end inquiry in Kentucky

2024Although authentication is not the same as admissibility, see Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 23 (Ky. 2005), we are also mindful of KRE 901(a), which states, “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Here, it appears that Mr. Webster was sufficiently acquainted with Hyundai’s creation and keeping of engineering documents that the trial court believed Hyundai had laid a “pretty good” foundation for the admission of Ba

2024Although authentication is not the same as admissibility, see Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 23 (Ky. 2005), we are also mindful of KRE 901(a), which states, “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Here, it appears that Mr. Webster was sufficiently acquainted with Hyundai’s creation and keeping of engineering documents that the trial court believed Hyundai had laid a “pretty good” foundation for the admission of Ba

2025Instead, we proceed to considering ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ . . . or put otherwise, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 23- 24 (1967)). 29 As explained in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22 (1988): “An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness’ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury’s assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such a

2025Instead, we proceed to considering ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ . . . or put otherwise, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 23- 24 (1967)). 29 As explained in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22 (1988): “An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness’ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury’s assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such a

2025Instead, we proceed to considering ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ . . . or put otherwise, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 23- 24 (1967)). 29 As explained in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22 (1988): “An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness’ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury’s assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such a

2025Instead, we proceed to considering ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ . . . or put otherwise, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 23- 24 (1967)). 29 As explained in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22 (1988): “An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness’ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury’s assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such a

2025In the context of DVOs, “KRS 403.740 only requires a court determine whether domestic violence has occurred at some point in the past.” Walker v. Walker, 520 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Ky. App. 2017) (citation omitted).

2023KRS 532.110’s statutory cap from “multiple sentences” has been held to “not extend to sentences resulting from previous cases.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Ky. 2018).

2021See, e.g., id.; Anderson v. Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453, 458 (Ky. 2011); Keifer v. Keifer, 354 S.W.3d 123, 125-26 (Ky. 2011). -9- The family court’s method of incorporating its oral findings into its written order, however, was recently approved by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Smith v. McCoy, No. 2021-SC-0050-DGE, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2021 WL 3828565 (Ky. Aug. 26, 2021):3 As previously described, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law orally at the end of the hearing.

2021See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Ky. 2009) (“[T]o preserve an error based upon the insufficiency of the evidence the defendant must move for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's proof and must renew his motion at the close of all evidence: at the end of the defense case (if there is one), or, if there is rebuttal evidence, as there was in this case, at the conclusion of rebuttal … the motion must state specific grounds for relief and should identify which elements of the alleged offense the Commonwealth has failed to prove.”). 29 On appellate review, the

2021See, e.g., id.; Anderson v. Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453, 458 (Ky. 2011); Keifer v. Keifer, 354 S.W.3d 123, 125-26 (Ky. 2011). -9- The family court’s method of incorporating its oral findings into its written order, however, was recently approved by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Smith v. McCoy, No. 2021-SC-0050-DGE, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2021 WL 3828565 (Ky. Aug. 26, 2021):3 As previously described, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law orally at the end of the hearing.

2014The court favorably quoted and applied the following statement of the estoppel by plat principle: Where the owner of real property makes a plat of it and divides the land into lots and blocks intersected by streets and alleys, and sells any of the lots with reference to such plan, or where he sells with reference to the map of a town or city, in which his land is so laid off, he thereby dedicates the streets and alleys to the use of the public, unless it appears either by express statement in the conveyance or otherwise that the mention of the street was solely for purposes of description and

2013Almost all issues are subject to waiver, whether from inaction or consent, even in a criminal case, and “[a] new theory of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky.1999); see also Fischer v. Fischer, 348 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Ky.2011) (“It has long been this Court’s view that specific grounds not raised before the trial court, but raised for the first time on appeal will not support a favorable ruling on appeal.”); Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 734 (Ky.2009) (“More importantly, this precise argument was never made i

2013Almost all issues are subject to waiver, whether from inaction or consent, even in a criminal case, and “[a] new theory of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky.1999); see also Fischer v. Fischer, 348 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Ky.2011) (“It has long been this Court’s view that specific grounds not raised before the trial court, but raised for the first time on appeal will not support a favorable ruling on appeal.”); Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 734 (Ky.2009) (“More importantly, this precise argument was never made i

2013Almost all issues are subject to waiver, whether from inaction or consent, even in a criminal case, and “[a] new theory of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky.1999); see also Fischer v. Fischer, 348 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Ky.2011) (“It has long been this Court’s view that specific grounds not raised before the trial court, but raised for the first time on appeal will not support a favorable ruling on appeal.”); Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 734 (Ky.2009) (“More importantly, this precise argument was never made i

2005In Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991), this Court states the rule as follows: On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth.

2005In Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991), this Court states the rule as follows: On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth.

1985Its argument is bottomed on the assumption that the Commission had in previous ratemaking cases adjusted Bell’s income to reflect the number of income producing units in service at the end of the test year, and that the current “(r)adical departure from (past) administrative interpretation consistently followed cannot be made except for the most cogent reasons.” Utility Regulatory Commission v. Kentucky Water Service Company, Ky.App., 642 S.W.2d 591, 593 (1982).

1985Its argument is bottomed on the assumption that the Commission had in previous ratemaking cases adjusted Bell’s income to reflect the number of income producing units in service at the end of the test year, and that the current “(r)adical departure from (past) administrative interpretation consistently followed cannot be made except for the most cogent reasons.” Utility Regulatory Commission v. Kentucky Water Service Company, Ky.App., 642 S.W.2d 591, 593 (1982).