noted rule in Arizona

2009In Ayala Division One of this court noted that a rule promulgated by the Maricopa County Law Enforcement Officers Merit System Council provided that the Council’s decision would be “subject only to administrative review” under the ARA. 136 Ariz. at 92 , 664 P.2d at 242 .

2009In Ayala Division One of this court noted that a rule promulgated by the Maricopa County Law Enforcement Officers Merit System Council provided that the Council’s decision would be “subject only to administrative review” under the ARA. 136 Ariz. at 92 , 664 P.2d at 242 .

2024The court noted that defense counsel “could not recall what efforts he made to gather [his client’s] psychiatric records” and asked no specific questions of his witnesses, rendering his investigation “substantively worthless.” Id. at 945 .

2012The court noted a presumption exists that police have no right to enter a home without a warrant “because it is only in certain carefully defined circumstances that lack of a warrant is excused.” Id. (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)).

2012The court noted a presumption exists that police have no right to enter a home without a warrant “because it is only in certain carefully defined circumstances that lack of a warrant is excused.” Id. (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)).

2012The court noted a presumption exists that police have no right to enter a home without a warrant “because it is only in certain carefully defined circumstances that lack of a warrant is excused.” Id. (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)).

2009The Court reasoned further that an inquiry into whether the error in the jury mechanism prejudiced the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt would not be sufficient because "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action ...; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty." Id. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 . ¶ 62 Citing Fulminante , the Court also noted that error in the trial mechanism is not subject to the type of quantitative analysis that is required in a review for harmless error.

2009The Court reasoned further that an inquiry into whether the error in the jury mechanism prejudiced the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt would not be sufficient because "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action ...; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty." Id. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 . ¶ 62 Citing Fulminante , the Court also noted that error in the trial mechanism is not subject to the type of quantitative analysis that is required in a review for harmless error.

2009Id. at 281-82 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 .

2009Id. at 281-82 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 .

2009The court noted that this rule had been interpreted as requiring “more than the mere deposit of cash” and that “[i]t is not the sum of the bail bond that society asks for, but rather the presence of the defendant ----” Id. 3 In holding that the trial court had the authority to inquire into the source of bond funds, the court stated: [T]he mere deposit of cash bail is not sufficient to deprive the court of the right to inquire into other factors which might bear' on the question of the adequacy of the bail and stress the importance placed upon the ability of the surety to produce the defendant.

2009Id.

2006The court noted that the rule "simply provides that an attorney may not enter into an agreement to refrain from the practice of law." Id.

2006The court noted that the rule “simply provides that an attorney may not enter into an agreement to refrain from the practice of law.” Id.

2003In so ruling, however, the court noted that error may be found harmless if the defendant’s absence has been only “ ‘from some minor portion of the selection process,’ rather than from the whole thing.” Id. at 148, ¶ 17 , 953 P.2d at 540 (quoting State v. Ayers, 133 Ariz. 570, 571 , 653 P.2d 27, 28 (App.1982)). *575 ¶ 68 In the case before us, Dann was present for the selection process and able to see the jurors and assist his counsel.

2002In finding no duty, the court noted that the violation of school rules did not increase the risk of an accident; indeed, the risk existed regardless of any school rule: “With or without rules, neither [the school board nor the district] has any duty to members of the driving public to keep their student ... off the public highways with his automobile during school hours.” Id. at 921 . ¶24 The Indiana Court of Appeals followed Ange in Wickey v. Sparks, 642 N.E.2d 262 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

2002Quoting Gates , the court noted that the standard of review is “ ‘whether the Magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that the ... evidence would be found at the place cited.’” Id. at 987, quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 , 103 S.Ct. at 2331 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 547 .

2002Quoting Gates , the court noted that the standard of review is “ ‘whether the Magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that the ... evidence would be found at the place cited.’” Id. at 987, quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 , 103 S.Ct. at 2331 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 547 .

