fact-specific inquiry in North Carolina

2021Only the third of these elements—intent to sell or deliver the controlled substance methamphetamine—is at issue in this appeal. ¶ 15 We agree with the Court of Appeals that “in ruling upon the sufficiency of evidence in cases involving the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver, . . . our case law demonstrates that this is a fact-specific inquiry in which the totality of the circumstances in each case must be considered unless the quantity of drugs found is so substantial that this factor—by itself—supports an inference of possession with intent to sell or deliver.” State v. Coley

2021Only the third of these elements—intent to sell or deliver the controlled substance methamphetamine—is at issue in this appeal. ¶ 15 We agree with the Court of Appeals that “in ruling upon the sufficiency of evidence in cases involving the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver, . . . our case law demonstrates that this is a fact-specific inquiry in which the totality of the circumstances in each case must be considered unless the quantity of drugs found is so substantial that this factor—by itself—supports an inference of possession with intent to sell or deliver.” State v. Coley

2019See Dogwood , 362 N.C. at 199 -200 , 657 S.E.2d at 366 (explaining that the Court's "exercise of remedial discretion under Rules 25 and 34 entails a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances of each case").

2019See Dogwood , 362 N.C. at 199 -200 , 657 S.E.2d at 366 (explaining that the Court's "exercise of remedial discretion under Rules 25 and 34 entails a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances of each case").

2005While the determination of neglect is a fact specific inquiry, "not every act of negligence" or commission of a crime by a parent constitutes "neglect" under the law and results in a "neglected juvenile." In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283 , 582 S.E.2d 255, 258 (2003) (an anonymous call reporting an unsupervised, naked, two-year-old in her driveway, standing alone, does not constitute neglect).

2005While the determination of neglect is a fact specific inquiry, "not every act of negligence" or commission of a crime by a parent constitutes "neglect" under the law and results in a "neglected juvenile." In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283 , 582 S.E.2d 255, 258 (2003) (an anonymous call reporting an unsupervised, naked, two-year-old in her driveway, standing alone, does not constitute neglect).

2025Ragland v. Moore, 299 N.C. 360, 363 , 261 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1980).

2025Ragland v. Moore, 299 N.C. 360, 363 , 261 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1980).

2025Although this determination is made on a case-by-case basis and is a fact-specific inquiry, this Court has outlined the following relevant considerations: “(1) pain and suffering; (2) loss of blood; (3) hospitalization; and (4) time lost from work.” State v. Morgan, 164 N.C.

2025App. 298, 303 , 595 S.E.2d 804, 809 (2004) (citation omitted).

2024Instead, “each . . . case[ ] will demand a fact-specific inquiry.” Id.

2024Furthermore, “[a]dultery is nearly always proved by circumstantial evidence” because such evidence “is often the only kind of evidence available.” Id. at 148 (cleaned up).

2024If a defendant lacks exclusive possession over the location where the contraband is found, the State “must show other incriminating circumstances before constructive possession may be inferred.” State v. Matias, 354 N.C. 549, 552 , 556 S.E.2d 269, 271 (2001) (citations omitted).

2024If a defendant lacks exclusive possession over the location where the contraband is found, the State “must show other incriminating circumstances before constructive possession may be inferred.” State v. Matias, 354 N.C. 549, 552 , 556 S.E.2d 269, 271 (2001) (citations omitted).

2017Inc., 748 F.3d at 174 (“[T]here is no fixed percentage market share that conclusively resolves whether monopoly power exists . . . .”); Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The trend of guidance from the Supreme Court and the practice of most courts endeavoring to follow that guidance has been to give only weight and not conclusiveness to market share evidence.”); see also Sitelink Software, LLC, 2016 NCBC LEXIS 45 , at *29−31 (stating that courts often apply certain presumptions for measuring market power, but a determination of market power

2017Inc., 748 F.3d at 174 (“[T]here is no fixed percentage market share that conclusively resolves whether monopoly power exists . . . .”); Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The trend of guidance from the Supreme Court and the practice of most courts endeavoring to follow that guidance has been to give only weight and not conclusiveness to market share evidence.”); see also Sitelink Software, LLC, 2016 NCBC LEXIS 45 , at *29−31 (stating that courts often apply certain presumptions for measuring market power, but a determination of market power

2012See Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1990).6 Given the derivative plaintiff’s fiduciary role as representative for the company, a ruling pursuant to “Rule 23.1 has been interpreted as requiring that a court consider any extrinsic factors which might indicate that a representative might disregard the interests of the other members of the class.” Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 564 A.2d 670, 673 (Del.

2012See Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1990).6 Given the derivative plaintiff’s fiduciary role as representative for the company, a ruling pursuant to “Rule 23.1 has been interpreted as requiring that a court consider any extrinsic factors which might indicate that a representative might disregard the interests of the other members of the class.” Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 564 A.2d 670, 673 (Del.

2012Compare Johnson v. Hampton Indus., 83 N.C.

2010See generally State v. Watson, 179 N.C.App. 228, 246 , 634 S.E.2d 231, 242 (2006) ("The unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is a lesser included offense of larceny where there is evidence to support the charge. " (emphasis added)), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 437 , 649 S.E.2d 896 (2007).

2010See generally State v. Watson, 179 N.C.App. 228, 246 , 634 S.E.2d 231, 242 (2006) ("The unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is a lesser included offense of larceny where there is evidence to support the charge. " (emphasis added)), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 437 , 649 S.E.2d 896 (2007).

2010See generally State v. Watson, 179 N.C.App. 228, 246 , 634 S.E.2d 231, 242 (2006) ("The unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is a lesser included offense of larceny where there is evidence to support the charge. " (emphasis added)), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 437 , 649 S.E.2d 896 (2007).

2010See generally State v. Watson, 179 N.C.App. 228, 246 , 634 S.E.2d 231, 242 (2006) ("The unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is a lesser included offense of larceny where there is evidence to support the charge. " (emphasis added)), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 437 , 649 S.E.2d 896 (2007).

2008See Hart, 361 N.C. at 317 , 644 S.E.2d at 206 (“[0]ur appellate courts must enforce the Rules of Appellate Procedure uniformly.”); Pruitt, 199 N.C. at 790, 156 S.E. at 127 (observing that it is “necessary to . . . enforce [the appellate rules] uniformly”).

2008See Hart, 361 N.C. at 317 , 644 S.E.2d at 206 (“[0]ur appellate courts must enforce the Rules of Appellate Procedure uniformly.”); Pruitt, 199 N.C. at 790, 156 S.E. at 127 (observing that it is “necessary to . . . enforce [the appellate rules] uniformly”).

2008See Hart, 361 N.C. at 317 , 644 S.E.2d at 206 (“[0]ur appellate courts must enforce the Rules of Appellate Procedure uniformly.”); Pruitt, 199 N.C. at 790, 156 S.E. at 127 (observing that it is “necessary to . . . enforce [the appellate rules] uniformly”).

2008See Hart, 361 N.C. at 317 , 644 S.E.2d at 206 (“[0]ur appellate courts must enforce the Rules of Appellate Procedure uniformly.”); Pruitt, 199 N.C. at 790, 156 S.E. at 127 (observing that it is “necessary to . . . enforce [the appellate rules] uniformly”).

2003Our careful review of New Jersey case law reveals that New Jersey courts do not regard a finding of emancipation as permanent and instead view it as a fact-specific inquiry dependent upon the “intricacies and various operative facts of each matter.” Monmouth County Div. of Social Servs. v. C.R., 316 N.J.

2003Super. 600, 616 , 720 A.2d 1004, 1012 (1998).