fact-specific analysis in New Jersey

2021Nevertheless, the Munroe Court explained that "[l]iberality in exercising discretion does not mean an abdication of all discretion, and, accordingly, any plea-withdrawal motion requires a fact-specific analysis." Id. at 441-42 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2021Nevertheless, the Munroe Court explained that "[l]iberality in exercising discretion does not mean an abdication of all discretion, and, accordingly, any A-2890-19 11 plea-withdrawal motion requires a fact-specific analysis." Id. at 441-42 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2012However, “[ljiberality in exercising discretion does not mean an abdication of all discretion,” id. at 157, 966 A.2d 461 (quoting State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 416 , 571 A.2d 1305 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and, accordingly, any plea-withdrawal motion requires a fact-specific analysis, id. at 155, 966 A.2d 461 .

2012However, “[ljiberality in exercising discretion does not mean an abdication of all discretion,” id. at 157, 966 A.2d 461 (quoting State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 416 , 571 A.2d 1305 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and, accordingly, any plea-withdrawal motion requires a fact-specific analysis, id. at 155, 966 A.2d 461 .

2001See, e.g., People v. Horton, 143 Ill.2d 11 , 155 Ill.Dec. 807 , 570 N.E.2d 320 (1991); In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173 (R.I.1984).

2001See, e.g., People v. Horton, 143 Ill.2d 11 , 155 Ill.Dec. 807 , 570 N.E.2d 320 (1991); In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173 (R.I.1984).

2020In Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 157 N.J. 504, 516 (1999), our Supreme Court recognized that a breach of loyalty claim generally requires a fact-specific analysis, explaining "[t]he scope of the duty of loyalty that an employee owes to an employer may vary with the nature of their relationship.

2019In Cameco, 157 N.J. at 516 , the Supreme Court recognized that a breach of loyalty claim generally requires a fact-specific analysis, explaining "[t]he scope of the duty of loyalty that an employee owes to an employer may vary with the nature of their relationship.

2026See Hardwicke, 188 N.J. at 100-02 ; Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 620 .

2015See id. at 620, 622-24 , 626 A.2d 445 .

2026It noted that “if an employer delegates the authority to control the work environment to a supervisor and that supervisor abuses that delegated authority, then vicarious liability under § 219(2)(d) will follow.” Ibid. 4 The Court prescribed factors in Lehmann to guide “[t]he determination of whether a supervisor who creates a hostile work environment was aided in accomplishing that tort by the power delegated to him or her to control the day-to-day working environment,” explaining that the factfinder must conduct a fact-specific analysis to decide (1) whether the employer delegated the authori

2026It noted that “if an employer delegates the authority to control the work environment to a supervisor and that supervisor abuses that delegated authority, then vicarious liability under § 219(2)(d) will follow.” Ibid. 4 The Court prescribed factors in Lehmann to guide “[t]he determination of whether a supervisor who creates a hostile work environment was aided in accomplishing that tort by the power delegated to him or her to control the day-to-day working environment,” explaining that the factfinder must conduct a fact-specific analysis to decide (1) whether the employer delegated the authori

2026Ibid.

2026See Hardwicke, 188 N.J. at 100-02 ; Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 620 .

2026It noted that “if an employer delegates the authority to control the work environment to a supervisor and that supervisor abuses that delegated authority, then vicarious liability under § 219(2)(d) will follow.” Ibid. 4 The Court prescribed factors in Lehmann to guide “[t]he determination of whether a supervisor who creates a hostile work environment was aided in accomplishing that tort by the power delegated to him or her to control the day-to-day working environment,” explaining that the factfinder must conduct a fact-specific analysis to decide (1) whether the employer delegated the authori

2024See S.T. v.1515 Broad St., LLC, 241 N.J. 257 , 278 (2020) (noting the role of a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to Rule 4:26-2(b) "is to act as an independent investigator and inform the court on the subject of the client's mental capacity"); In re Guardianship of Macak, 377 N.J.

2022Dep't of Corr., 189 N.J. 413, 417 (2007) (acknowledging that New Jersey Department of Corrections bears "a non[-]delegable duty to assure adequate medical care to inmates," which includes, inter alia, "maintaining and making available to inmates complete and accurate medical records[.]"); In re Stransky, 130 N.J. 38, 44 (1992) (finding an "attorney's fiduciary responsibility for client trust funds [to be] a non-delegable duty.") Here, our inquiry centers on whether patient confidentiality qualifies as a matter of "extraordinary importance to the public." See Leontarakis, 387 N.J.

2022Dep't of Corr., 189 N.J. 413, 417 (2007) (acknowledging that New Jersey Department of Corrections bears "a non[-]delegable duty to assure adequate medical care to inmates," which includes, inter alia, "maintaining and making available to inmates complete and accurate medical records[.]"); In re Stransky, 130 N.J. 38, 44 (1992) (finding an "attorney's fiduciary responsibility for client trust funds [to be] a non-delegable duty.") Here, our inquiry centers on whether patient confidentiality qualifies as a matter of "extraordinary importance to the public." See Leontarakis, 387 N.J.

2022The test for a non-delegable duty is a fact-specific inquiry and turns on considerations such as "the relationship among the relevant parties, . . . the nature of the risk, warranted by the opportunity and ability to exercise care, [and A-3713-19 8 whether the duty is] grounded in the public policy of [New Jersey]." Davis v. Devereux Found., 209 N.J. 269, 278 (2012); see, e.g., J.D.A. v. N.J.

2022Whether a statement is testimonial under the primary purpose test is "a fact-specific analysis . . . based on the circumstances presented." State v. Bass, 224 N.J. 285 , 317 n.9 (2016). "[A]dmission of an out-of-court testimonial statement violates the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine that witness." State v. Wilson, 442 N.J.

2022Paladino v. Auletto Enters., Inc., 459 N.J.

2021Rather, the court must engage in a fact-specific inquiry, id. at 335 , including consideration of the length of the deprivation.

2021Id. at 342 (rejecting per se rule that moratorium on development lasting more than one year constituted a taking).

2021Thus, "[o]n appellate review, the issue is whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion at the time it denied the withdrawal motion," and an abuse of discretion only arises "when 'there has been a clear error of judgment.'" Id. at 443, 448 (quoting State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 313 (1988)).

2020Although "the hearsay statement need not be contemporaneous with the startling event," there must be a showing that "the interval was brief and the excited state of the declarant continued." Ibid. (quoting State v. Clark, 347 N.J.