25 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fulminantegreen2 sentences2025State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, ¶ 50 (1999). 2025A fact-specific inquiry is necessary to determine whether an error is harmless, State v. Poyson, 198 Ariz. 70, ¶ 21 (2000), and it must be evaluated within the context of properly admitted evidence, State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, ¶ 50 (1999). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Poysongreen2 sentences2025A fact-specific inquiry is necessary to determine whether an error is harmless, State v. Poyson, 198 Ariz. 70, ¶ 21 (2000), and it must be evaluated within the context of properly admitted evidence, State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, ¶ 50 (1999). 2022State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, ¶ 50 (1999); State v. Poyson, 198 Ariz. 70, ¶ 21 (2000). | 3 | 3 |
Robinson v. Herringgreen2 sentences2023Robinson v. Herring, 75 Ariz. 166, 169 (1953) (looking to surrounding circumstances). 2023Robinson v. Herring, 75 Ariz. 166, 169 (1953) (looking to surrounding circumstances). | 2 | 2 |
Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2020Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251-52, ¶ 29 . “[T]here is no threshold level under each individual factor in Michael J. that either compels, or forbids, severance.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 2019Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 29 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Biblegreen2 sentences2025An error is harmless if “the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). ¶16 The trial court instructed the jury that a defendant is justified in using physical force in self-defense if: “A reasonable person in the situation would have believed that physical force was immediately necessary to protect against another’s use . . . of unlawful physical force and the defendant used . . . no more physical force than what appeared necessary to a reasonable person in the situa 2000See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1191 (1993). ¶ 22 Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court should not have admitted the palm print, we nevertheless conclude that the error was harmless. | 1 | 2 |
Gipson v. Kaseygreen2 sentences2015Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 230 . ¶ 11 Recognizing that the existence of duty is a legal, not a factual, matter, Gipson cautioned against “a fact-specific analysis of the relationship between the parties” in determining whether a duty of care exists. 2015Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 230 . ¶ 11 Recognizing that the existence of duty is a legal, not a factual, matter, Gipson cautioned against “a fact-specific analysis of the relationship between the parties” in determining whether a duty of care exists. | 1 | 2 |
Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F./d.L.green1 sentence2026Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4-5, ¶¶ 13, 16-17 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Sullivan v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2025An error is harmless if “the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). ¶16 The trial court instructed the jury that a defendant is justified in using physical force in self-defense if: “A reasonable person in the situation would have believed that physical force was immediately necessary to protect against another’s use . . . of unlawful physical force and the defendant used . . . no more physical force than what appeared necessary to a reasonable person in the situa | 1 | 1 |
State v. Aguilargreen1 sentence2023Aguilar, 209 Ariz. at 49, ¶ 29 ; see also State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 28, 33, ¶ 21 (App. 1998). ¶27 We agree that Long’s performing oral sex on a teenager, forcing his son to masturbate in front of him, and organizing incestual acts between his wife and son, were relevant to show his “aberrant propensity” to commit the charged offenses. | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Clarkgreen1 sentence2023See Clark v. Clark, 124 Ariz. 235, 237 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisongreen1 sentence2023Aguilar, 209 Ariz. at 49, ¶ 29 ; see also State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 28, 33, ¶ 21 (App. 1998). ¶27 We agree that Long’s performing oral sex on a teenager, forcing his son to masturbate in front of him, and organizing incestual acts between his wife and son, were relevant to show his “aberrant propensity” to commit the charged offenses. | 1 | 1 |
