noted standard in Ohio

2000State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195 , 205 citing State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 231 .

2000State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195 , 205 citing State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 231 .

2000State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195 , 205 citing State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 231 .

2000State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195 , 205 citing State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 231 .

2020Id. at 597 . {¶ 21} This court noted the rule that joint tortfeasors may not seek indemnification or contribution from each other, but it explained that this rule applies when the joint tortfeasors had been actively negligent.

2020Id. at 597 . {¶ 23} This court noted the rule that joint tortfeasors may not seek indemnification or contribution from each other, but it explained that this rule applies when the joint tortfeasors had been actively negligent.

2013Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

2013Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

2008Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38 , 41 , 654 N.E.2d 1327 ; Koos v. Cent.

2008Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38 , 41 , 654 N.E.2d 1327 ; Koos v. Cent.

1999Id.

1999Id.

1995The court noted that an exception existed “where a person is chargeable with another’s wrongful act and pays damages to the injured party as a result thereof.” Id.

1995The court noted that an exception existed “where a person is chargeable with another’s wrongful act and pays damages to the injured party as a result thereof.” Id.

1991Id. at 178 , 524 N.E.2d at 490 , citing State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291 , 18 O.O.3d 472 , 414 N.E.2d 1044 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

1991Id. at 178 , 524 N.E.2d at 490 , citing State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291 , 18 O.O.3d 472 , 414 N.E.2d 1044 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

1991Id. at 178 , 524 N.E.2d at 490 , citing State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291 , 18 O.O.3d 472 , 414 N.E.2d 1044 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

1991Id. at 178 , 524 N.E.2d at 490 , citing State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291 , 18 O.O.3d 472 , 414 N.E.2d 1044 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2026State v. Allen, 2025-Ohio-2789 (2d Dist.).1 {¶ 26} The court indicated that Allen, acting pro se, filed a motion to stay proceedings “several weeks ago” and that it did not consider the motion because Allen was represented 1 “Once an appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals, the trial court retains all jurisdiction not inconsistent with that of the Court of Appeals to review, affirm, modify or reverse the final judgment from which the appeal has been perfected.” State v. Gibbs, 1983 WL 2546 (2d Dist.

2025And while the Court noted that the hearing that is required varies based on the circumstances of the case, it concluded that due process requires “‘an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO . . . , ‘for (a) hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,’ Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, 339 U.S. at 313 , 70 S.Ct. at 657 .” Boddie at 378 .

2025And while the Court noted that the hearing that is required varies based on the circumstances of the case, it concluded that due process requires “‘an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO . . . , ‘for (a) hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,’ Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, 339 U.S. at 313 , 70 S.Ct. at 657 .” Boddie at 378 .

2025And while the Court noted that the hearing that is required varies based on the circumstances of the case, it concluded that due process requires “‘an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO . . . , ‘for (a) hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,’ Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, 339 U.S. at 313 , 70 S.Ct. at 657 .” Boddie at 378 .

2023State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2002-Ohio-6625 , 779 N.E.2d 1011 , ¶ 19.” {¶16} The court said that appellant’s argument of ineffective assistance of counsel had been raised on direct appeal and found to be without merit.

2023State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2002-Ohio-6625 , 779 N.E.2d 1011 , ¶ 19.” {¶16} The court said that appellant’s argument of ineffective assistance of counsel had been raised on direct appeal and found to be without merit.

2022I disagree with this approach as more akin to de novo review, relying on reasoning never articulated or even implicitly applied by the trial court. “‘Abuse of discretion’ has been described as including a ruling that lacks a ‘sound reasoning process.’” State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337 , 2012-Ohio-2407 , 972 N.E.2d 528 , ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 , 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). {¶ 58} Considering the sparse analysis, it appears the trial court noted the claim for fraud and concluded Civ.R. 60(B)(3) was the only applicab

2022I disagree with this approach as more akin to de novo review, relying on reasoning never articulated or even implicitly applied by the trial court. “‘Abuse of discretion’ has been described as including a ruling that lacks a ‘sound reasoning process.’” State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337 , 2012-Ohio-2407 , 972 N.E.2d 528 , ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 , 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). {¶ 58} Considering the sparse analysis, it appears the trial court noted the claim for fraud and concluded Civ.R. 60(B)(3) was the only applicab

