fact-specific inquiry in California

2025(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [“complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”]; People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 [“A claim that a sentence is cruel or unusual requires a ‘fact specific’ inquiry and is forfeited if 28 not raised below.”]; People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 [a cruel and unusual punishment claim is a fact-specific inquiry that “requires examination of the offense and the offender,” such that it must be raised in

2021(See People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 [claims requiring a fact-specific inquiry are forfeited if not raised below]; People v. McCoy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1525 [claims based on “facts . . . different from those the trial court was asked to apply” are forfeited if the defendant failed to “object[ ] on the ‘specific grounds’ asserted as error on appeal”].) Even if he had not forfeited the claim, we would find it unpersuasive.

2016(Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, 794-795 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 , 978 P.2d 2 ] (Ramirez); accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-197 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 1 , 94 S.Ct. 2223 ].) Determining whether an exemption applies is a fact-specific inquiry.

2016(Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, 794-795 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 , 978 P.2d 2 ] (Ramirez); accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-197 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 1 , 94 S.Ct. 2223 ].) Determining whether an exemption applies is a fact-specific inquiry.

2026(Id. at pp. 934–935.) Describing this as a fact-specific inquiry, the court held that it was “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to appellant would have been reached” in the absence of the improper testimony because it was “an extremely close case in which the jury had to make its fact determination based upon the credibility of the appellant and his witnesses and on the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses.” (Id. at p. 935; see also People v. Ozuna (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 338, 339 , 341–342 [on retrial after a hung jury in a case with no eyewitnesses, admonition did not “pro

2025(Id. at pp. 934–935.) Describing this as a fact-specific inquiry, the court held that it was “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to appellant would have been reached” in the absence of the improper testimony because it was “an extremely close case in which the jury had to make its fact determination based upon the credibility of the appellant and his witnesses and on the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses.” (Id. at p. 935; see also People v. Ozuna (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 338, 339 , 341–342 [on retrial after a hung jury in a case with no eyewitnesses, admonition did not “pro

2024(San Francisco, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036 ); South Coast, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 320, see also Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1270, fn. 17 [whether to permit intervention requires a fact- specific inquiry focused on practical considerations].) The trial court has broad discretion to strike this balance.

2021(See Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1270, fn. 17 [whether to permit intervention requires a fact-specific inquiry focused on practical considerations].) The Union’s logic reveals the weakness of its position.

2017(Apple Valley, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 944-947.) Rather, the court reasoned that the fact-specific inquiry articulated in Jordache for the timing of injury in a legal malpractice action “should apply except to cases which fall within Feddersen’s narrow holding governing negligent tax return preparation.” (Id. at p. 952.) Applying the Jordache analysis of actual injury based on “whether the plaintiff has sustained damages compensable in a malpractice action” (id. at p. 948), the court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the district “suffered actual injury when it recognized the allege

2017(Apple Valley, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 944-947.) Rather, the court reasoned that the fact-specific inquiry articulated in Jordache for the timing of injury in a legal malpractice action “should apply except to cases which fall within Feddersen’s narrow holding governing negligent tax return preparation.” (Id. at p. 952.) Applying the Jordache analysis of actual injury based on “whether the plaintiff has sustained damages compensable in a malpractice action” (id. at p. 948), the court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the district “suffered actual injury when it recognized the allege

2016(Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, 794-795 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 , 978 P.2d 2 ] (Ramirez); accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-197 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 1 , 94 S.Ct. 2223 ].) Determining whether an exemption applies is a fact-specific inquiry.

2016(Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, 794-795 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 , 978 P.2d 2 ] (Ramirez); accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-197 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 1 , 94 S.Ct. 2223 ].) Determining whether an exemption applies is a fact-specific inquiry.

2016(Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 571 F.3d 935, 945 .) As a general matter, FLSA exemptions ‘“are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application [is] limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; see Guerrero v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 912, 941 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 ] (Guerrero).) Appellants, however, seek to transform this policy statement into a new standard of proof.

2016(Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 571 F.3d 935, 945 .) As a general matter, FLSA exemptions ‘“are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application [is] limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; see Guerrero v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 912, 941 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 ] (Guerrero).) Appellants, however, seek to transform this policy statement into a new standard of proof.

