fact-specific analysis in West Virginia

2023As noted above, based on the facts put forth by Cornerstone, that evaluation does not lead back to “patient care.” In that sense, reliance on the circuit court’s findings, which are little more than broad generalizations about non- routine events, is much more problematic than the fact-specific inquiry that analysis of an asserted privilege should be.20 It creates a rule that non-routine events that occur “in the facility” are subject an assertion of the peer review privilege because that “facility” is a hospital and patient care is going on somewhere. “[d]ocuments that may be provided to a pe

2014Moreover, in Geary v. Telular Corp., 341 Ill.App.3d 694 , 275 Ill.Dec. 648 , 793 N.E.2d 128 (2003), the employer altered the employee’s commission plan after the employee acquired “agreements to purchase” from clients.

2014Moreover, in Geary v. Telular Corp., 341 Ill.App.3d 694 , 275 Ill.Dec. 648 , 793 N.E.2d 128 (2003), the employer altered the employee’s commission plan after the employee acquired “agreements to purchase” from clients.

2004This Court recognized the necessity of a case-by-case approach in Syllabus Point 5 of Greenfield, supra, where we held that "[a] determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), requires a fact specific analysis." Finally, in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 , 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), the United States Supreme Court explained: [A] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under fed

2004This Court recognized the necessity of a case-by-case approach in Syllabus Point 5 of Greenfield, supra, where we held that "[a] determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), requires a fact specific analysis." Finally, in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 , 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), the United States Supreme Court explained: [A] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under fed

2004This Court recognized the necessity of a case-by-case approach in Syllabus Point 5 of Greenfield, supra, where we held that "[a] determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), requires a fact specific analysis." Finally, in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 , 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), the United States Supreme Court explained: [A] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under fed

2004This Court recognized the necessity of a case-by-case approach in Syllabus Point 5 of Greenfield, supra, where we held that "[a] determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), requires a fact specific analysis." Finally, in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 , 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), the United States Supreme Court explained: [A] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under fed

1999In this Court's recent examination of these issues in Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co., 199 W.Va. 447 , 485 S.E.2d 391 (1997), we stated as follows at syllabus point four: "An application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." Based upon extensive evaluation of federal preemption law, we also explained at syllabus point five of Greenfield : "A determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1

1999In this Court's recent examination of these issues in Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co., 199 W.Va. 447 , 485 S.E.2d 391 (1997), we stated as follows at syllabus point four: "An application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." Based upon extensive evaluation of federal preemption law, we also explained at syllabus point five of Greenfield : "A determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1

1999In this Court's recent examination of these issues in Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co., 199 W.Va. 447 , 485 S.E.2d 391 (1997), we stated as follows at syllabus point four: "An application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." Based upon extensive evaluation of federal preemption law, we also explained at syllabus point five of Greenfield : "A determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1

1999In this Court's recent examination of these issues in Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co., 199 W.Va. 447 , 485 S.E.2d 391 (1997), we stated as follows at syllabus point four: "An application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." Based upon extensive evaluation of federal preemption law, we also explained at syllabus point five of Greenfield : "A determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1

1999In this Court's recent examination of these issues in Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co., 199 W.Va. 447 , 485 S.E.2d 391 (1997), we stated as follows at syllabus point four: "An application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." Based upon extensive evaluation of federal preemption law, we also explained at syllabus point five of Greenfield : "A determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1

1999In this Court's recent examination of these issues in Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co., 199 W.Va. 447 , 485 S.E.2d 391 (1997), we stated as follows at syllabus point four: "An application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." Based upon extensive evaluation of federal preemption law, we also explained at syllabus point five of Greenfield : "A determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1

1991Thus, the Court believes that the general test set forth in Mingo County Equal Opportunity Council v. State Human Rights Commission, supra , rather than the more fact specific test in the Shepherdstown case, should control this case. [*] The majority speaks of Mr. Moore's work in the Navy at Kingsville, Texas, where "his job [was] to see that some 125 houses and apartments were occupied and maintained," and of his job at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for the Public Works Department, "which managed some 900 units of family housing." ___ W.Va. at ___, 406 S.E.2d at 437 .

1984In Conley, we recognized that in Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 112 , 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979), we had attempted to set a more fact specific test as to when from a substantive standpoint prohibition would lie.

1984In Conley, we recognized that in Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 112 , 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979), we had attempted to set a more fact specific test as to when from a substantive standpoint prohibition would lie.