2022I disagree with this approach as more akin to de novo review, relying on reasoning never articulated or even implicitly applied by the trial court. “‘Abuse of discretion’ has been described as including a ruling that lacks a ‘sound reasoning process.’” State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337 , 2012-Ohio-2407 , 972 N.E.2d 528 , ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 , 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). {¶ 58} Considering the sparse analysis, it appears the trial court noted the claim for fraud and concluded Civ.R. 60(B)(3) was the only applicab

2022However, it is well-settled law that “the fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct contemplated by Civ.R. 60(B)(3) refers to deceit or other unconscionable conduct committed by a party to obtain judgment and does not refer to conduct that would have been a defense to or claim in the case itself.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75 , 2014-Ohio- 4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 13 ; PNC Bank, Natl.

2022However, it is well-settled law that “the fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct contemplated by Civ.R. 60(B)(3) refers to deceit or other unconscionable conduct committed by a party to obtain judgment and does not refer to conduct that would have been a defense to or claim in the case itself.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75 , 2014-Ohio- 4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 13 ; PNC Bank, Natl.

2020Montgomery No. 26122, 2015-Ohio-3793, ¶ 12 . {¶ 11} Counsel, with the noted exception, concedes the trial court’s compliance -6- with Crim.R. 11.

2018Montgomery No. 8591, 1984 WL 3840 , *1 (Aug. 27, 1984) ; Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. , 70 Ohio St.2d 207 , 209, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982). {¶ 92} In Schade , the court noted that if waiver occurs, courts can consider plain error, which is noticed with " 'utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.' " Schade at 209, 436 N.E.2d 1001 , quoting State v. Long , 53 Ohio St.2d 91 , 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

2018Montgomery No. 8591, 1984 WL 3840 , *1 (Aug. 27, 1984) ; Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. , 70 Ohio St.2d 207 , 209, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982). {¶ 92} In Schade , the court noted that if waiver occurs, courts can consider plain error, which is noticed with " 'utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.' " Schade at 209, 436 N.E.2d 1001 , quoting State v. Long , 53 Ohio St.2d 91 , 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

2017Id. {¶ 71} As a result, the court concluded that “consistent with our adoption in Kenty 2 In a later appeal, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court, which held a bench trial and decided that the facts did not support the business interference claim.

2017OCSEA at 102, 759 N.E.2d 794 , citing Charlton at 71-73, 521 N.E.2d 804 .

2014Id. at 9 .

2014The court reasoned: “It cannot be said with any degree of probability, let alone conclusively, that [the defendant] was unavoidably prevented from discovering any alleged misconduct * * * since none of his attorneys asked about juror misconduct, outside influence, tampering or other improper conduct which could have been identified and proved by means of outside sources.” Id. at 75 . {¶ 10} In the Portis case cited by the trial court below, the defendant was convicted of complicity in the commission of a robbery.

2013The court noted that the test adopted in Belvedere “struck the correct balance between the guiding principles of limited shareholder liability and the fact that shareholders occasionally misuse the corporate form as a shield from liability for their own misdeeds.” Id., citing Belvedere at 287, 289.

2012Id., 794-95 . {¶ 84} This Court noted the rule that Civ.R. 60(B)(5) cannot be used as a substitute for the other specific grounds in Civ.R. 60(B) and further noted, however, that “that requirement does not preclude the use of Civ.R. 60(B)(5) on the basis of operative facts different from and/or in addition to those contemplated by Civ.R. 60(B)(1).” Id., 797 .

2012Id., 794-95 . {¶ 84} This Court noted the rule that Civ.R. 60(B)(5) cannot be used as a substitute for the other specific grounds in Civ.R. 60(B) and further noted, however, that “that requirement does not preclude the use of Civ.R. 60(B)(5) on the basis of operative facts different from and/or in addition to those contemplated by Civ.R. 60(B)(1).” Id., 797 .