20 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Biddeford v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2019See Adams, 1999 ME 49, ¶ 26 , 727 A.2d 346 (“The Board only has power to grant abatements and does not have the authority to remand the case to the assessor to recompute the tax.”). [¶21] That brings us to the second option—the one favored by the Taxpayers—which is to extend the benefit to them. 2019See Adams, 1999 ME 49, ¶ 26 , 727 A.2d 346 (“The Board only has power to grant abatements and does not have the authority to remand the case to the assessor to recompute the tax.”). [¶21] That brings us to the second option—the one favored by the Taxpayers—which is to extend the benefit to them. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Metzgergreen2 sentences2025See State v. Metzger, 2010 ME 67, ¶ 22 , 999 A.2d 947 (“[W]hether [a statement] is testimonial and thus barred by the Confrontation Clause . . . is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry.”). 2025See State v. Metzger, 2010 ME 67, ¶ 22 , 999 A.2d 947 (“[W]hether [a statement] is testimonial and thus barred by the Confrontation Clause . . . is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry.”). | 1 | 3 |
Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subiliagreen2 sentences2019See Fiber Materials, Inc., 2009 ME 71, ¶ 14 , 974 A.2d 918 . 2019See Fiber Materials, Inc., 2009 ME 71, ¶ 14 , 974 A.2d 918 . | 1 | 2 |
State of Maine v. Richard J. Kimballgreen2 sentences2024Among those relevant here are State v. Adams, where we noted that “[f]or purposes of the Confrontation Clause, testimonial statements are out-of-court statements made primarily to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 2019 ME 132 , ¶ 20 n.8, 214 A.3d 496 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). State v. Kimball, where we recognized that whether a statement is testimonial is “necessarily a fact-specific inquiry” and said that “[a]n ‘ongoing emergency’ is by its nature broader than the attack itself; it includes the victim’s untreated injuries 2024Among those relevant here are State v. Adams, where we noted that “[f]or purposes of the Confrontation Clause, testimonial statements are out-of-court statements made primarily to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 2019 ME 132 , ¶ 20 n.8, 214 A.3d 496 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). State v. Kimball, where we recognized that whether a statement is testimonial is “necessarily a fact-specific inquiry” and said that “[a]n ‘ongoing emergency’ is by its nature broader than the attack itself; it includes the victim’s untreated injuries | 1 | 1 |
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councilgreen1 sentence2020Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); and (3) ao ad /we regulatory taking, which depends on a fact-specific inquiry into the diminution in value caused by the government action, the reasonableness of the landowner's investment-backed expectations for the property, aod the character of the interference, Penn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cruthirdsgreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Cruthirds, 2014 ME 86, ¶ 32 , 96 A.3d 80 (affirming a finding of no bad faith where police destroyed a sexual assault victim’s clothing, given that the defendant had been positively identified by an eyewitness and “nothing beyond bare speculation pointed to an alternative suspect” when the clothing was destroyed). “[B]ad faith requires more than negligence.” Cote, 2015 ME 78 , ¶ 19 n.5, 118 A.3d 805 ; see St. 2020See, e.g., Cruthirds, 2014 ME 86, ¶ 32 , 96 A.3d 80 (affirming a finding of no bad faith where police destroyed a sexual assault victim’s clothing, given that the defendant had been positively identified by an eyewitness and “nothing beyond bare speculation pointed to an alternative suspect” when the clothing was destroyed). “[B]ad faith requires more than negligence.” Cote, 2015 ME 78 , ¶ 19 n.5, 118 A.3d 805 ; see St. | 1 | 1 |
State of Maine v. Clarence Cotegreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Cruthirds, 2014 ME 86, ¶ 32 , 96 A.3d 80 (affirming a finding of no bad faith where police destroyed a sexual assault victim’s clothing, given that the defendant had been positively identified by an eyewitness and “nothing beyond bare speculation pointed to an alternative suspect” when the clothing was destroyed). “[B]ad faith requires more than negligence.” Cote, 2015 ME 78 , ¶ 19 n.5, 118 A.3d 805 ; see St. 2020See, e.g., Cruthirds, 2014 ME 86, ¶ 32 , 96 A.3d 80 (affirming a finding of no bad faith where police destroyed a sexual assault victim’s clothing, given that the defendant had been positively identified by an eyewitness and “nothing beyond bare speculation pointed to an alternative suspect” when the clothing was destroyed). “[B]ad faith requires more than negligence.” Cote, 2015 ME 78 , ¶ 19 n.5, 118 A.3d 805 ; see St. | 1 | 1 |
Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvaniagreen1 sentence2019Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890). 12 Accordingly, a remedy that is appropriate in one discriminatory tax case may not be appropriate in another; each case requires a fact-specific analysis. [¶20] As for the first option, the Board in this case could not withdraw the abutting lot benefit to achieve equal tax treatment because it lacked the authority to retroactively raise the values of the underassessed properties. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Banksgreen2 sentences2009See also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 , 124 S.Ct. 521 , 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003) (“[W]e have treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case....”). 2009See also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 , 124 S.Ct. 521 , 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003) (“[W]e have treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case....”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Spring Valley Developmentgreen2 sentences2009In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d at 751 (emphasis in original). [¶22] In re Spring Valley Development underscores that a reasonableness determination is a fact-specific inquiry. 2009While most such developments may be expected to "affect" the environment adversely to the extent that they add to the demands already made upon it, it is the unreasonable effect upon existing uses, scenic character and natural resources which the Legislature seeks to avoid by empowering the Commission to measure the nature and extent of the proposed use against the environment's capacity to tolerate the use. *410 In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d at 751 (emphasis in original). [¶ 22] In re Spring Valley Development underscores that a reasonableness determination is a fact-specific inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. Rossignolgreen1 sentence1997Such an inquiry would be a marked departure from our prior decisions and one that we deem neither wise nor desirable. [¶ 8] In Patterson v. Rossignol, we articulated the public policy considerations that militate against permitting jurors to impeach their verdicts: (1) the need for stability of verdicts; (2) the need to conclude litigation and desire to prevent any prolongation thereof; (3) the need to protect jurors in their communications to fellow jurors made in the confidence of secrecy of the jury room; (4) the need to save jurors harmless from tampering and harassment by disappointed lit | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Maine v. Wai Chan
green
2 sentences2024When a criminal defendant claims that police unconstitutionally destroyed evidence, bad faith "is a fact-specific inquiry focusing on the reasons behind the action or inaction leading to the claimed due process violation .. . [and] requires more than negligence." State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91 , <[ 20, 236 A.3d 471 . 2024When a criminal defendant claims that police unconstitutionally destroyed evidence, bad faith "is a fact-specific inquiry focusing on the reasons behind the action or inaction leading to the claimed due process violation .. . [and] requires more than negligence." State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91 , <[ 20, 236 A.3d 471 . | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Portfolio Recover Associates, LLC v. Richard Docamp
neutral
1 sentence2025Additionally, because the parties developed their respective records based on a standard that is no longer permissible, fairness requires us to vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial to allow the trial court, in the first instance, to address whether the statements relied upon by the expert witness in reaching her opinion were testimonial or nontestimonial. 16 See Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Clougherty, 2021 ME 20, ¶ 11 , 248 A.3d 950 (“Because the parties developed their respective records with a different evidentiary standard in mind, fairness requires | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State of Maine v. Ross S. Adams
green
1 sentence2024Among those relevant here are State v. Adams, where we noted that “[f]or purposes of the Confrontation Clause, testimonial statements are out-of-court statements made primarily to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 2019 ME 132 , ¶ 20 n.8, 214 A.3d 496 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). State v. Kimball, where we recognized that whether a statement is testimonial is “necessarily a fact-specific inquiry” and said that “[a]n ‘ongoing emergency’ is by its nature broader than the attack itself; it includes the victim’s untreated injuries | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2024If a statement was made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial, then the statement is testimonial for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” 2012 ME 63, ¶ 27 , 52 A.3d 911 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 6. 2024If a statement was made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial, then the statement is testimonial for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” 2012 ME 63, ¶ 27 , 52 A.3d 911 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 6. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
March v. Mills
green
1 sentence2020Tr. 84; Tr. 40-41.) After Defendant received his initial warning that he could be heard inside the building, he resumed preaching "about as loud as he was the previous time." (Tr. 191.) The jury's verdict in Phase I establishes that the Defendant had the requisite intent to disrupt health services: [W]hether an individual has the requisite intent to interfere with or jeopardize the delivery of healthcare services is a fact-specific inquiry that may depend on a variety of factors, including, crucially, whether the individual has ignored an initial order "by a law enforcement officer to cease su | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Moffett v. City of Portland
green
1 sentence2019Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51 , ¶ 12 n.9, 66 A.3d 571 (stating the correct standard of review for a special motion to dismiss); Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 , 343 n.8 (Me. 1979) (the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the disclosure of confidential records is immediately appealable). [¶9] The determination of whether the death knell exception is applicable to a particular case rests on a fact-specific analysis. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ralph Nader v. Maine Democratic Party
green
