end inquiry in New Jersey

2015The "extraordinary circumstances" language was added by amendment in 1994, L. 1994, c. 49, § 5, in order to "raise the bar for the filing of late notice from a 'fairly permissive standard' to a 'more demanding' one." Beauchamp, supra, 164 N.J. at 118 (quoting Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 625 ). "'[T]he amendment may have signaled the end to a rule of liberality' in filing." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 ).

2015The "extraordinary circumstances" language was added by amendment in 1994, L. 1994, c. 49, § 5, in order to "raise the bar for the filing of late notice from a 'fairly permissive standard' to a 'more demanding' one." Beauchamp, supra, 164 N.J. at 118 (quoting Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 625 ). "'[T]he amendment may have signaled the end to a rule of liberality' in filing." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 ).

2015Notably, the 1994 amendment "'does not define what circumstances are to be considered "extraordinary" and necessarily leaves it for a case- by-case determination as to whether the reasons given rise to the level of "extraordinary" on the facts presented.'" Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 (quoting Allen, supra, 306 N.J.

2015Notably, the 1994 amendment "'does not define what circumstances are to be considered "extraordinary" and necessarily leaves it for a case- by-case determination as to whether the reasons given rise to the level of "extraordinary" on the facts presented.'" Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 (quoting Allen, supra, 306 N.J.

2013Auth., 286 N.J.Super. 670, 675 , 670 A.2d 92 (App.Div.1996) (observing that statutory change “suggested that the amendment may have signaled the end to a rule of liberality”).

2013Auth., 286 N.J.Super. 670, 675 , 670 A.2d 92 (App.Div.1996) (observing that statutory change “suggested that the amendment may have signaled the end to a rule of liberality”).

2025Even if the service agreement were an adhesion contract, it would not instantaneously render the agreement unconscionable. "[T]hat a contract is a A-0078-24 16 contract of adhesion imbued with some procedural unconscionability marks only 'the beginning, not the end of the inquiry' regarding its enforceability." Pace, 258 N.J. at 103 (quoting Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 354 ).

2024Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 354 .

2017"If the language is clear, that is the end of the inquiry." Ibid. (citing Zacarias, supra, 168 N.J. at 594-95 ). "[I]n the absence of an ambiguity, a court should not 'engage in a strained construction to support the imposition of liability' or write a better policy for the insured 10 A-4267-15T1 than the one purchased." Ibid. (quoting Progressive Cas.

2017"If the language is clear, that is the end of the inquiry." Ibid. (citing Zacarias, supra, 168 N.J. at 594-95 ). "[I]n the absence of an ambiguity, a court should not 'engage in a strained construction to support the imposition of liability' or write a better policy for the insured 10 A-4267-15T1 than the one purchased." Ibid. (quoting Progressive Cas.

2015The "extraordinary circumstances" language was added by amendment in 1994, L. 1994, c. 49, § 5, in order to "raise the bar for the filing of late notice from a 'fairly permissive standard' to a 'more demanding' one." Beauchamp, supra, 164 N.J. at 118 (quoting Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 625 ). "'[T]he amendment may have signaled the end to a rule of liberality' in filing." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 ).

2015The "extraordinary circumstances" language was added by amendment in 1994, L. 1994, c. 49, § 5, in order to "raise the bar for the filing of late notice from a 'fairly permissive standard' to a 'more demanding' one." Beauchamp, supra, 164 N.J. at 118 (quoting Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 625 ). "'[T]he amendment may have signaled the end to a rule of liberality' in filing." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 ).

2008Notably, the 1994 amendment "`does not define what circumstances are to be considered "extraordinary" and necessarily leaves it for a case-by-case determination as to whether the reasons given rise to the level of "extraordinary" on the facts presented.'" Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 , 731 A. 2d 14 (quoting Allen, supra, 306 N.J.Super. at 455 , 703 A. 2d 993 ; Ohlweiler, supra, 290 N.J.Super. at 404 , 675 A. 2d 1176 ; O'Neill v. City of Newark, 304 N.J.Super. 543, 551 , 701 A. 2d 717 (App.Div.1997); Margolis and Novack, Claims Against Public Entities, Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 (1999)).

2008Notably, the 1994 amendment "`does not define what circumstances are to be considered "extraordinary" and necessarily leaves it for a case-by-case determination as to whether the reasons given rise to the level of "extraordinary" on the facts presented.'" Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 , 731 A. 2d 14 (quoting Allen, supra, 306 N.J.Super. at 455 , 703 A. 2d 993 ; Ohlweiler, supra, 290 N.J.Super. at 404 , 675 A. 2d 1176 ; O'Neill v. City of Newark, 304 N.J.Super. 543, 551 , 701 A. 2d 717 (App.Div.1997); Margolis and Novack, Claims Against Public Entities, Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 (1999)).

