fact-specific inquiry (Vermont) · Go Syfert
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fact-specific inquiry in Vermont

9 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Severancegreen
vt · 1958 · cited in 2 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2011–2015
2 sentences

2015“We have held that the immediacy with which a defendant renders aid and provides information is a fact-specific inquiry, but that aid and identification should occur ‘as soon as reasonably possible.’ ” State v. Myers, 2011 VT 43, ¶ 37 , 190 Vt. 29 (quoting State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 274 (1958)); see also State v. Loso, 151 Vt. 262, 266 (1989) (observing that, under the statute, “failure to . . . to give the required information at a time and manner reasonable under the circumstances is sufficient to convict”).

2011We have held that the immediacy with which a defendant renders aid and provides information is a fact-specific inquiry, but that aid and identification should occur “as soon as reasonably possible.” State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 274 , 138 A.2d 425, 429 (1958); see also State v. Loso, 151 Vt. 262, 266 , 559 A.2d 681, 684 (1989) (noting 23 V.S.A. § 1128 requires rendering assistance and providing information “at a time and in a manner reasonable under the circumstances”).

22
State v. Losogreen
vt · 1989 · cited in 2 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2011–2015
2 sentences

2015“We have held that the immediacy with which a defendant renders aid and provides information is a fact-specific inquiry, but that aid and identification should occur ‘as soon as reasonably possible.’ ” State v. Myers, 2011 VT 43, ¶ 37 , 190 Vt. 29 (quoting State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 274 (1958)); see also State v. Loso, 151 Vt. 262, 266 (1989) (observing that, under the statute, “failure to . . . to give the required information at a time and manner reasonable under the circumstances is sufficient to convict”).

2011We have held that the immediacy with which a defendant renders aid and provides information is a fact-specific inquiry, but that aid and identification should occur “as soon as reasonably possible.” State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 274 , 138 A.2d 425, 429 (1958); see also State v. Loso, 151 Vt. 262, 266 , 559 A.2d 681, 684 (1989) (noting 23 V.S.A. § 1128 requires rendering assistance and providing information “at a time and in a manner reasonable under the circumstances”).

22
Elizabeth Lawson v. Patricia Halpern-Reiss and Central Vermont Medical Centergreen
vt · 2019 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025See Lawson, 2019 VT 38, ¶¶ 32-39 .

11
United States v. Cutigreen
ca2 · 2013 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024United States v. Cuti, 720 F.3d 453, 458 (2d Cir. 2013).

11
United States v. Garcia-Garciagreen
ca7 · 2011 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Hanging objects “may (or may not) constitute material obstructions depending on their size, their position relative to the driver’s line of vision, and whether they are stationary or mobile.” United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 615 (7th Cir. 2011).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Murray v. White green
vt · 1991
1 sentence

2024Id.

12024–2024
Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Town of Ludlow green
vt · 2000
2 sentences

2022Okemo emphasizes that an abutting landowner is entitled to “reasonable and convenient access,” which is a fact-specific inquiry. 171 Vt. at 209 , 762 A.2d at 1226 .

2022Okemo emphasizes that an abutting landowner is entitled to “reasonable and convenient access,” which is a fact-specific inquiry. 171 Vt. at 209 , 762 A.2d at 1226 .

12022–2022
State v. Myers green
vt · 2011
2 sentences

2015“We have held that the immediacy with which a defendant renders aid and provides information is a fact-specific inquiry, but that aid and identification should occur ‘as soon as reasonably possible.’ ” State v. Myers, 2011 VT 43, ¶ 37 , 190 Vt. 29 (quoting State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 274 (1958)); see also State v. Loso, 151 Vt. 262, 266 (1989) (observing that, under the statute, “failure to . . . to give the required information at a time and manner reasonable under the circumstances is sufficient to convict”).

2015“We have held that the immediacy with which a defendant renders aid and provides information is a fact-specific inquiry, but that aid and identification should occur ‘as soon as reasonably possible.’ ” State v. Myers, 2011 VT 43, ¶ 37 , 190 Vt. 29 (quoting State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 274 (1958)); see also State v. Loso, 151 Vt. 262, 266 (1989) (observing that, under the statute, “failure to . . . to give the required information at a time and manner reasonable under the circumstances is sufficient to convict”).

12015–2015
Coty v. Ramsey Associates, Inc. green
vt · 1988
1 sentence

2010Id.

12010–2010
Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance red
md · 1991
1 sentence

2000But even accepting defendant’s contention that homeowner’s policies extending coverage should be broadly interpreted, we are unable to conclude that a Maryland court making a fact-specific inquiry of the “‘aggregate details of the living arrangements[,]’” see Forbes, 589 A.2d at 952 (quoting Davenport, 241 S.E.2d at 594 ), would conclude that Swann was a resident of his parents’ household.

12000–2000
Davenport v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. green
gactapp · 1978
1 sentence

2000But even accepting defendant’s contention that homeowner’s policies extending coverage should be broadly interpreted, we are unable to conclude that a Maryland court making a fact-specific inquiry of the “‘aggregate details of the living arrangements[,]’” see Forbes, 589 A.2d at 952 (quoting Davenport, 241 S.E.2d at 594 ), would conclude that Swann was a resident of his parents’ household.

12000–2000

Where else courts name it

TX 117 (1994–2026) OR 106 (1991–2026) WA 79 (1992–2026) CA 74 (1995–2026) MI 68 (1999–2026) IL 63 (2002–2025) PA 60 (1993–2026) NY 59 (1995–2026) NJ 57 (1993–2026) CT 38 (1986–2025) NM 35 (1998–2025) TN 29 (1999–2024) NC 29 (2003–2025) LA 28 (1993–2022) ND 27 (2002–2021) VA 25 (2002–2026) AZ 25 (1992–2026) CO 25 (1989–2026) OH 24 (2003–2026) MA 22 (2002–2025) SC 21 (2000–2026) DC 20 (1991–2025) MD 20 (1995–2024) ME 20 (1997–2025) DE 16 (2015–2025) WI 15 (1994–2026) MO 14 (2001–2025) NV 14 (1991–2022) FL 13 (2005–2026) IA 13 (2000–2023) NH 12 (1990–2025) KS 11 (2000–2025) IN 9 (1998–2025) MN 9 (2001–2024) VT 9 (2000–2025) WV 8 (1984–2023) KY 8 (2008–2026) GA 8 (2014–2025) MT 7 (2006–2022) WY 6 (2010–2025) UT 6 (1997–2025) AL 6 (1998–2017) RI 5 (2004–2020) NE 5 (2016–2020) SD 5 (1998–2022) OK 5 (1998–2024) AK 4 (2009–2019) ID 4 (2013–2026)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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