35 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. SMILEgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, ¶ 27 . 2014See, e.g., Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, ¶ 27 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Olivasgreen2 sentences2021Rather, we consider how “a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {20} In the event that there is no formal arrest prior to questioning, “our appellate courts engage in a fact-specific analysis of the totality of the circumstances under which the questioning took place in order to decide whether the custody requirement is met.” State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 10 , 149 N.M. 498 , 252 P.3d 722 . 2021Rather, we consider how “a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {20} In the event that there is no formal arrest prior to questioning, “our appellate courts engage in a fact-specific analysis of the totality of the circumstances under which the questioning took place in order to decide whether the custody requirement is met.” State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 10 , 149 N.M. 498 , 252 P.3d 722 . | 2 | 6 |
State v. Arredondogreen2 sentences2007See § 30-7-2.1(A)(5); Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶28 (eschewing bright-line rules and requiring a fact-specific inquiry into the reasonableness of a search under Article II, Section 10). {34} We hold that the State failed to justify the warrantless search and seizure related to the weapons, and that suppression of the weapons, therefore, is affirmed. 2007See § 30-7-2.1(A)(5); Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 28 (eschewing bright-line rules and requiring a fact-specific inquiry into the reasonableness of a search under Article II, Section 10). {34} We hold that the State failed to justify the warrantless search and seizure related to the weapons, and that suppression of the weapons, therefore, is affirmed. | 2 | 3 |
Trinity Episcopal Church v. State Board of Tax Commissionersgreen2 sentences2014The Appropriate Inquiry Is Whether the Property’s Use Furthered the Exempt Purpose {21} Instead of adding a new fact-specific exception to the rule, we distill the various rules and exceptions governing exemptions to one overarching principle: “[T]he proper focus of any inquiry into the propriety of an exemption is whether the use of the property furthers exempt purposes.” Trinity Episcopal Church v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998) (representing the source of authority for this proposition on which multiple Indiana cases have since relied); see also Congregati 2014The Appropriate Inquiry Is Whether the Property’s Use Furthered the Exempt Purpose {21} Instead of adding a new fact-specific exception to the rule, we distill the various rules and exceptions governing exemptions to one overarching principle: “[T]he proper focus of any inquiry into the propriety of an exemption is whether the use of the property furthers exempt purposes.” Trinity Episcopal Church v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998) (representing the source of authority for this proposition on which multiple Indiana cases have since relied); see also Congregati | 2 | 2 |
Congregation Machne Chaim, Inc. v. Kwakgreen2 sentences2014The Appropriate Inquiry Is Whether the Property’s Use Furthered the Exempt Purpose {21} Instead of adding a new fact-specific exception to the rule, we distill the various rules and exceptions governing exemptions to one overarching principle: “[T]he proper focus of any inquiry into the propriety of an exemption is whether the use of the property furthers exempt purposes.” Trinity Episcopal Church v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998) (representing the source of authority for this proposition on which multiple Indiana cases have since relied); see also Congregati 2014The Appropriate Inquiry Is Whether the Property’s Use Furthered the Exempt Purpose {21} Instead of adding a new fact-specific exception to the rule, we distill the various rules and exceptions governing exemptions to one overarching principle: “[T]he proper focus of any inquiry into the propriety of an exemption is whether the use of the property furthers exempt purposes.” Trinity Episcopal Church v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998) (representing the source of authority for this proposition on which multiple Indiana cases have since relied); see also Congregati | 2 | 2 |
State v. Munozgreen2 sentences2021The following factors guide our inquiry: “the purpose, place, and length of interrogation[,] . . . the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the duration of the detention, and the degree of pressure applied to the defendant.” State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 40 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 P.2d 847 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {21} Defendant drove to the sheriff’s department on his own accord for the purpose of discussing the burglary of his trailer with Detective Babadi. 2021The following factors guide our inquiry: “the purpose, place, and length of interrogation[,] . . . the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the duration of the detention, and the degree of pressure applied to the defendant.” State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 40 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 P.2d 847 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {21} Defendant drove to the sheriff’s department on his own accord for the purpose of discussing the burglary of his trailer with Detective Babadi. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Fernandezgreen2 sentences2015See State v. LaPietra, 2010-NMCA-009, ¶ 10 , 147 N.M. 569 , 226 P.3d 668 8 (holding that it is beyond a district court’s Foulenfont authority to dismiss charges 9 when an element of the offense involves a fact-specific inquiry that is within the 10 unique purview of the jury); see also State v. Fernandez, 2007-NMCA-091, ¶ 7 , 142 11 N.M. 231 , 164 P.3d 112 (concluding that it is well-settled law that a jury determines 12 whether an object is used as a “deadly weapon” because it is a fact-specific inquiry 13 and requires a case-by-case determination). 2015See State v. LaPietra, 2010-NMCA-009, ¶ 10 , 147 N.M. 569 , 226 P.3d 668 8 (holding that it is beyond a district court’s Foulenfont authority to dismiss charges 9 when an element of the offense involves a fact-specific inquiry that is within the 10 unique purview of the jury); see also State v. Fernandez, 2007-NMCA-091, ¶ 7 , 142 11 N.M. 231 , 164 P.3d 112 (concluding that it is well-settled law that a jury determines 12 whether an object is used as a “deadly weapon” because it is a fact-specific inquiry 13 and requires a case-by-case determination). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Swisegreen2 sentences2012State v. Swise, 100 N.M. 256, 258 , 669 P.2d 11 732, 734 (1983). 12 In a case such as this, where no formal arrest occurred prior to questioning by 13 law enforcement, we “engage in a fact-specific analysis of the totality of the 14 circumstances under which the questioning took place in order to decide whether the 15 custody requirement is met.” Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 10 . 2009State v. Swise, 100 N.M. 256, 258 , 669 P.2d 732, 734 (1983). {27} Determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda requires a fact-specific analysis of the circumstances in which the questioning took place. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hermosillogreen1 sentence2025See State v. Hermosillo, 2014-NMCA-102, ¶ 11 , 336 P.3d 446 (“If no formal arrest occurred prior to questioning, our appellate courts engage in a fact-specific analysis of the totality of the circumstances under which the questioning took place in order to decide whether the custody requirement is met.”). {6} Before the investigating officer arrived, civilian bystanders1 prevented Defendant from fleeing the scene of the accident. | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2025See Coleman v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 49 , 59 16 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton Ex Rel. Suttongreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton, 1973-NMSC-111 , ¶ 9, 85 N.M. 679 , 515 P.2d 1283 (“The apparent authority of an agent is to be determined by the acts of the principal . . . from statements, conduct, lack of ordinary care, or other manifestation of the principal’s consent, whereby third persons are justified in believing that the agent is acting within his authority” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 2021See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton, 1973-NMSC-111 , ¶ 9, 85 N.M. 679 , 515 P.2d 1283 (“The apparent authority of an agent is to be determined by the acts of the principal . . . from statements, conduct, lack of ordinary care, or other manifestation of the principal’s consent, whereby third persons are justified in believing that the agent is acting within his authority” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Trujillogreen1 sentence2019See Trujillo, 2012-NMCA-112, ¶ 42 (noting that a “more complicated factual scenario” presents a fact-specific inquiry for the jury as to whether a restraint is incidental to another crime). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Le Miergreen1 sentence2018See Le Mier, 10 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 25 (“When a court orders a party to provide discovery within a 11 given time frame, failure to comply with that order causes prejudice both to the 12 opposing party and to the court.”); see also Lewis, 2018-NMCA-019 , ¶ 14 (noting 13 that, under Le Mier, every discovery violation results in some level of prejudice). 14 Additionally, the discovery violation in this case was not discovered until the middle 15 of trial. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ozbirngreen1 sentence2017Instead, 17 the Tenth Circuit reiterated its holding in United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 , 1978 18 (10th Cir. 1996), that the statute’s “ ‘as nearly as practicable’ ” qualification 19 “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present during the 20 incident in question to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to 21 maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway.” Alvarado, 430 22 F.3d at 1309; see United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003) 10 1 (stating that “the particular facts and circumstances of | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cline, Timothygreen1 sentence2017Instead, 17 the Tenth Circuit reiterated its holding in United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 , 1978 18 (10th Cir. 1996), that the statute’s “ ‘as nearly as practicable’ ” qualification 19 “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present during the 20 incident in question to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to 21 maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway.” Alvarado, 430 22 F.3d at 1309; see United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003) 10 1 (stating that “the particular facts and circumstances of | 1 | 1 |
State v. LaPIETRAgreen2 sentences2015See State v. LaPietra, 2010-NMCA-009, ¶ 10 , 147 N.M. 569 , 226 P.3d 668 8 (holding that it is beyond a district court’s Foulenfont authority to dismiss charges 9 when an element of the offense involves a fact-specific inquiry that is within the 10 unique purview of the jury); see also State v. Fernandez, 2007-NMCA-091, ¶ 7 , 142 11 N.M. 231 , 164 P.3d 112 (concluding that it is well-settled law that a jury determines 12 whether an object is used as a “deadly weapon” because it is a fact-specific inquiry 13 and requires a case-by-case determination). 2015See State v. LaPietra, 2010-NMCA-009, ¶ 10 , 147 N.M. 569 , 226 P.3d 668 8 (holding that it is beyond a district court’s Foulenfont authority to dismiss charges 9 when an element of the offense involves a fact-specific inquiry that is within the 10 unique purview of the jury); see also State v. Fernandez, 2007-NMCA-091, ¶ 7 , 142 11 N.M. 231 , 164 P.3d 112 (concluding that it is well-settled law that a jury determines 12 whether an object is used as a “deadly weapon” because it is a fact-specific inquiry 13 and requires a case-by-case determination). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Figueroagreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., State v. Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, ¶ 27 , 146 N.M. 525 , 212 P.3d 413 , cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-006 , 148 N.M. 584 , 241 P.3d 182 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. SMILEgreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., State v. Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, ¶ 27 , 146 N.M. 525 , 212 P.3d 413 , cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-006 , 148 N.M. 584 , 241 P.3d 182 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Montoyagreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., State v. Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, ¶ 27 , 146 N.M. 525 , 212 P.3d 413 , cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-006 , 148 N.M. 584 , 241 P.3d 182 . | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Romerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Maresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hugheygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Parksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ohio v. Robinettegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Silva v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Duran
green
2 sentences2025“This is a fact-specific inquiry that does not lend itself to bright-line rules.” State v. Duran, 2005- NMSC-034, ¶ 23, 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 3 . 2025“This is a fact-specific inquiry that does not lend itself to bright-line rules.” State v. Duran, 2005- NMSC-034, ¶ 23, 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 3 . | 4 | 2010–2025 |
State v. Leyva
green
1 sentence2025“This is a fact-specific inquiry that does not lend itself to bright-line rules.” State v. Duran, 2005- NMSC-034, ¶ 23, 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 3 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State Ex Rel. State Highway Department v. Kistler-Collister Co.
