fact-specific inquiry in Texas

2024App. 2014) (citations omitted)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[I]t is a fact-specific inquiry, and the facts may or may not support such a finding.” Clark v. State, 573 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no pet.) (citing Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 799 ).

2006The determination of whether a deadly weapon is appropriate in an evading arrest case “is a fact-specific inquiry, and the facts will not always support such a finding.” Id.

2015Ct. 2004) (noting that “various courts have begun to adopt a fact-specific analysis of the particular call and the caller’s motive for making the call” in conducting Crawford analyses); Davis, 111 P.3d at 850 (“In most cases, one who calls 911 for emergency help is not ‘bearing witness,’ whereas calls made to the police simply to report a crime may conceivably be considered testimonial.

2015Ct. 2004) (noting that “various courts have begun to adopt a fact-specific analysis of the particular call and the caller’s motive for making the call” in conducting Crawford analyses); Davis, 111 P.3d at 850 (“In most cases, one who calls 911 for emergency help is not ‘bearing witness,’ whereas calls made to the police simply to report a crime may conceivably be considered testimonial.

2005See George Grubbs Enters. v. Bien, 900 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1995) (“Disregarding the corporate structure . . . demands a fact-specific analysis of each case and therefore demands jury instructions that advise the jury concerning all the factors bearing on their decision.”); Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. 1986). 12 However, a section of her termination paperwork, identifying “dealership,” states “Ancira Motorhomes.” 13 Having found legally insufficient evidence to support a deemed finding that Ancira Enterprises had at least fifteen employees for the required time period du

2005See George Grubbs Enters. v. Bien, 900 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex.1995) (“Disregarding the corporate structure ... demands a fact-specific analysis of each case and therefore demands jury instructions that advise the jury concerning all the factors bearing on their decision.”); Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex.1986).

2017See Mieth v. Ranchquest, Inc., 177 S.W.3d 296, 303-304 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005); N. Ridge Corp. v. Walraven, 957 S.W.2d 116, 119-120 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, pet. denied) (though injuries caused by unrelated spills were capable of being remediated, the cost was more than six times the value of the entire tract; on remand, "to properly determine if it was 'economically feasible’ to ‘repair’ the land, the jury should consider evidence of the difference in the value of the land before and after the injury”); Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22, 32 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2006,

2013See Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22, 32 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

2010See Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Johnson v. State , 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim.

2022Slicker, 464 S.W.3d at 860 (citing Amos v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.)).

2019Id. (citing Amos v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.)).

2022Further, “[w]hether a child was 8 removed for abuse or neglect is a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. (citing In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. 2014)).

2022Further, “[w]hether a child was removed for abuse or neglect is a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. (citing In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. 2014)).

2015Cf. City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Tex. 2006) (in the estoppel context, analyzing what “justice requires” in light of the particularized factual circumstances and context of the case); Trudy’s Texas Star, Inc. v. City of Austin, 307 S.W.3d 894, 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (same); City of Austin Police Dep’t v. Brown, 96 S.W.3d 588, 602 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. dism’d) (“In this instance, in light of these unique facts, and the absence of controlling law, we believe the interest of justice requires a new trial.”).

2015Cf. City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Tex. 2006) (in the estoppel context, analyzing what “justice requires” in light of the particularized factual circumstances and context of the case); Trudy’s Texas Star, Inc. v. City of Austin, 307 S.W.3d 894, 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (same); City of Austin Police Dep’t v. Brown, 96 S.W.3d 588, 602 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. dism’d) (“In this instance, in light of these unique facts, and the absence of controlling law, we believe the interest of justice requires a new trial.”).

2015Cf. City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Tex. 2006) (in the estoppel context, analyzing what “justice requires” in light of the particularized factual circumstances and context of the case); Trudy’s Texas Star, Inc. v. City of Austin, 307 S.W.3d 894, 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (same); City of Austin Police Dep’t v. Brown, 96 S.W.3d 588, 602 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. dism’d) (“In this instance, in light of these unique facts, and the absence of controlling law, we believe the interest of justice requires a new trial.”).

2015Cf. City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Tex. 2006) (in the estoppel context, analyzing what “justice requires” in light of the particularized factual circumstances and context of the case); Trudy’s Texas Star, Inc. v. City of Austin, 307 S.W.3d 894, 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (same); City of Austin Police Dep’t v. Brown, 96 S.W.3d 588, 602 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. dism’d) (“In this instance, in light of these unique facts, and the absence of controlling law, we believe the interest of justice requires a new trial.”).

