15 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1919–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Edwards v. Lowrygreen1 sentence2022The trial court told wife’s counsel he could make a fuller proffer “at the end of the hearing,” and although counsel agreed, he never did so. 3 A party seeking to modify his spousal support obligation must show his inability “to pay is not due to his own voluntary act or . . . neglect.” Edwards v. Lowry, 232 Va. 110, 112-13 (1986); Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 31-32 (1975). -4- At the end of the hearing, the second trial court found husband’s termination, coupled with the end of his severance pay, to be a material change in circumstances and granted husband’s motion to modify spousal suppor | 1 | 1 |
Hammers v. Hammersgreen1 sentence2022The trial court told wife’s counsel he could make a fuller proffer “at the end of the hearing,” and although counsel agreed, he never did so. 3 A party seeking to modify his spousal support obligation must show his inability “to pay is not due to his own voluntary act or . . . neglect.” Edwards v. Lowry, 232 Va. 110, 112-13 (1986); Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 31-32 (1975). -4- At the end of the hearing, the second trial court found husband’s termination, coupled with the end of his severance pay, to be a material change in circumstances and granted husband’s motion to modify spousal suppor | 1 | 1 |
McBride v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2021At the end of the hearing, when the court stated in response to husband’s counsel’s question that it considered the factors included in Code § 20-109 and offered to elaborate, counsel explicitly declined the court’s offer. “[A]n appellate court will not ‘notice error which has been invited by the party seeking to take advantage thereof on appeal.’” McBride v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 526, 529 (2004) (quoting Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 400 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
Saunders v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2021At the end of the hearing, when the court stated in response to husband’s counsel’s question that it considered the factors included in Code § 20-109 and offered to elaborate, counsel explicitly declined the court’s offer. “[A]n appellate court will not ‘notice error which has been invited by the party seeking to take advantage thereof on appeal.’” McBride v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 526, 529 (2004) (quoting Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 400 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
Srinivasan v. Srinivasangreen1 sentence2019See Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. at 733 (“[W]here one party contributes substantially more to a marriage financially, the court may in its discretion, in weighing and balancing all of the factors in Code § 20-107.3, give appropriate weight to that factor and make a greater award to the party contributing the most financially.”). | 1 | 1 |
Rhode Island v. Innisgreen1 sentence2012It must also be established that a suspect’s incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 8 Id. at 303 (emphasis added); see also Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987) (recognizing “subtle compulsion” standard of Innis). | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Maurogreen1 sentence2012It must also be established that a suspect’s incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 8 Id. at 303 (emphasis added); see also Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987) (recognizing “subtle compulsion” standard of Innis). | 1 | 1 |
Giles v. Californiagreen2 sentences2009If this were the end of our analysis, we would remand this case back to the trial court for it to determine on retrial whether an intent on the part of Crawford “to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution” can be reasonably inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. 12 Id. at -, 128 S.Ct. at 2698 , 171 L.Ed.2d at 506 . 2009If this were the end of our analysis, we would remand this case back to the trial court for it to determine on retrial whether an intent on the part of Crawford “to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution” can be reasonably inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. 12 Id. at -, 128 S.Ct. at 2698 , 171 L.Ed.2d at 506 . | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2009See Harris, 258 Va. at 584 . | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2009See id. (quoting Giles , ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2693 , 171 L.Ed.2d at 506 ). | 1 | 1 |
Bowers v. Bowersgreen2 sentences2006At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated, “I’m not even sure how much you’re behind and neither are you.” “When the party with the burden of proof on an issue fails for lack of proof, he cannot prevail on that question.” Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 618 , 359 S.E.2d 546, 551 (1987). 2006At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated, “I’m not even sure how much you’re behind and neither are you.” “When the party with the burden of proof on an issue fails for lack of proof, he cannot prevail on that question.” Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 618 , 359 S.E.2d 546, 551 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Marie Holt Hart v. James P. Hart, IIIgreen2 sentences2004Recognizing the possibility that Scott I gave him “all those options . . . all three options,” the chancellor agreed to consider Mr. Scott’s additional evidence and argument.2 At the end of the hearing, however, the court ruled: “Having heard all the evidence and all the argument, I still remain where I was before.” The court declared the condo wholly marital and ordered that it be divided equally. 2 We acknowledge that the panel citations to Code § 20-107.3(A), dealing with all three property classifications (marital, hybrid, and separate), as well as Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 65-66 , 497 2004Recognizing the possibility that Scott I gave him “all those options . . . all three options,” the chancellor agreed to consider Mr. Scott’s additional evidence and argument.2 At the end of the hearing, however, the court ruled: “Having heard all the evidence and all the argument, I still remain where I was before.” The court declared the condo wholly marital and ordered that it be divided equally. 2 We acknowledge that the panel citations to Code § 20-107.3(A), dealing with all three property classifications (marital, hybrid, and separate), as well as Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 65-66 , 497 | 1 | 1 |
Sara Rahbaran v. Kamran Rahbarangreen2 sentences2004Recognizing the possibility that Scott I gave him “all those options . . . all three options,” the chancellor agreed to consider Mr. Scott’s additional evidence and argument.2 At the end of the hearing, however, the court ruled: “Having heard all the evidence and all the argument, I still remain where I was before.” The court declared the condo wholly marital and ordered that it be divided equally. 2 We acknowledge that the panel citations to Code § 20-107.3(A), dealing with all three property classifications (marital, hybrid, and separate), as well as Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 65-66 , 497 2004Recognizing the possibility that Scott I gave him “all those options . . . all three options,” the chancellor agreed to consider Mr. Scott’s additional evidence and argument.2 At the end of the hearing, however, the court ruled: “Having heard all the evidence and all the argument, I still remain where I was before.” The court declared the condo wholly marital and ordered that it be divided equally. 2 We acknowledge that the panel citations to Code § 20-107.3(A), dealing with all three property classifications (marital, hybrid, and separate), as well as Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 65-66 , 497 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Necaise v. Com.