green
2 sentences2021State Highway Dep’t v. Kistler-Collister Co., 1975-NMSC-039, ¶ 21 , 88 N.M. 221 , 539 P.2d 611 , for expenses or loss of business occasioned by the government’s road construction, a test that includes consideration of whether the government was “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” They argue this test is suitable since both the 19Miller recognized that when a state is “under the necessity of making a choice” between injuries, [i]t would have been none the less a choice if . . . the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury . . . to go on unchecked. 2021State Highway Dep’t v. Kistler-Collister Co., 1975-NMSC-039, ¶ 21 , 88 N.M. 221 , 539 P.2d 611 , for expenses or loss of business occasioned by the government’s road construction, a test that includes consideration of whether the government was “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” They argue this test is suitable since both the 19Miller recognized that when a state is “under the necessity of making a choice” between injuries, [i]t would have been none the less a choice if . . . the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury . . . to go on unchecked. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Trevizo v. Adams
green
1 sentence2021Trevizo, 455 F.3d at 1162 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2021Rather, we consider how “a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {20} In the event that there is no formal arrest prior to questioning, “our appellate courts engage in a fact-specific analysis of the totality of the circumstances under which the questioning took place in order to decide whether the custody requirement is met.” State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 10 , 149 N.M. 498 , 252 P.3d 722 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Paul Charleston Gregory
green
1 sentence2017Instead, 17 the Tenth Circuit reiterated its holding in United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 , 1978 18 (10th Cir. 1996), that the statute’s “ ‘as nearly as practicable’ ” qualification 19 “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present during the 20 incident in question to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to 21 maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway.” Alvarado, 430 22 F.3d at 1309; see United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003) 10 1 (stating that “the particular facts and circumstances of | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ettenson v. Burke
green
1 sentence2017This determination requires 15 that district courts undertake a fact-specific inquiry that examines “the motivating 16 forces” behind the inducement of the breach—specifically whether the breach 17 “serve[d the defendant’s] private interest with no benefit to the corporation.” Id. ¶ 18 18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 37 1 {64} Only an officer or director of Wallen could have directed Montoya’s actions 2 or made decisions about delaying payments to vendors and closing the company as 3 described in the district court’s findings of fact. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2012Our Supreme Court has 16 identified factors to guide our inquiry, including “the purpose, place, and length of 17 interrogation, the extent to which the defendant [was] confronted with evidence of 18 guilt, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the duration of the detention, and 27 1 the degree of pressure applied to the defendant.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation 2 marks, and citation omitted); Wilson, 2011-NMSC-001, ¶ 48 . 3 Defendant asserts that he was in custody at the time he was asked who the red 4 backpack belonged to and during the subsequent search of the backpack. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Funderburg
green
2 sentences2012Determining whether reasonable suspicion exists “is a fact-specific inquiry that does not lend itself to bright-line rules.” Id. “[RJeasonable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical conception]], which requires that officers articulate a reason, beyond a mere hunch, for their belief that an individual has committed a criminal act.” State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 15 , 144 N.M. 37 , 183 P.3d 922 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2012Determining whether reasonable suspicion exists “is a fact-specific inquiry that does not lend itself to bright-line rules.” Id. “[RJeasonable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical conception]], which requires that officers articulate a reason, beyond a mere hunch, for their belief that an individual has committed a criminal act.” State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 15 , 144 N.M. 37 , 183 P.3d 922 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Fevig v. Fevig
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Neal
green
2 sentences2012A “reasonable suspicion determination requires us to assess the totality of the circumstances and precludes ... [a] divide-and-conquer analysis in which we view each individual factor or circumstance in a vacuum.” State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 28 , 142 N.M. 176 , 164 P.3d 57 (alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2012A “reasonable suspicion determination requires us to assess the totality of the circumstances and precludes ... [a] divide-and-conquer analysis in which we view each individual factor or circumstance in a vacuum.” State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 28 , 142 N.M. 176 , 164 P.3d 57 (alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Lozoya v. Sanchez green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Steinzig green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| cluster 771473 green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.