2008Notably, the 1994 amendment "`does not define what circumstances are to be considered "extraordinary" and necessarily leaves it for a case-by-case determination as to whether the reasons given rise to the level of "extraordinary" on the facts presented.'" Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 , 731 A. 2d 14 (quoting Allen, supra, 306 N.J.Super. at 455 , 703 A. 2d 993 ; Ohlweiler, supra, 290 N.J.Super. at 404 , 675 A. 2d 1176 ; O'Neill v. City of Newark, 304 N.J.Super. 543, 551 , 701 A. 2d 717 (App.Div.1997); Margolis and Novack, Claims Against Public Entities, Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 (1999)).

2008Notably, the 1994 amendment "`does not define what circumstances are to be considered "extraordinary" and necessarily leaves it for a case-by-case determination as to whether the reasons given rise to the level of "extraordinary" on the facts presented.'" Lowe, supra, 158 N.J. at 626 , 731 A. 2d 14 (quoting Allen, supra, 306 N.J.Super. at 455 , 703 A. 2d 993 ; Ohlweiler, supra, 290 N.J.Super. at 404 , 675 A. 2d 1176 ; O'Neill v. City of Newark, 304 N.J.Super. 543, 551 , 701 A. 2d 717 (App.Div.1997); Margolis and Novack, Claims Against Public Entities, Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 (1999)).

2026"If the language is clear, that is the end of the inquiry." Ibid. (quoting Chubb Custom Ins.

2026A-1843-24 22 However, the ambiguity of the provision was not the end of the inquiry because a court must examine the reasonable, objective expectations of the policy, Voorhees, 128 N.J. at 175 , and apply "a rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose" of the policy, Owens, 20 N.J. at 543 .

2026A-1843-24 22 However, the ambiguity of the provision was not the end of the inquiry because a court must examine the reasonable, objective expectations of the policy, Voorhees, 128 N.J. at 175 , and apply "a rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose" of the policy, Owens, 20 N.J. at 543 .

2024Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 354 ; Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 15 .

2024Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 354 ; Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 15 .

2016Following such a finding, the parent is obliged to offer a visitation schedule, and if the grandparents agree to that schedule, “that will be the end of the inquiry.” Id. at 117 , 827 A.2d 203 .

2016Following such a finding, the parent is obliged to offer a visitation schedule, and if the grandparents agree to that schedule, “that will be the end of the inquiry.” Id. at 117 , 827 A.2d 203 .

2010"Ignorance of the 90-day statutory requirement, ignorance of one's rights or mere ambivalence by the claimant have never been found to be sufficient reasons on their own to allow late filing." Escalante v. Twp. of Cinnaminson, 283 N.J.Super. 244, 250 , 661 A. 2d 837 (App.Div.1995).

2010"Ignorance of the 90-day statutory requirement, ignorance of one's rights or mere ambivalence by the claimant have never been found to be sufficient reasons on their own to allow late filing." Escalante v. Twp. of Cinnaminson, 283 N.J.Super. 244, 250 , 661 A. 2d 837 (App.Div.1995).

2007However, the State then introduced exhibits and rested, after which the transcript reveals that Hamlet was called as a defense witness and "Mr. Hamlet is le[]d in." [5] When a photographic array is misplaced, the burden shifts to the State, and "the State should bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that any in-court identification . . . is derived from an independent source." State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J.Super. 25, 45 , 543 A. 2d 466 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 295 , 554 A. 2d 850 (1988).

2007However, the State then introduced exhibits and rested, after which the transcript reveals that Hamlet was called as a defense witness and "Mr. Hamlet is le[]d in." [5] When a photographic array is misplaced, the burden shifts to the State, and "the State should bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that any in-court identification . . . is derived from an independent source." State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J.Super. 25, 45 , 543 A. 2d 466 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 295 , 554 A. 2d 850 (1988).

2007However, the State then introduced exhibits and rested, after which the transcript reveals that Hamlet was called as a defense witness and "Mr. Hamlet is le[]d in." [5] When a photographic array is misplaced, the burden shifts to the State, and "the State should bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that any in-court identification . . . is derived from an independent source." State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J.Super. 25, 45 , 543 A. 2d 466 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 295 , 554 A. 2d 850 (1988).

2007However, the State then introduced exhibits and rested, after which the transcript reveals that Hamlet was called as a defense witness and "Mr. Hamlet is le[]d in." [5] When a photographic array is misplaced, the burden shifts to the State, and "the State should bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that any in-court identification . . . is derived from an independent source." State v. Peterkin, 226 N.J.Super. 25, 45 , 543 A. 2d 466 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 295 , 554 A. 2d 850 (1988).