Sanchez v. City of Tucsongreen1 sentence2021See Sanchez, 191 Ariz. at 130–31, 172–73 ¶¶ 10, 22 (stating that the existence and extent of an assumed duty is a fact-specific determination); Tollenaar v. Chino Valley School Dist., 190 Ariz. 179, 181 (App. 1997) (same); see also Jefferson County School Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Tollenaar v. Chino Valley School Districtgreen1 sentence2021See Sanchez, 191 Ariz. at 130–31, 172–73 ¶¶ 10, 22 (stating that the existence and extent of an assumed duty is a fact-specific determination); Tollenaar v. Chino Valley School Dist., 190 Ariz. 179, 181 (App. 1997) (same); see also Jefferson County School Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Boisson v. Arizona Board of Regentsgreen2 sentences2016Boisson v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 236 Ariz. 619, 623, ¶ 11 , 343 P.3d 931, 935 (App. 2015). 2016Boisson v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 236 Ariz. 619, 623, ¶ 11 , 343 P.3d 931, 935 (App. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jamesgreen1 sentence2016State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490, 493, ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Johnstongreen2 sentences2015See Davies, 880 P.2d at 1375 (“A discount for a minority interest is appropriate when the minority shareholder has no ability to control salaries, dividends, profit distribution, and day-to-day corporate operations.”); In re Marriage of Johnston, 223 Mont. 383, 387 , 726 P.2d 322, 325 (1986) (explaining that application of a minority discount may be applied when it “accurately reflect[s]” a minority shareholder’s lack of control); In re Marriage of Branscomb, 201 Or.App. 188, 195-96 , 117 P.3d 1051, 1056 (2005) (noting the application of a minority share discount is a fact-specific inquiry tha 2015See Davies, 880 P.2d at 1375 (“A discount for a minority interest is appropriate when the minority shareholder has no ability to control salaries, dividends, profit distribution, and day-to-day corporate operations.”); In re Marriage of Johnston, 223 Mont. 383, 387 , 726 P.2d 322, 325 (1986) (explaining that application of a minority discount may be applied when it “accurately reflect[s]” a minority shareholder’s lack of control); In re Marriage of Branscomb, 201 Or.App. 188, 195-96 , 117 P.3d 1051, 1056 (2005) (noting the application of a minority share discount is a fact-specific inquiry tha | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Daviesgreen1 sentence2015See Davies, 880 P.2d at 1375 (“A discount for a minority interest is appropriate when the minority shareholder has no ability to control salaries, dividends, profit distribution, and day-to-day corporate operations.”); In re Marriage of Johnston, 223 Mont. 383, 387 , 726 P.2d 322, 325 (1986) (explaining that application of a minority discount may be applied when it “accurately reflect[s]” a minority shareholder’s lack of control); In re Marriage of Branscomb, 201 Or.App. 188, 195-96 , 117 P.3d 1051, 1056 (2005) (noting the application of a minority share discount is a fact-specific inquiry tha | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Marriage of Tofte and Toftegreen2 sentences2015See Davies, 880 P.2d at 1375 (“A discount for a minority interest is appropriate when the minority shareholder has no ability to control salaries, dividends, profit distribution, and day-to-day corporate operations.”); In re Marriage of Johnston, 223 Mont. 383, 387 , 726 P.2d 322, 325 (1986) (explaining that application of a minority discount may be applied when it “accurately reflect[s]” a minority shareholder’s lack of control); In re Marriage of Branscomb, 201 Or.App. 188, 195-96 , 117 P.3d 1051, 1056 (2005) (noting the application of a minority share discount is a fact-specific inquiry tha 2015See Davies, 880 P.2d at 1375 (“A discount for a minority interest is appropriate when the minority shareholder has no ability to control salaries, dividends, profit distribution, and day-to-day corporate operations.”); In re Marriage of Johnston, 223 Mont. 383, 387 , 726 P.2d 322, 325 (1986) (explaining that application of a minority discount may be applied when it “accurately reflect[s]” a minority shareholder’s lack of control); In re Marriage of Branscomb, 201 Or.App. 188, 195-96 , 117 P.3d 1051, 1056 (2005) (noting the application of a minority share discount is a fact-specific inquiry tha | 1 | 1 |