2015Cf. City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Tex. 2006) (in the estoppel context, analyzing what “justice requires” in light of the particularized factual circumstances and context of the case); Trudy’s Texas Star, Inc. v. City of Austin, 307 S.W.3d 894, 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (same); City of Austin Police Dep’t v. Brown, 96 S.W.3d 588, 602 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. dism’d) (“In this instance, in light of these unique facts, and the absence of controlling law, we believe the interest of justice requires a new trial.”).

2015Cf. City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Tex. 2006) (in the estoppel context, analyzing what “justice requires” in light of the particularized factual circumstances and context of the case); Trudy’s Texas Star, Inc. v. City of Austin, 307 S.W.3d 894, 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (same); City of Austin Police Dep’t v. Brown, 96 S.W.3d 588, 602 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. dism’d) (“In this instance, in light of these unique facts, and the absence of controlling law, we believe the interest of justice requires a new trial.”).

2005See George Grubbs Enters. v. Bien, 900 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1995) (“Disregarding the corporate structure . . . demands a fact-specific analysis of each case and therefore demands jury instructions that advise the jury concerning all the factors bearing on their decision.”); Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. 1986). 12 However, a section of her termination paperwork, identifying “dealership,” states “Ancira Motorhomes.” 13 Having found legally insufficient evidence to support a deemed finding that Ancira Enterprises had at least fifteen employees for the required time period du

2005See George Grubbs Enters. v. Bien, 900 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex.1995) (“Disregarding the corporate structure ... demands a fact-specific analysis of each case and therefore demands jury instructions that advise the jury concerning all the factors bearing on their decision.”); Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex.1986).

2023The Fifth Circuit has described the appropriate review as “a fact-specific inquiry into what EEOC investigations [the administrative charge] can reasonably be expected to trigger.” Id. at 792.

2023The Fifth Circuit has described the appropriate review as “a fact-specific inquiry” into what investigations the administrative charge “can reasonably be expected to trigger.” Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 792 .

2016Id. at 468 .

2011See Dyar, 125 S.W.3d at 464-65 ; Banda, 317 S.W.3d at 912 .

2013With respect to the standard of review, the court of appeals reasoned that the custody determination in this case “necessarily involves an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the two police officers that testified at the suppression hearing, because custody is ‘a fact-specific inquiry,’ and because the only facts in the record were those established by the officers’ testimony.” Id. at *2 (citing Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526, 535 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)).

2013With respect to the standard of review, the court of appeals reasoned that the custody determination in this case “necessarily involves an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the two police officers that testified at the suppression hearing, because custody is ‘a fact-specific inquiry,’ and because the only facts in the record were those established by the officers’ testimony.” Id. at *2 (citing Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526, 535 (Tex. Crim.

2025See id.

2025See id.

2025In re Oceanografia, S.A., 494 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re E.S., No. 07-19-00323-CV, 2019 WL 7342242 , at *1 (Tex. App.— Amarillo Dec. 30, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

2025In re Oceanografia, S.A., 494 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re E.S., No. 07-19-00323-CV, 2019 WL 7342242 , at *1 (Tex. App.— Amarillo Dec. 30, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

2024App. 2014) (citations omitted)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[I]t is a fact-specific inquiry, and the facts may or may not support such a finding.” Clark v. State, 573 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no pet.) (citing Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 799 ).

2023When we review a deadly weapon finding, “it is a fact-specific inquiry, and the facts may or may not support such a finding.” Clark v. State, 573 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2019, no pet.).

2022And “[a]pplying well-established rules of statutory construction, subsection (O) does not require that the parent who failed to comply with a court order be the same person whose abuse or neglect of the child warranted the child’s removal.” See In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (citing In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)).

2022And “[a]pplying well-established rules of statutory construction, subsection (O) does not require that the parent who failed to comply with a court order be the same person whose abuse or neglect of the child warranted the child’s removal.” See In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (citing In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). 8 Father argues that the evidence was insufficient because the Department’s “suspicion and concerns” at the hospital where Mother had just given birth to the Twins were “based only” on Mother’s “

2022And “[a]pplying well-established rules of statutory construction, subsection (O) does not require that the parent who failed to comply with a court order be the same person whose abuse or neglect of the child warranted the child’s removal.” See In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (citing In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)).

2022And “[a]pplying well-established rules of statutory construction, subsection (O) does not require that the parent who failed to comply with a court order be the same person whose abuse or neglect of the child warranted the child’s removal.” See In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (citing In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). 8 Father argues that the evidence was insufficient because the Department’s “suspicion and concerns” at the hospital where Mother had just given birth to the Twins were “based only” on Mother’s “

2026This balancing test is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry that “resists categorization[.]” Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136 .

2025This balancing test is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry that “resists categorization[.]” Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136 .

2015Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)).

2010Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63 .

2025Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 840 (citing Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 710 (Tex. Crim.

2021See Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tex. Crim.

2018In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2013A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d at 428 .