court.

1911Co. v. Comm’rs of Chase Co., 42 Kan. 223 ; The State v. Miller, 54 Kan. 244 ; Railway Co. v. Love, 61 Kan. 433 .) The juris diction of the district court, regularly acquired by the service of notice, could not be wrested from it by any action of the probate court, and its right to proceed' to the end of the inquiry could not be thwarted or impeded by any intermeddling process issued by the probate court.

1907(Railway Co. v. Poole, 73 Kan. 466 , 87 Pac. 465 ; Cornelius v. Railway Co., 74 Kan. 599 , 87 Pac. 751 .) The damages in controversy were sustained on account of deficient stock-pens, and are wholly disconnected from the transportation of the stock in the defendant’s cars or over its railroad.

1907(Railway Co. v. Poole, 73 Kan. 466 , 87 Pac. 465 ; Cornelius v. Railway Co., 74 Kan. 599 , 87 Pac. 751 .) The damages in controversy were sustained on account of deficient stock-pens, and are wholly disconnected from the transportation of the stock in the defendant’s cars or over its railroad.

1907(Railway Co. v. Poole, 73 Kan. 466 , 87 Pac. 465 ; Cornelius v. Railway Co., 74 Kan. 599 , 87 Pac. 751 .) The damages in controversy were sustained on account of deficient stock-pens, and are wholly disconnected from the transportation of the stock in the defendant’s cars or over its railroad.

1907(Railway Co. v. Poole, 73 Kan. 466 , 87 Pac. 465 ; Cornelius v. Railway Co., 74 Kan. 599 , 87 Pac. 751 .) The damages in controversy were sustained on account of deficient stock-pens, and are wholly disconnected from the transportation of the stock in the defendant’s cars or over its railroad.