fact-specific inquiry in Tennessee

2020A driver who is stopped for a traffic violation “should expect ‘to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.’” State v. Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)). “[W]here a de minimis intrusion ends and an undue delay begins is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. (citation omitted).

2020A driver who is stopped for a traffic violation “should expect ‘to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.’” State v. Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)). “[W]here a de minimis intrusion ends and an undue delay begins is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. (citation omitted).

2020A driver who is stopped for a traffic violation “should expect ‘to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.’” State v. Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)). “[W]here a de minimis intrusion ends and an undue delay begins is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. (citation omitted).

2012A driver who is stopped for a traffic violation “should expect ‘to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.’” State v. Donaldson, ___S.W.3d___, 2012 WL 3667376, at *6 (Tenn. Aug. 24, 2012) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)). “[W]here a de minimis intrusion ends and an undue delay begins is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. (citation omitted).

2016See Alvarado, 430 F.3d at 1309 (opining that determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop made pursuant to Utah’s version of Section 123(1) “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present during the incident in question in order to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway”); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (“Determining whether reasonable suspicion exists in a particular traffic stop is a fact-intensive and objective analysis.”).

2016See Alvarado, 430 F.3d at 1309 (opining that determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop made pursuant to Utah‟s version of Section 123(1) “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present 13 We recognize that some lane excursions may be so egregious that they will support probable cause to stop the motorist. 17 during the incident in question in order to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway”); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (“Determining whether reasonable suspi

2016See Alvarado, 430 F.3d at 1309 (opining that determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop made pursuant to Utah’s version of Section 123(1) “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present during the incident in question in order to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway”); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (“Determining whether reasonable suspicion exists in a particular traffic stop is a fact-intensive and objective analysis.”).

2016See Alvarado, 430 F.3d at 1309 (opining that determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop made pursuant to Utah‟s version of Section 123(1) “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present 13 We recognize that some lane excursions may be so egregious that they will support probable cause to stop the motorist. 17 during the incident in question in order to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway”); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (“Determining whether reasonable suspi

2014See In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“The determinations of whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and where the best interests of the child lie are factual questions.”).

2014See In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“The determinations of whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and where the best interests of the child lie are factual questions.”).

2013Five years later, in State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 381 (Tenn.1996), this Court expanded the inquiry under double jeopardy principles to include a Blockburger analysis of the statutory elements, a comparison of the purpose of the respective statutes, and a fact-specific inquiry to determine the evidence available to prove each offense and whether there were multiple victims or discrete acts.

2008Five years later, in State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 381 (Tenn.1996), this Court expanded the inquiry under double jeopardy principles to include a Blockhurger analysis of the statutory elements, a comparison of the purpose of the respective statutes, and a fact-specific inquiry to determine the evidence available to prove each offense and whether there were multiple victims or discrete acts.

2024Our Supreme Court has stated that, “Whether work is a regular part of the business of any entity is a fact-specific inquiry, relative to the size and scope of the business.” Id. at 422 .

2013“Whether work is a regular part of the business of any entity is a fact-specific inquiry, relative to the size and scope of the business.” Lindsey, 275 S.W.3d at 422 .

2024Whether dissipation has occurred is a fact-specific analysis, but the most common factors to consider include: (1) whether the expenditure benefitted the marriage or was made for a purpose entirely unrelated to the marriage; (2) whether the expenditure or transaction occurred when the parties were experiencing marital difficulties or were contemplating divorce; (3) whether the expenditure was excessive or de minimis; and (4) whether the dissipating party intended to hide, deplete, or divert a marital asset. -8- Altman, 181 S.W.3d at 682 (footnote omitted) (citing Halkiades v. Halkiades, No. W2

2020Altman, 181 S.W.3d at 682 (citing Halkiades v. Halkiades, No. W2004-00226-COA-R3- CV, 2004 WL 3021092 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2004)).

2005Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 327 , 122 S. Ct. at 1481 ; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 , 121 S. Ct. at 2457 ; see also Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. at 234, 123 S. Ct. at 1418.12 Until very recently, another analysis was applied where the claim was based primarily on the government’s conduct rather than the impact of that conduct on the value of the property.

2005Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 327 , 122 S. Ct. at 1481 ; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 , 121 S. Ct. at 2457 ; see also Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. at 234, 123 S. Ct. at 1418.12 Until very recently, another analysis was applied where the claim was based primarily on the government’s conduct rather than the impact of that conduct on the value of the property.

2026As our Supreme Court stated in Scott, Tennessee courts have long interpreted the inevitable discovery doctrine as requiring more than a mere showing that evidence could have been obtained through independent and lawful means; rather, the proof of inevitable discovery must show, with a level of certainty, that the evidence would have been obtained based on “no[n]-speculative elements . . . focuse[d] on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” This fact specific inquiry requires this Court to examine if - 21 - the record provides sufficient proof that the evid

2021Doctor Engum cautioned, however, that “it would be improper, based upon the results of the present neuropsychological assessment, to conclude that [the defendant] was incapable of forming the specific intent to engage in certain actions or pursue certain goals or objectives.” -7- In State v. Hall, our supreme court held that, because “the general criminal law requires that mental state be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt,” “evidence which tends to prove or disprove the required mental state is relevant and generally admissible under Tennessee law.” State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 6

2020Furthermore, the Burns court observed that “[t]o the extent that the [d]efendant argues that the State was required to affirmatively prove that the [d]efendant was the author of the message, we agree with reasoning from other jurisdictions that such challenge goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.” Id. at *12 (citing Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 646 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Lindsey, 275 S.W.3d at 422 (“Whether work is a regular part of the business of any entity is a fact-specific inquiry, relative to the size and scope of the business.”); Randolph, 180 S.W.3d at 558 (considering the “entire picture” and viewing the shutdown “as one large project”); Shires v. King, No. 2:05-CV-84, 2007 WL 784350 , at *3 (E.D.

2013In Murray v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 46 S.W.3d 171, 173 (Tenn. 2001), Goodyear undertook an extensive project of cleaning and painting the overhead air ducts, located about twenty feet above the ground, at its tire plant.

2012See United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 493-94 (6th Cir.2010) (recognizing that “a fact-bound, context-dependent inquiry” must be conducted in each case to determine whether the duration of the stop was unreasonable).

2005Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 327 , 122 S. Ct. at 1481 ; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 , 121 S. Ct. at 2457 ; see also Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. at 234, 123 S. Ct. at 1418.12 Until very recently, another analysis was applied where the claim was based primarily on the government’s conduct rather than the impact of that conduct on the value of the property.

2003State v. Winn, 974 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tenn. Crim.