In re the Marriage of Branscombgreen2 sentences2015See Davies, 880 P.2d at 1375 (“A discount for a minority interest is appropriate when the minority shareholder has no ability to control salaries, dividends, profit distribution, and day-to-day corporate operations.”); In re Marriage of Johnston, 223 Mont. 383, 387 , 726 P.2d 322, 325 (1986) (explaining that application of a minority discount may be applied when it “accurately reflect[s]” a minority shareholder’s lack of control); In re Marriage of Branscomb, 201 Or.App. 188, 195-96 , 117 P.3d 1051, 1056 (2005) (noting the application of a minority share discount is a fact-specific inquiry tha 2015See Davies, 880 P.2d at 1375 (“A discount for a minority interest is appropriate when the minority shareholder has no ability to control salaries, dividends, profit distribution, and day-to-day corporate operations.”); In re Marriage of Johnston, 223 Mont. 383, 387 , 726 P.2d 322, 325 (1986) (explaining that application of a minority discount may be applied when it “accurately reflect[s]” a minority shareholder’s lack of control); In re Marriage of Branscomb, 201 Or.App. 188, 195-96 , 117 P.3d 1051, 1056 (2005) (noting the application of a minority share discount is a fact-specific inquiry tha | 1 | 1 |
Prince v. City of Apache Junctiongreen2 sentences2013Although this does not provide a clear legal standard for determining whether any particular fee is “nominal” for purposes of the recreational-use immunity statute, unless and until the legislature speaks more definitively in this area, the question can be answered only through a fact-specific inquiry that incorporates relevant factors from the definition of “nominal” as that word is commonly understood. 7 Whether the fee charged by the golf course in this case fit within the definition of “nominal” was disputed by the parties and, under the standard articulated above, is a mixed question of l 2013Although this does not provide a clear legal standard for determining whether any particular fee is “nominal” for purposes of the recreational-use immunity statute, unless and until the legislature speaks more definitively in this area, the question can be answered only through a fact-specific inquiry that incorporates relevant factors from the definition of “nominal” as that word is commonly understood. 7 Whether the fee charged by the golf course in this case fit within the definition of “nominal” was disputed by the parties and, under the standard articulated above, is a mixed question of l | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rogovichgreen2 sentences2007Also, the official Comment accompanying the adoption of Rule 703 reveals that the rule was not intended to authorize the admission of facts or data that "should be excluded pursuant to an applicable constitutional provision, statute, rule or decision." [7] Our supreme court has also emphasized that if the expert "merely acts as a conduit for another non-testifying expert's opinion, the `expert opinion' is hearsay and is inadmissible, Rule 703 notwithstanding." Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. at 148 , 776 P.2d at 1074 ; see also Rogovich, 188 Ariz. at 42 n. 1, 932 P.2d at 798 n. 1. ¶ 16 Whether an expert 2007Also, the official Comment accompanying the adoption of Rule 703 reveals that the rule was not intended to authorize the admission of facts or data that "should be excluded pursuant to an applicable constitutional provision, statute, rule or decision." [7] Our supreme court has also emphasized that if the expert "merely acts as a conduit for another non-testifying expert's opinion, the `expert opinion' is hearsay and is inadmissible, Rule 703 notwithstanding." Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. at 148 , 776 P.2d at 1074 ; see also Rogovich, 188 Ariz. at 42 n. 1, 932 P.2d at 798 n. 1. ¶ 16 Whether an expert | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bojorquez
green
1 sentence2025An error is harmless if “the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). ¶16 The trial court instructed the jury that a defendant is justified in using physical force in self-defense if: “A reasonable person in the situation would have believed that physical force was immediately necessary to protect against another’s use . . . of unlawful physical force and the defendant used . . . no more physical force than what appeared necessary to a reasonable person in the situa | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State Ex Rel. Montgomery v. Miller
green
1 sentence2024Id. at ¶¶ 23–24. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co.
green
1 sentence2023Relying on White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), the Appellants argue that the court should have engaged in a fact-specific inquiry and weighed the interests of the parties to determine whether federal law preempts Arizona’s taxing authority rather than finding the “bright-line” test for federal preemption enunciated in Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co., Inc., 526 U.S. 32 (1999), dispositive. ¶9 In Bracker, the United States Supreme Court considered the extent of state authority to regulate and tax economic activities on Native American reservations | 1 | 2023–2023 |
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker
green
2 sentences2023Relying on White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), the Appellants argue that the court should have engaged in a fact-specific inquiry and weighed the interests of the parties to determine whether federal law preempts Arizona’s taxing authority rather than finding the “bright-line” test for federal preemption enunciated in Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co., Inc., 526 U.S. 32 (1999), dispositive. ¶9 In Bracker, the United States Supreme Court considered the extent of state authority to regulate and tax economic activities on Native American reservations 2023Relying on White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), the Appellants argue that the court should have engaged in a fact-specific inquiry and weighed the interests of the parties to determine whether federal law preempts Arizona’s taxing authority rather than finding the “bright-line” test for federal preemption enunciated in Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co., Inc., 526 U.S. 32 (1999), dispositive. ¶9 In Bracker, the United States Supreme Court considered the extent of state authority to regulate and tax economic activities on Native American reservations | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2016Determining whether an error is 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 Both parties admit Devorce’s BAC at the time of arrest was likely between .181 and .212. 3 STATE v. DEVORCE Decision of the Court fundamental is a fact specific inquiry. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Lundstrom
green
2 sentences2007Also, the official Comment accompanying the adoption of Rule 703 reveals that the rule was not intended to authorize the admission of facts or data that "should be excluded pursuant to an applicable constitutional provision, statute, rule or decision." [7] Our supreme court has also emphasized that if the expert "merely acts as a conduit for another non-testifying expert's opinion, the `expert opinion' is hearsay and is inadmissible, Rule 703 notwithstanding." Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. at 148 , 776 P.2d at 1074 ; see also Rogovich, 188 Ariz. at 42 n. 1, 932 P.2d at 798 n. 1. ¶ 16 Whether an expert 2007Also, the official Comment accompanying the adoption of Rule 703 reveals that the rule was not intended to authorize the admission of facts or data that "should be excluded pursuant to an applicable constitutional provision, statute, rule or decision." [7] Our supreme court has also emphasized that if the expert "merely acts as a conduit for another non-testifying expert's opinion, the `expert opinion' is hearsay and is inadmissible, Rule 703 notwithstanding." Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. at 148 , 776 P.2d at 1074 ; see also Rogovich, 188 Ariz. at 42 n. 1, 932 P.2d at 798 n. 1. ¶ 16 Whether an expert | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Gipson v. Kasey
green
2 sentences2007In identifying this relationship as a factor supporting a finding of duty, the court of appeals noted that “[t]hey were co-workers and friends; they had socialized previously; [and] Followill had asked Kasey for pills in the past.” Gipson, 212 Ariz. at 239 ¶ 16, 129 P.3d at 961 . ¶ 21 A fact-specific analysis of the relationship between the parties is a problematic basis for determining if a duty of care exists. 2007In identifying this relationship as a factor supporting a finding of duty, the court of appeals noted that “[t]hey were co-workers and friends; they had socialized previously; [and] Followill had asked Kasey for pills in the past.” Gipson, 212 Ariz. at 239 ¶ 16, 129 P.3d at 961 . ¶ 21 A fact-specific analysis of the relationship between the parties is a problematic basis for determining if a duty of care exists. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Gottsfield
green
2 sentences1995The same approach was used a few years later in State ex rel Romley v. Gottsfield, 171 Ariz. 195 , 829 P.2d 1241 (App.1992). 1995The same approach was used a few years later in State ex rel Romley v. Gottsfield, 171 Ariz. 195 , 829 P.2d 1241 (App.1992). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Tober
neutral
2 sentences1992State v. Tober, 170 Ariz. 573 , 826 P.2d 1199 (App.1991). 1992State v. Tober, 170 Ariz. 573 , 826 P.2d 1199 (App.1991). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.