green
2 sentences2023The circuit court explained that, in this case, the indictment itself showed that the original accessory after the fact of homicide charge and the amended obstruction of justice charge “share[d] many similarities.” Relying on Necaise v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 666 (2011), the circuit court reasoned that “[a]mending an indictment from accessory to a charge of the same ‘nature or character’ — obstruction of justice — does not render [Williams] an ‘innocent citizen’ ‘falsely accused.’” The circuit court concluded that “[o]bstruction of justice and accessory after the fact are not completely differe 2023The circuit court explained that, in this case, the indictment itself showed that the original accessory after the fact of homicide charge and the amended obstruction of justice charge “share[d] many similarities.” Relying on Necaise v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 666 (2011), the circuit court reasoned that “[a]mending an indictment from accessory to a charge of the same ‘nature or character’ — obstruction of justice — does not render [Williams] an ‘innocent citizen’ ‘falsely accused.’” The circuit court concluded that “[o]bstruction of justice and accessory after the fact are not completely differe | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2014Because Strickland prescribes that “the appropriate vehicle for claims that the defendant’s right to testify was violated by defense counsel is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” Teague, 953 F.2d at 1534 , it is appropriate to determine, as directed by Strickland , whether “it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice....” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2014The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process . . . must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. . . . “[This] demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 418 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Donald Teague
green
1 sentence2014Because Strickland prescribes that “the appropriate vehicle for claims that the defendant’s right to testify was violated by defense counsel is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” Teague, 953 F.2d at 1534 , it is appropriate to determine, as directed by Strickland , whether “it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice....” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Cortez
green
1 sentence2014The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process . . . must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. . . . “[This] demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 418 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2009In its ruling on Crawford's motion to suppress, the trial court found that the statements contained in the affidavit "do fall within the scope of Crawford. " The trial court reached this conclusion because, in Crawford, the Supreme Court specifically included affidavits in its non-exhaustive list of the types of testimonial statements. 541 U.S. at 51 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . 2009In its ruling on Crawford's motion to suppress, the trial court found that the statements contained in the affidavit "do fall within the scope of Crawford. " The trial court reached this conclusion because, in Crawford, the Supreme Court specifically included affidavits in its non-exhaustive list of the types of testimonial statements. 541 U.S. at 51 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Jones v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2002At that time, and without specifically ruling on the objection, the trial court denied Bryant’s motion to suppress, holding: So just like in Jones [v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 725 , 432 S.E.2d 517 (1993) ], the key issue here is whether apparent authority existed and as I have already indicated, based upon the testimony of the police officer, [Klepsattel] had the apparent authority to give consent to search the premises since he had identified himself as being the person to whom the room was registered. 2002At that time, and without specifically ruling on the objection, the trial court denied Bryant’s motion to suppress, holding: So just like in Jones [v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 725 , 432 S.E.2d 517 (1993) ], the key issue here is whether apparent authority existed and as I have already indicated, based upon the testimony of the police officer, [Klepsattel] had the apparent authority to give consent to search the premises since he had identified himself as being the person to whom the room was registered. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
green
2 sentences1938However, under either rule, in the end the test is “What was the intent of the law-makers?” In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 , 56 S. Ct. 855, 873 , 80 L. 1938However, under either rule, in the end the test is “What was the intent of the law-makers?” In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 , 56 S. Ct. 855, 873 , 80 L. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Whealton & Wisherd v. Doughty
neutral
2 sentences1919If it does not ebb bare, there is an end of the claim of your petitioner, so far as title by virtue of the statute is concerned.” It will be observed, however, in reading the former opinions in this case,- that the riparian rights of Mrs. Doughty, the defendant in error, were not passed upon nor intended to be passed upon, for in the report of the case in 112 Va. at page 657 , 72 S. E. 115 , it is said: “As we have seen, the marsh land in controversy in this case is "not within the descriptive boundaries of defendant in error’s title papers offered in evidence, and, therefore, if she has title 1919If it does not ebb bare, there is an end of the claim of your petitioner, so far as title by virtue of the statute is concerned.” It will be observed, however, in reading the former opinions in this case,- that the riparian rights of Mrs. Doughty, the defendant in error, were not passed upon nor intended to be passed upon, for in the report of the case in 112 Va. at page 657 , 72 S. E. 115 , it is said: “As we have seen, the marsh land in controversy in this case is "not within the descriptive boundaries of defendant in error’s title papers offered in evidence, and, therefore, if she has title | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.