fact-specific inquiry in Pennsylvania

2025The Commonwealth’s actions after the withdrawal or dismissal of the first complaint only become relevant for Rule 600 purposes if the Commonwealth - 14 - J-S45036-24 was forced to file a second complaint because it failed to exercise due diligence in prosecuting the first complaint.6,7 Determining whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence is a fact-specific inquiry, which “does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 at comment (quoting Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa

2025Determining whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence is a fact-specific inquiry, which “does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable - 25 - J-A11038-25 effort.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, comment (quoting Commonwealth v. Selenski, 606 Pa. 51, 61 , 994 A.2d 1083 , 1089 (2010)).

2024See York, 136 A.3d at 1050-51 . “[W]hen determining whether a de facto taking has occurred, we focus on the governmental action in question.” Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Auth., 166 A.3d at 561 .

2022See York, 136 A.3d at 1050-51 . “[W]hen determining whether a de facto taking has occurred, we focus on the governmental action in question.” Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Auth., 166 A.3d at 561 .

2024See York, 136 A.3d at 1050-51 . “[W]hen determining whether a de facto taking has occurred, we focus on the governmental action in question.” Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Auth., 166 A.3d at 561 .

2022See York, 136 A.3d at 1050-51 . “[W]hen determining whether a de facto taking has occurred, we focus on the governmental action in question.” Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Auth., 166 A.3d at 561 .

2020See Wisler, 124 A.3d at 323 . “[W]e do not assume agency by a mere showing that one person does an act for another.” Walton, 66 A.3d at 787 (citation omitted).

2020See Wisler, 124 A.3d at 323 . “[W]e do not assume agency by a mere showing that one person does an act for another.” Walton, 66 A.3d at 787 (citation omitted).

2020See Wisler, 124 A.3d at 323 . “[W]e do not assume agency by a mere showing that one person does an act for another.” Walton, 66 A.3d at 787 (citation omitted).

2020See Wisler, 124 A.3d at 323 . “[W]e do not assume agency by a mere showing that one person does an act for another.” Walton, 66 A.3d at 787 (citation omitted).

2014Jones, 590 Pa. at 225 , 912 A.2d at 282 (citing Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 577 Pa. 421 , 846 A.2d 75,95-96 (2004».

2014Jones, 590 Pa. at 225 , 912 A.2d at 282 (citing Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 577 Pa. 421 , 846 A.2d 75,95-96 (2004».

2024Padilla, supra at 1194–[]95 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2017Commonwealth v. Padilla, 923 A.2d 1189, 1194-95 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 934 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). -8- J-S05043-17 Here, the incident did not deprive Appellant of a fair and impartial trial because the comment was, at most, a fleeting reference to criminal activity.

2025Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 282 (Pa. 2006) (citations omitted; paragraphing altered).

2024Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 282 (Pa. 2006) (citations omitted).

2025Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 179 A.3d 77, 82-83 (Pa. Super. 2018) (applying Coleman and holding that the officer’s asking the defendant to take his hands out of his pockets did not turn the mere encounter into a seizure); Commonwealth v. Hemingway, 192 A.3d 126, 135 (Pa. Super. 2018) (acknowledging our precedent regarding police requests to defendants to remove their hands from their pockets, but determining, following a fact-specific inquiry, that in response to a noise complaint, the de

2022Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Hemingway, 192 A.3d 126, 130 (Pa.Super. 2018).

2025Appellant contends that the trial court failed to “‘conduct a fact-specific inquiry and ascertain whether the remark was sufficiently contemporaneous to the startling event to be considered spontaneous.’” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 496 (Pa. 2009); N.T., 3/8/24, at 85).

2025In Sherwood, our Supreme Court held that “in determining whether a remark fits within [the excited utterance] exception, a court must conduct a fact-specific inquiry and ascertain whether the remark was sufficiently contemporaneous to the startling event to be considered spontaneous.” Sherwood, 982 A.2d at 496 .

2022"If evidence of prior criminal activity is inadvertently presented to the jury, the trial court may cure the improper prejudice with an appropriate cautionary instruction to the jury." Id. quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 955 A.2d 1031, 1034 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 739 , 964 A.2d 1 (2009).

2014Padilla, supra at 1194- of prior criminal activity is inadvertently presented to the jury, the trial court may cure the improper Commonwealth v. Hudson, 955 A.2d 1031, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 964 Id. - 12 - J-S41043-14 In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective Lythgoe, the lead investigator in the underlying case.

2025Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 179 A.3d 77, 82-83 (Pa. Super. 2018) (applying Coleman and holding that the officer’s asking the defendant to take his hands out of his pockets did not turn the mere encounter into a seizure); Commonwealth v. Hemingway, 192 A.3d 126, 135 (Pa. Super. 2018) (acknowledging our precedent regarding police requests to defendants to remove their hands from their pockets, but determining, following a fact-specific inquiry, that in response to a noise complaint, the de

2025Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 179 A.3d 77, 82-83 (Pa. Super. 2018) (applying Coleman and holding that the officer’s asking the defendant to take his hands out of his pockets did not turn the mere encounter into a seizure); Commonwealth v. Hemingway, 192 A.3d 126, 135 (Pa. Super. 2018) (acknowledging our precedent regarding police requests to defendants to remove their hands from their pockets, but determining, following a fact-specific inquiry, that in response to a noise complaint, the de

2025“It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.” Harris v. U.S., 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).

2025Of Ctr., 138 A.3d 88, 95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (“In discerning whether records qualify as records ‘of’ a particular agency, we consider the subject-matter of the records.

2025See Thompson, 314 A.3d at 926 ; Pa.R.E. 803(2).

2025See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2); Adoption of A.M.W., 289 A.3d at 116.

2025Mission Pennsylvania, LLC v. McKelvey, 212 A.3d 119, 136 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 255 A.3d 385 (Pa. 2021).

2025Matters of “due diligence must be judged by what was done by the authorities rather than by what was not done.” Commonwealth v. Lynch, 57 A.3d 120, 125 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

2024The intent to cause SBI may be proved with direct or circumstantial - 13 - J-A24036-23 evidence, see Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254, 1257-58 (Pa. 2006), and is a fact-specific inquiry, see Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 247 (Pa. Super. 2018).

2024Id. (“The fact that potential for danger to police or the public is enough to constitute exigent circumstances does not mean that a mere assertion of danger is sufficient.

2024Id. at 719 (Saylor, J., concurring). [J-5-2024] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 11 He rejected Justice Castille’s framing of the limited automobile exception as being defined “solely in terms related to the development of probable cause.” Id.

2024Id. at 719 (Saylor, J., concurring). [J-5-2024] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 11 He rejected Justice Castille’s framing of the limited automobile exception as being defined “solely in terms related to the development of probable cause.” Id.