2009(Bailey, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 519 ; see In re Arthur V., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 69 ; see also People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 867, 888-889 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 442 ] [discussing Bailey principle in terms of requisite jury instruction].) The People do not point to, and we are unable to find, any evidence of separate and distinct intents on the part of Tabb.

2009(Bailey, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 519 ; see In re Arthur V., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 69 ; see also People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 867, 888-889 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 442 ] [discussing Bailey principle in terms of requisite jury instruction].) The People do not point to, and we are unable to find, any evidence of separate and distinct intents on the part of Tabb.

2021(People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1299 .) A deadly weapon within the meaning of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) is “ ‘ “any object, instrument or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury.” ’ ” (In re B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th 528, 532-533 .) For an object to qualify as a deadly weapon based upon use, “the defendant must have used the object in a manner not only capable of producing but also likely to produce death or great bodily injury. . . . [T]he extent of any bodily injuries caused by the object [is an] appr

2021(People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1299 .) A deadly weapon within the meaning of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) is “ ‘ “any object, instrument or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury.” ’ ” (In re B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th 528, 532-533 .) For an object to qualify as a deadly weapon based upon use, “the defendant must have used the object in a manner not only capable of producing but also likely to produce death or great bodily injury. . . . [T]he extent of any bodily injuries caused by the object [is an] appr

2009(Id. at pp. 626-627.) Both Bailey and Packard demonstrate that “[w]hether there were separate independent takings or one general scheme is a question of fact based on the particular circumstances of each case.” (Packard, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 626 ; see Bailey, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 519 [the question of “[w]hether a series of wrongful acts constitutes a single offense or multiple offenses” requires a fact-specific inquiry that depends on an evaluation of the defendant’s intent].) Such an inquiry is appropriately left to the fact finder in the first instance, and as with other such factua

2008As Bailey emphasizes, the question of "[w]hether a series of wrongful acts constitutes a single offense or multiple offenses" requires a fact-specific inquiry that depends on an evaluation of the defendant's intent. ( Bailey, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 519 .) Such an inquiry is appropriately left to the fact finder in the first instance.

2025(London v. Dri-Honing Corp. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009 [timeliness of request for sanctions is left to trial court’s discretion because it is a fact-specific analysis].) Guadalupe also argued the amounts awarded are excessive because the court could award fees only for time spent in research and preparation of motions to compel.

2015(London v. Dri-Honing Corp. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 999, 1008-1009 .) Defendant argues sanctions were warranted because plaintiffs’ designation of Rich as a trial expert was a mere sham designed to cost defendant unwarranted burden and expense.

2025(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [“complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”]; People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 [“A claim that a sentence is cruel or unusual requires a ‘fact specific’ inquiry and is forfeited if 28 not raised below.”]; People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 [a cruel and unusual punishment claim is a fact-specific inquiry that “requires examination of the offense and the offender,” such that it must be raised in

2019(See People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 .) Rodriguez identifies no authority holding an as-applied constitutional challenge to a sentence is “purely legal.” 11 In any event, even purely legal questions can be forfeited.

2016(Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 571 F.3d 935, 945 .) As a general matter, FLSA exemptions ‘“are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application [is] limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; see Guerrero v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 912, 941 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 ] (Guerrero).) Appellants, however, seek to transform this policy statement into a new standard of proof.

2016(Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 571 F.3d 935, 945 .) As a general matter, FLSA exemptions ‘“are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application [is] limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; see Guerrero v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 912, 941 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 ] (Guerrero).) Appellants, however, seek to transform this policy statement into a new standard of proof.

2026(People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 220 (Huggins) [“We apply a deferential standard of review to a trial court’s ruling concerning whether another competency hearing must be held”]; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33 (Marshall) [same].) Hronis first contends the initial competency finding should be given little weight because it was based on the submission of written reports rather than a full evidentiary proceeding.

2026(See People v. Megown (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 157, 164 .) Evidence is unduly prejudicial under section 352 if it “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘ uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and . . . 10 has very little effect on the issues.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 513, 532 (Kerley).) We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion.