fact-specific inquiry in District of Columbia

2024Serv., 831 A.2d 890, 912 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 37 n.19). 17 ‘adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information.’” 25 “Determining the existence of an act of production privilege is a fact-specific inquiry, which turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof.’” 26 Applying these principles in this case, we conclude that Mr. Clark has asserted a valid act-of-production privilege in response to ODC’s document subpoena.

2019Quoting Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 , 601, 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), appellant contends that "the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are daunting." 4 See § 48-904.01(a)(1)(B)-(C). 5 Appellant argues that use of a fact-specific analysis is "inherently arbitrary" in cases that did not proceed to conviction, that involve primarily "notoriously inaccurate" and exaggerated hearsay police reports, and that "have no meaningful records to review"; and in cases in which the movants were without counsel.

2019Quoting Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 , 601, 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), appellant contends that "the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are daunting." 4 See § 48-904.01(a)(1)(B)-(C). 5 Appellant argues that use of a fact-specific analysis is "inherently arbitrary" in cases that did not proceed to conviction, that involve primarily "notoriously inaccurate" and exaggerated hearsay police reports, and that "have no meaningful records to review"; and in cases in which the movants were without counsel.

2019See Andrew , 110 A.3d at 633 n.8, 637-38 ; *672 Moore v. Waller , 930 A.2d 176 , 182 (D.C. 2007) ("There must be a showing that the parties were greatly disparate in bargaining power, that there was no opportunity for negotiation and that the services could not be obtained elsewhere." (citation omitted) ).

2015Glossing over those differences, my colleagues seem to read Hairston as announcing a per se rule that, as long as a defendant does not speak before the police read from the rights card, the recitation of the information on the card constitutes an effective warning, no matter what else the police say in conjunction with that recitation. 13 But Hair-ston, which clearly employed a fact-specific analysis, does not announce such a rule. 14 The question in Hairston was whether the detective had reduced the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings by withholding them until after he had outlined some of

2015Glossing over those differences, my colleagues seem to read Hairston as announcing a per se rule that, as long as a defendant does not speak before the police read from the rights card, the recitation of the information on the card constitutes an effective warning, no matter what else the police say in 12 Miranda only limits the use of an interviewee’s statements “against the individual in court.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (emphasis added). 44 conjunction with that recitation.13 But Hairston, which clearly employed a fact- specific analysis, does not announce such a rule.14 The question in Hair

2012“The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness, ‘is a question of reasonableness.’ ” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 , 100 S.Ct. 2581 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 189 n. 22, 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2012“The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness, ‘is a question of reasonableness.’ ” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 , 100 S.Ct. 2581 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 189 n. 22, 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2012“The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the factfinder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude *1270 of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Rivas, 783 A.2d at 133 (quoting Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 ).

2012“The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the factfinder ‘to reach a subjective state of near certitude *1270 of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Rivas, 783 A.2d at 133 (quoting Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 ).

2012“The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness, ‘is a question of reasonableness.’ ” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 , 100 S.Ct. 2581 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 189 n. 22, 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2012“The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness, ‘is a question of reasonableness.’ ” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 , 100 S.Ct. 2581 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 189 n. 22, 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2005Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.1994); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir.1989); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, supra. 4 But “[w]hile the ministerial exception promotes the most cherished principles of religious liberty, its contours are not unlimited and its application in .a given case requires a fact-specific inquiry.” Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801 .

2005Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.1994); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir.1989); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, supra. 4 But “[w]hile the ministerial exception promotes the most cherished principles of religious liberty, its contours are not unlimited and its application in .a given case requires a fact-specific inquiry.” Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801 .

2005Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.1994); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir.1989); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, supra. 4 But “[w]hile the ministerial exception promotes the most cherished principles of religious liberty, its contours are not unlimited and its application in .a given case requires a fact-specific inquiry.” Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801 .

2005Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.1994); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir.1989); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, supra. 4 But “[w]hile the ministerial exception promotes the most cherished principles of religious liberty, its contours are not unlimited and its application in .a given case requires a fact-specific inquiry.” Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801 .

2005Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.1994); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir.1989); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, supra. 4 But “[w]hile the ministerial exception promotes the most cherished principles of religious liberty, its contours are not unlimited and its application in .a given case requires a fact-specific inquiry.” Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801 .

2003Determining the existence of an act of production privilege is a fact-specific inquiry, which turns on the “facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof.” Doe , 465 U.S. at *913 613, 104 S.Ct. 1237 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 , 96 S.Ct. 1569 ).

2003Determining the existence of an act of production privilege is a fact-specific inquiry, which turns on the “facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof.” Doe , 465 U.S. at *913 613, 104 S.Ct. 1237 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 , 96 S.Ct. 1569 ).

2003Determining the existence of an act of production privilege is a fact-specific inquiry, which turns on the “facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof.” Doe , 465 U.S. at *913 613, 104 S.Ct. 1237 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 , 96 S.Ct. 1569 ).