2002In finding no duty, the court noted that the violation of school rules did not increase the risk of an accident; indeed, the risk existed regardless of any school rule: “With or without rules, neither [the school board nor the district] has any duty to members of the driving public to keep their student ... off the public highways with his automobile during school hours.” Id. at 921 . ¶24 The Indiana Court of Appeals followed Ange in Wickey v. Sparks, 642 N.E.2d 262 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

2002The court noted that the principle of fair apportionment of municipal taxes developed in federal case law under the Commerce Clause, but was adopted and applied to intrastate taxation in City of Los Angeles v. Shell Oil Co., 4 Cal.3d 108, 93 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 480 P.2d 953 (1971), as a matter of equal protection and the California constitutional prohibition against extraterritorial application of state law.

2002The court noted that the principle of fair apportionment of municipal taxes developed in federal case law under the Commerce Clause, but was adopted and applied to intrastate taxation in City of Los Angeles v. Shell Oil Co., 4 Cal.3d 108, 93 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 480 P.2d 953 (1971), as a matter of equal protection and the California constitutional prohibition against extraterritorial application of state law.

2002By analogy, and pursuant to the due process and equal privileges and immunities provisions of the Arizona Constitution, the Prescott court adopted the principle that "[o]ne municipality should not be permitted on the basis of fractional activity to reap an undue windfall at the expense of the taxpayer or another community.” 163 Ariz. at 619 , 790 P.2d at 274 .

2002By analogy, and pursuant to the due process and equal privileges and immunities provisions of the Arizona Constitution, the Prescott court adopted the principle that "[o]ne municipality should not be permitted on the basis of fractional activity to reap an undue windfall at the expense of the taxpayer or another community.” 163 Ariz. at 619 , 790 P.2d at 274 .

2000The operative fact is simply that the conduct of each defendant was a cause and the result is indivisible damage.” Id. at 189, ¶27 , 962 P.2d at 916 . ¶ 25 Thus, once a plaintiff proves that the defendants’ conduct contributed to the plaintiffs damages, see Markiewicz, 118 Ariz. at 338 , 576 P.2d at 526 , the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to apportion damages.

2000The operative fact is simply that the conduct of each defendant was a cause and the result is indivisible damage.” Id. at 189, ¶27 , 962 P.2d at 916 . ¶ 25 Thus, once a plaintiff proves that the defendants’ conduct contributed to the plaintiffs damages, see Markiewicz, 118 Ariz. at 338 , 576 P.2d at 526 , the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to apportion damages.

2000The operative fact is simply that the conduct of each defendant was a cause and the result is indivisible damage.” Id. at 189, ¶27 , 962 P.2d at 916 . ¶ 25 Thus, once a plaintiff proves that the defendants’ conduct contributed to the plaintiffs damages, see Markiewicz, 118 Ariz. at 338 , 576 P.2d at 526 , the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to apportion damages.

1999Southwestern Paint, 191 Ariz. at 42 , 951 P.2d at 1233 .

1999Southwestern Paint, 191 Ariz. at 42 , 951 P.2d at 1233 .

1989In Schoenberger , the court noted that the doctrine of laches was the only restraint upon the time in which to file a special action. 124 Ariz. at 530 , 606 P.2d at 20 .

1989In Schoenberger , the court noted that the doctrine of laches was the only restraint upon the time in which to file a special action. 124 Ariz. at 530 , 606 P.2d at 20 .

1986Id. at 700-701, 95 S.Ct. at 1890-91 .

1986Id. at 700-701, 95 S.Ct. at 1890-91 .

1986Id.

1984Id. at 682 , 86 Cal.App.3d at 914 .

1984Id. at 682 , 86 Cal.App.3d at 914 .

1983The court noted the factors upon which he based his decision on the record in compliance with the rule of State v. Reid, 114 Ariz. 16, 22 , 559 P.2d 136, 142 (1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 921 , 97 S.Ct. 2191 , 53 L.Ed.2d 234 (1977).

1983The court noted the factors upon which he based his decision on the record in compliance with the rule of State v. Reid, 114 Ariz. 16, 22 , 559 P.2d 136, 142 (1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 921 , 97 S.Ct. 2191 , 53 L.Ed.2d 234 (1977).