fact-specific inquiry in Maryland

2019Larson's Indicia of a Home Work Site With the aforementioned principles in mind, we find persuasive Professor Larson's approach to determining when a home qualifies as a place of employment: When reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of employment generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific work assignment at the end of the particular homeward trip, three principal indicia may be looked for: [1] the quantity and regularity of work performed at home; [2] the continuing presence of work equipment at home; and [3] special circumstances of the particular

2019Larson’s Indicia of a Home Work Site With the aforementioned principles in mind, we find persuasive Professor Larson’s approach to determining when a home qualifies as a place of employment: When reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of employment generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific work assignment at the end of the particular homeward trip, three principal indicia may be looked for: [1] the quantity and regularity of work performed at home; [2] the continuing presence of work equipment at home; and [3] special circumstances of the particular

2012See id. at 458 [ 101 S.Ct. 2860 ] (“[A] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2011See id. at 458 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 (“[A] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2019State v. Okafor , 225 Md.

2019State v. Okafor, 225 Md.

2019Larson's Indicia of a Home Work Site With the aforementioned principles in mind, we find persuasive Professor Larson's approach to determining when a home qualifies as a place of employment: When reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of employment generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific work assignment at the end of the particular homeward trip, three principal indicia may be looked for: [1] the quantity and regularity of work performed at home; [2] the continuing presence of work equipment at home; and [3] special circumstances of the particular

2019Larson’s Indicia of a Home Work Site With the aforementioned principles in mind, we find persuasive Professor Larson’s approach to determining when a home qualifies as a place of employment: When reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of employment generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific work assignment at the end of the particular homeward trip, three principal indicia may be looked for: [1] the quantity and regularity of work performed at home; [2] the continuing presence of work equipment at home; and [3] special circumstances of the particular

2019Larson's Indicia of a Home Work Site With the aforementioned principles in mind, we find persuasive Professor Larson's approach to determining when a home qualifies as a place of employment: When reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of employment generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific work assignment at the end of the particular homeward trip, three principal indicia may be looked for: [1] the quantity and regularity of work performed at home; [2] the continuing presence of work equipment at home; and [3] special circumstances of the particular

2019Larson's Indicia of a Home Work Site With the aforementioned principles in mind, we find persuasive Professor Larson's approach to determining when a home qualifies as a place of employment: When reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of employment generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific work assignment at the end of the particular homeward trip, three principal indicia may be looked for: [1] the quantity and regularity of work performed at home; [2] the continuing presence of work equipment at home; and [3] special circumstances of the particular

2024See Smullen, 380 Md. at 270 (“[I]f the defendant is confronted by a person with a gun, he may reasonably, even if incorrectly, believe that the gun is loaded and presents an imminent danger and shoot the person in self-defense.”); Marr, 362 Md. at 480 (“In making that determination, the facts or 16 In Jones v. State, we stated that if a defendant successfully argues perfect self- defense, then that individual is “legally exonerated from the criminal liability his or her actions may create[.]” 357 Md. 408, 425 (2000) (emphasis added).

2024See Smullen, 380 Md. at 270 (“[I]f the defendant is confronted by a person with a gun, he may reasonably, even if incorrectly, believe that the gun is loaded and presents an imminent danger and shoot the person in self-defense.”); Marr, 362 Md. at 480 (“In making that determination, the facts or 16 In Jones v. State, we stated that if a defendant successfully argues perfect self- defense, then that individual is “legally exonerated from the criminal liability his or her actions may create[.]” 357 Md. 408, 425 (2000) (emphasis added).

2024See Smullen, 380 Md. at 270 (“[I]f the defendant is confronted by a person with a gun, he may reasonably, even if incorrectly, believe that the gun is loaded and presents an imminent danger and shoot the person in self-defense.”); Marr, 362 Md. at 480 (“In making that determination, the facts or 16 In Jones v. State, we stated that if a defendant successfully argues perfect self- defense, then that individual is “legally exonerated from the criminal liability his or her actions may create[.]” 357 Md. 408, 425 (2000) (emphasis added).

