15 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pohlhammergreen1 sentence2026See Pohlhammer, 78 Wis. 2d at 522 . | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen1 sentence2022See Illinois v Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 140 . | 1 | 1 |
Industrial Risk Insurers & Quad Graphics, Inc. v. American Engineering Testing, Inc.green2 sentences2019See Tammy W-G. , 333 Wis. 2d 273 , ¶49, 797 N.W.2d 854 . "[W]e will not abandon our neutrality to develop arguments[.]" Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng'g Testing, Inc. , 2009 WI App 62 , ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148 , 769 N.W.2d 82 . 2019See Tammy W-G. , 333 Wis. 2d 273 , ¶49, 797 N.W.2d 854 . "[W]e will not abandon our neutrality to develop arguments[.]" Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng'g Testing, Inc. , 2009 WI App 62 , ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148 , 769 N.W.2d 82 . | 1 | 1 |
Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T.green2 sentences2019See Tammy W-G. , 333 Wis. 2d 273 , ¶49, 797 N.W.2d 854 . "[W]e will not abandon our neutrality to develop arguments[.]" Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng'g Testing, Inc. , 2009 WI App 62 , ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148 , 769 N.W.2d 82 . 2019See Tammy W-G. , 333 Wis. 2d 273 , ¶49, 797 N.W.2d 854 . "[W]e will not abandon our neutrality to develop arguments[.]" Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng'g Testing, Inc. , 2009 WI App 62 , ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148 , 769 N.W.2d 82 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leuteneggergreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., State v. Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127 , ¶ 21 n.5, 275 Wis. 2d 512 , 685 N.W.2d 536 . 2016See, e.g., State v. Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127 , ¶ 21 n.5, 275 Wis. 2d 512 , 685 N.W.2d 536 . | 1 | 1 |
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2004The Supreme Court has "eschewed bright-line rules [in Fourth Amendment inquiries], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (rejecting a per se rule in favor of an inquiry into "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter."); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (rejecting the parties' proposals for bright-line rules in favor of a fact specific analysis); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) ("The constitutional validity of a warrantless | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Bostickgreen1 sentence2004The Supreme Court has "eschewed bright-line rules [in Fourth Amendment inquiries], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (rejecting a per se rule in favor of an inquiry into "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter."); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (rejecting the parties' proposals for bright-line rules in favor of a fact specific analysis); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) ("The constitutional validity of a warrantless | 1 | 1 |
Ohio v. Robinettegreen1 sentence2004The Supreme Court has "eschewed bright-line rules [in Fourth Amendment inquiries], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (rejecting a per se rule in favor of an inquiry into "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter."); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (rejecting the parties' proposals for bright-line rules in favor of a fact specific analysis); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) ("The constitutional validity of a warrantless | 1 | 1 |
Sibron v. New Yorkgreen1 sentence2004The Supreme Court has "eschewed bright-line rules [in Fourth Amendment inquiries], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (rejecting a per se rule in favor of an inquiry into "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter."); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (rejecting the parties' proposals for bright-line rules in favor of a fact specific analysis); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) ("The constitutional validity of a warrantless | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Chesternutgreen1 sentence2004The Supreme Court has "eschewed bright-line rules [in Fourth Amendment inquiries], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (rejecting a per se rule in favor of an inquiry into "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter."); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (rejecting the parties' proposals for bright-line rules in favor of a fact specific analysis); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) ("The constitutional validity of a warrantless | 1 | 1 |
Ross Ex Rel. Rodli v. Martinigreen2 sentences2002See Ross v. Martini, 204 Wis. 2d 354, 358 , 555 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1996). 2002See Ross v. Martini, 204 Wis. 2d 354, 358 , 555 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mandujanogreen2 sentences2001On the other hand, the crime of perjury erodes the integrity of our judicial system. 7 As the United States Supreme Court declared in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976), "[pjerjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. 2001On the other hand, the crime of perjury erodes the integrity of our judicial system. [7] As the United States Supreme Court declared in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976), "[p]erjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Koput
green
2 sentences2018The totality of the circumstances herein differ from those in the cases Bartelt cites. ¶52 Although the specific question we address today—— whether confession to a serious crime transforms a noncustodial interview into a custodial interrogation in these circumstances— —is an issue of first impression in Wisconsin, Bartelt contends that our decision in State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370 , 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988), supports the conclusion that no reasonable person 29 No. 2015AP2506-CR would have felt free to leave following his confession to a serious, violent crime. 2018The totality of the circumstances herein differ from those in the cases Bartelt cites. ¶52 Although the specific question we address today—— whether confession to a serious crime transforms a noncustodial interview into a custodial interrogation in these circumstances— —is an issue of first impression in Wisconsin, Bartelt contends that our decision in State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370 , 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988), supports the conclusion that no reasonable person 29 No. 2015AP2506-CR would have felt free to leave following his confession to a serious, violent crime. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2025Standing derives from the nature and immediacy of the claimed injury, meaning that it is a fact-specific inquiry and legal precedent cannot be applied blindly. ¶25 Furthermore, as FMG identifies, after Fox, Lewert, and Remijas were decided, the United States Supreme Court decided TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2022Probable cause is a fact specific inquiry and “includes the ‘totality of the circumstances’ within the officer’s knowledge at the time[.]” State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 148 , 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990) (citation omitted). ¶13 We apply this “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether information provided by a confidential informant provided probable cause for an arrest. 2022Probable cause is a fact specific inquiry and “includes the ‘totality of the circumstances’ within the officer’s knowledge at the time[.]” State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 148 , 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990) (citation omitted). ¶13 We apply this “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether information provided by a confidential informant provided probable cause for an arrest. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Company
green
2 sentences2017Comm'n, 256 Wis. 62, 66 , 39 N.W.2d 854 (1949). ¶65 Whether a waiver of a constitutional right was knowing and voluntary is a fact-specific inquiry that is "separate and distinct from the operation of rules of substantive contract law . . . ." K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 . 2017Whether a waiver of a constitutional right was knowing and voluntary is a fact-specific inquiry that is "separate and distinct from the operation of rules of substantive contract law . . . ." K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Wendlandt v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2017Comm'n, 256 Wis. 62, 66 , 39 N.W.2d 854 (1949). ¶65 Whether a waiver of a constitutional right was knowing and voluntary is a fact-specific inquiry that is "separate and distinct from the operation of rules of substantive contract law . . . ." K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 . 2017Comm'n, 256 Wis. 62, 66 , 39 N.W.2d 854 (1949). ¶65 Whether a waiver of a constitutional right was knowing and voluntary is a fact-specific inquiry that is "separate and distinct from the operation of rules of substantive contract law . . . ." K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Silverman v. United States
green
1 sentence2016We therefore regard the area 'immediately surrounding and associated with the home'——what our cases call the curtilage——as 'part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.' That principle has ancient and durable roots." Id. (internal citation omitted). ¶79 The determination of whether Dumstrey's parking garage is curtilage presents a fact specific analysis. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Martin Ex Rel. Scoptur v. Richards
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 175 , 531 N.W.2d 70 ("The information that is reasonably necessary for a patient to make an informed decision regarding treatment will vary from case to case."). 2008Id. at 175 , 531 N.W.2d 70 ("The information that is reasonably necessary for a patient to make an informed decision regarding treatment will vary from case to case."). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hoey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Ricci
green
2 sentences2006Id. ¶ 44 Interference with a present or prospective contractual relationship requires proof of the following five elements: "(1) the plaintiff had a contract or prospective contractual relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant interfered with the relationship; (3) the interference was intentional; (4) a causal connection exists between the interference and the damages; and (5) the defendant was not justified or privileged to interfere." Hoey Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Ricci, 2002 WI App 231, ¶ 27 , 256 Wis.2d 347 , 653 N.W.2d 763 . 2006Id. ¶ 44 Interference with a present or prospective contractual relationship requires proof of the following five elements: "(1) the plaintiff had a contract or prospective contractual relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant interfered with the relationship; (3) the interference was intentional; (4) a causal connection exists between the interference and the damages; and (5) the defendant was not justified or privileged to interfere." Hoey Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Ricci, 2002 WI App 231, ¶ 27 , 256 Wis.2d 347 , 653 N.W.2d 763 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
St. Francis Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Hearthside Homes, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Id. ¶ 44 Interference with a present or prospective contractual relationship requires proof of the following five elements: "(1) the plaintiff had a contract or prospective contractual relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant interfered with the relationship; (3) the interference was intentional; (4) a causal connection exists between the interference and the damages; and (5) the defendant was not justified or privileged to interfere." Hoey Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Ricci, 2002 WI App 231, ¶ 27 , 256 Wis.2d 347 , 653 N.W.2d 763 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Neiman v. AMERICAN NAT. PROP. & CAS. CO.
green
1 sentence2001As the supreme court has stated, the balancing test applied in Martin, Neiman and Matthies is, at heart, a rational basis test that is used to assess the constitutionality of retroactive legislation. *327 Matthies, 2001 WI 82 at ¶ 27 ; Neiman, 2000 WI 83 at ¶ 9 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Matthies v. Positive Safety Manufacturing Co.
green
1 sentence2001As the supreme court has stated, the balancing test applied in Martin, Neiman and Matthies is, at heart, a rational basis test that is used to assess the constitutionality of retroactive legislation. *327 Matthies, 2001 WI 82 at ¶ 27 ; Neiman, 2000 WI 83 at ¶ 9 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Flemming v. Nestor
green
1 sentence1994Id. at 619 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.