2 sentences2019Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51 , ¶ 12 n.9, 66 A.3d 571 (stating the correct standard of review for a special motion to dismiss); Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 , 343 n.8 (Me. 1979) (the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the disclosure of confidential records is immediately appealable). [¶9] The determination of whether the death knell exception is applicable to a particular case rests on a fact-specific analysis. 2019Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51 , ¶ 12 n.9, 66 A.3d 571 (stating the correct standard of review for a special motion to dismiss); Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 , 343 n.8 (Me. 1979) (the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the disclosure of confidential records is immediately appealable). [¶9] The determination of whether the death knell exception is applicable to a particular case rests on a fact-specific analysis. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dechert v. Maine Insurance Guaranty Ass'n
green
2 sentences2014In Dechert v. Maine Insurance Guaranty Assn., 1998 ME 127 ~~5-7, 711 A.2d 1290 , the Law Court found that the term "resident of an insured's household" was ambiguous and required a fact-specific inquiry. 2014In Dechert v. Maine Insurance Guaranty Assn., 1998 ME 127 ~~5-7, 711 A.2d 1290 , the Law Court found that the term "resident of an insured's household" was ambiguous and required a fact-specific inquiry. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Bernard Quirion v. Bryan Veilleux
green
2 sentences2014Quirion v. Veilleux, 2013 ME 50, ¶ 8 , 65 A.3d 1287 (citations and quotation marks omitted). [¶ 11] When an insured is a defendant in an active lawsuit, then a trial court’s order declaring that the insurer has no duty to defend, or, as occurred here, an order declining to decide the question, deprives the insured of an insurer-provided defense in the initial stages of the action. *599 Those stages may include assessing the suit’s viability, conducting settlement negotiations, deciding whether to settle, engaging in discovery, and filing a motion for summary judgment. 2014Quirion v. Veilleux, 2013 ME 50, ¶ 8 , 65 A.3d 1287 (citations and quotation marks omitted). [¶ 11] When an insured is a defendant in an active lawsuit, then a trial court’s order declaring that the insurer has no duty to defend, or, as occurred here, an order declining to decide the question, deprives the insured of an insurer-provided defense in the initial stages of the action. *599 Those stages may include assessing the suit’s viability, conducting settlement negotiations, deciding whether to settle, engaging in discovery, and filing a motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Cason
green
1 sentence2013Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71, ¶ 14 , 974 A.2d 918 . [¶ 9] The judicial economy exception permits an interlocutory appeal when “(1) review of a non-final order can establish a final, or practically final, disposition of the entire litigation, and (2) the interests of justice require that immediate review be undertaken.” Liberty, 2012 ME 81, ¶ 19 , 46 A.3d 1141 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Liberty v. Bennett
green
1 sentence2013Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71, ¶ 14 , 974 A.2d 918 . [¶ 9] The judicial economy exception permits an interlocutory appeal when “(1) review of a non-final order can establish a final, or practically final, disposition of the entire litigation, and (2) the interests of justice require that immediate review be undertaken.” Liberty, 2012 ME 81, ¶ 19 , 46 A.3d 1141 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Carey v. Boulette
green
2 sentences2012Carey v. Boulette, 158 Me. 204, 207 , 182 A.2d 473 . [¶ 18] The Bank clearly had knowledge of Jim’s Plumbing and Westbrook Tools’s work. 2012Carey v. Boulette, 158 Me. 204, 207 , 182 A.2d 473 . [¶ 18] The Bank clearly had knowledge of Jim’s Plumbing and Westbrook Tools’s work. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kimball v. New England Guaranty Ins.
green
1 sentence2012Used to service an ‘insured’s’ residence.” Citing our decision in Kimball v. New England Guaranty Insurance Co., 642 A.2d 1347 (Me.1994), the court concluded that “subject to motor vehicle registration” was an unambiguous phrase that was concerned with specific types of vehicles rather than a fact-specific inquiry as to whether a given vehicle must be registered based on its use. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Taylor v. Lapomarda
green
2 sentences2010In reaching this decision, we acknowledged that courts of other jurisdictions have taken a "wide variety of approaches to deciding whether to permit jury reassembly after discharge," concluding that this evidences "the impossibility of drawing a line which properly fits all of the points upon which parties may urge revisiting jury verdicts." Id. ¶ 8 n. 4, 702 A.2d at 688 . [¶ 39] Taylor had urged us to make a fact-specific inquiry and conclude that the jury, despite having been discharged, was "still together in the courthouse functioning as a jury" when it sent the note to the court. 2010In reaching this decision, we acknowledged that courts of other jurisdictions have taken a "wide variety of approaches to deciding whether to permit jury reassembly after discharge," concluding that this evidences "the impossibility of drawing a line which properly fits all of the points upon which parties may urge revisiting jury verdicts." Id. ¶ 8 n. 4, 702 A.2d at 688 . [¶ 39] Taylor had urged us to make a fact-specific inquiry and conclude that the jury, despite having been discharged, was "still together in the courthouse functioning as a jury" when it sent the note to the court. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commerce Bank and Trust Co. v. Dworman
green
2 sentences2006Commerce Bank and Trust Co. v.Dworman, 2004 ME 142 ¶ 15 , 861 A.2d 662, 666 . 2006Commerce Bank and Trust Co. v.Dworman, 2004 ME 142 ¶ 15 , 861 A.2d 662, 666 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.