2022Whether a defendant’s conduct rises to the level of gross negligence is a fact- specific inquiry and “[t]here is no scientific test or quantifiable probability of death that converts ordinary negligence to criminal gross negligence.” Id. at 159 , 211 A.3d at 289 .

2022Whether a defendant’s conduct rises to the level of gross negligence is a fact- specific inquiry and “[t]here is no scientific test or quantifiable probability of death that converts ordinary negligence to criminal gross negligence.” Id. at 159 , 211 A.3d at 289 .

2021See Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 150-53, 156 (2006). 15 In the Court of Special Appeals, the State defended the circuit court’s ruling that Corporal Russell did not seize Carter.

2019The court should give due weight (. . . continued) Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 369 , 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999) (citation omitted).

2019The court should give due weight (. . . continued) Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 369 , 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999) (citation omitted).

2019It is a fact-specific inquiry, which the court must view “through the eyes of a reasonably prudent police officer.” Sellman, 449 Md. at 542 , 144 A.3d at 781 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

2019It is a fact-specific inquiry, which the court must view “through the eyes of a reasonably prudent police officer.” Sellman, 449 Md. at 542 , 144 A.3d at 781 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

2015See, e.g., Sánchez- Rodríguez v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, 673 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012); E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 2008).

2015See, e.g., Sánchez- Rodríguez v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, 673 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012); E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 2008).

2013One reasonable alternative is an inquiry into the jury’s status and intention to render a verdict regarding those counts as to which unanimity appears, self-reported, to exist. 15 In making this inquiry, however, the trial judge “treads a fine line ...: he must neither pressure the jury to reconsider what it had actually decided nor force the jury to turn a tentative decision into a final one.” United States v. Heriot, 496 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 802 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir.1986)); see also Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88, 98 , 371 A.2d 663, 668 (1977) (“Co

2013One reasonable alternative is an inquiry into the jury’s status and intention to render a verdict regarding those counts as to which unanimity appears, self-reported, to exist. 15 In making this inquiry, however, the trial judge “treads a fine line ...: he must neither pressure the jury to reconsider what it had actually decided nor force the jury to turn a tentative decision into a final one.” United States v. Heriot, 496 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 802 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir.1986)); see also Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88, 98 , 371 A.2d 663, 668 (1977) (“Co

2013One reasonable alternative is an inquiry into the jury’s status and intention to render a verdict regarding those counts as to which unanimity appears, self-reported, to exist. 15 In making this inquiry, however, the trial judge “treads a fine line ...: he must neither pressure the jury to reconsider what it had actually decided nor force the jury to turn a tentative decision into a final one.” United States v. Heriot, 496 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 802 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir.1986)); see also Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88, 98 , 371 A.2d 663, 668 (1977) (“Co

2013Rather, the determination of whether there is manifest necessity for a mistrial — or, a “high degree” of necessity, Washington, 434 U.S. at 506-07 , 98 S.Ct. at 831 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728 — is a fact-specific inquiry not reducible to “a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.” Id. at 505-06, 509-10 , 98 S.Ct. at 830-32 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728-29 (noting that deference to a trial judge’s discretion guards against the possibility of trial judges otherwise “employ[ing] coercive means to break the apparent deadlock,” which migh

2013Rather, the determination of whether there is manifest necessity for a mistrial — or, a “high degree” of necessity, Washington, 434 U.S. at 506-07 , 98 S.Ct. at 831 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728 — is a fact-specific inquiry not reducible to “a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.” Id. at 505-06, 509-10 , 98 S.Ct. at 830-32 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728-29 (noting that deference to a trial judge’s discretion guards against the possibility of trial judges otherwise “employ[ing] coercive means to break the apparent deadlock,” which migh

2013One reasonable alternative is an inquiry into the jury’s status and intention to render a verdict regarding those counts as to which unanimity appears, self-reported, to exist. 15 In making this inquiry, however, the trial judge “treads a fine line ...: he must neither pressure the jury to reconsider what it had actually decided nor force the jury to turn a tentative decision into a final one.” United States v. Heriot, 496 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 802 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir.1986)); see also Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88, 98 , 371 A.2d 663, 668 (1977) (“Co