noted rule in Illinois

2021Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d at 219 .

2015In Hanson, our supreme court determined that a grant of a defense motion for a psychological evaluation, without more, does not create a sufficient inference that the trial court found bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness to stand trial such that the trial court would be required to hold a fitness hearing before proceeding. ¶ 70 Specifically, the court noted that the defense motion referred only to section 104-13(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/104-13(a) (West 2012)) and made no reference to section 104-11(a) or (b). 18 Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d at 218 .

2021The court noted that the doctrine was firmly established in federal law and had - 25 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200342-U been the subject of several United States Supreme Court cases, which identified three requirements for associational standing: “ ‘(a) [the organization’s] members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.’ ” International Union, 215 Ill.2d at 47 (quoting Hunt v. Was

2008The court noted that the doctrine was firmly established in federal law and had been the subject of several United States Supreme Court cases, which identified three requirements for associational standing: “ ‘(a) [the organization’s] members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.’ ” International Union, 215 Ill. 2d at 47 , quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising

2021In considering the issue on review, this court noted the rule that “[w]hen a motion in limine is denied, the unsuccessful movant is left with the - 22 - procedure of specifically objecting to the evidence when it is offered at trial.” Id. at 206 .

2021In considering the issue on review, this court noted the rule that “[w]hen a motion in limine is denied, the unsuccessful movant is left with the procedure of specifically objecting to the evidence when it is offered at trial.” Id. at 206 .

2020In addressing the State’s argument the defendant failed to plead enough facts to justify further proceedings, the court noted its analysis was not finished, as “young adult defendants are not entitled to make an as-applied challenge to their sentences under Miller unless they first show that Miller applies to them.” Id. ¶ 27 (citing Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45 ).

2020In addressing the State’s argument the defendant failed to plead enough facts to justify further proceedings, the court noted its analysis was not finished as “young adult defendants are not entitled to make an as-applied challenge to their sentences under Miller unless they first show that Miller applies to them.” Id. ¶ 27 (citing Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45 ).

2019Id. at 509 ; see also Berbig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 378 Ill.

2018Id. at 509 , 274 Ill.Dec. 368 , 791 N.E.2d 164 .

2017The court noted that the doctrine of absolute privilege is broad in scope, has been “liberally protected” by Illinois courts, and to carve an expert-witness exception into - 12 - No. 1-16-3313 the doctrine would require the court to “break with Illinois precedent *** [and] go beyond the most far-reaching precedents in any jurisdiction.” Id. at 906 . ¶ 32 We agree with the decision in McNall and see no reason to depart from its holding.

2017The court noted that the doctrine of absolute privilege is broad in scope, that the doctrine has been “liberally protected” by Illinois courts, and that an expert-witness exception to the doctrine would require the court to “break with Illinois -7- precedent *** [and] go beyond the most far-reaching precedents in any jurisdiction.” Id. at 907 . ¶ 32 We agree with the decision in McNall and see no reason to depart from its holding.

2017Willhite, 399 Ill.

2017Willhite, 399 Ill.

2015In analyzing the issue, the Court noted that a claim for fraudulent transfer was not a core claim: "There can be little doubt that fraudulent conveyance actions by bankruptcy trustees – suits which, we said in Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S., at 94-95 (citation omitted), 'constitute no part of the proceedings in bankruptcy but concern controversies arising out of it' – are quintessentially suits at common law that more nearly resemble state-law contract claims ***." Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56 .

2015In analyzing the issue, the Court noted that a claim for fraudulent transfer was not a core claim: “There can be little doubt that fraudulent conveyance actions by bankruptcy trustees–suits which, we said in Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S., at 94-95 (citation omitted), ‘constitute no part of the proceedings in bankruptcy but concern controversies arising out of it’–are quintessentially suits at common law that more nearly resemble state-law contract claims ***.” Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56 .

2015However, the court noted an exception “if the owner makes any payments to the original contractor which are in violation of the rights of any subcontractor.” Id. at 73 .

2015However, the court noted an exception "if the owner makes any payments to the original contractor which are in violation of the rights of any subcontractor." Id. at 73 .

2015The court noted that this clause was applicable to the fines at issue because they served "the punitive purpose of deterring owners from allowing their vehicles to be used for prohibited purposes." Towers, 173 F.3d at 624 .

2015The court noted that this clause was applicable to the fines at issue because they served “the punitive purpose of deterring owners from allowing their vehicles to be used for prohibited purposes.” Towers, 173 F.3d at 624 .

2015Counsel had also filed a Franks motion (Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)) relating to the controlled drug buys and the time frame around those buys.

2015Counsel had also filed a Franks motion (Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)) relating to the controlled drug buys and the time frame around those buys.

2014The court also noted the doctrine applies equally to a chapter 7 and a chapter 13 bankruptcy, "as both chapters require full disclosure of assets." Berge, 2011 IL App (1st) 103778, ¶ 20 . ¶ 15 The second case is Holland, in which the Fifth District determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to apply the doctrine.

2014The court also noted the doctrine applies equally to a chapter 7 and a chapter 13 bankruptcy, “as both chapters require full disclosure of assets.” Berge, 2011 IL App (1st) 103778, ¶ 20 . ¶ 15 The second case is Holland, in which the Fifth District determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to apply the doctrine.

2012In re Lisa G.C., 373 Ill.App.3d at 593 , 313 Ill.Dec. 67 , 871 N.E.2d at 801 .

2012In re Lisa G.C., 373 Ill.App.3d at 593 , 313 Ill.Dec. 67 , 871 N.E.2d at 801 .

2012Hudson, 378 Ill.App.3d at 392 , 317 Ill.Dec. 262 , 881 N.E.2d 430 .

2012Hudson, 378 Ill.App.3d at 392 , 317 Ill.Dec. 262 , 881 N.E.2d 430 .

2011Id.

2011Id.

2011Laas, 134 Ill.App.3d at 510 , 89 Ill.Dec. 440 , 480 N.E.2d 1183 .

2011Laas, 134 Ill.App.3d at 510 , 89 Ill.Dec. 440 , 480 N.E.2d 1183 .

2008The court noted that the exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous statements or declarations "has commonly been applied only where there has been independent evidence of an exciting event." Jones, 231 F.2d at 245 , citing Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138, 140 (D.C.

2008The court noted that the exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous statements or declarations “has commonly been applied only where there has been independent evidence of an exciting event.” Jones, 231 F.2d at 245 , citing Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138, 140 (D.C.

2008“The question is whether the lower court *** has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality.” Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 212 , 97 L.

2008“The question is whether the lower court *** has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality.” Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 212 , 97 L.

2008With respect to count I, the court noted the rule, adopted by this court in Pfister v. Shusta, 167 Ill.2d 417 , 212 Ill.

2008With respect to count I, the court noted the rule, adopted by this court in Pfister v. Shusta, 167 Ill.2d 417 , 212 Ill.

2008Hollembaek, 137 Ill.App.3d at 778 , 92 Ill.Dec. 382 , 484 N.E.2d 1237 , citing Crothers v. La Salle Institute, 68 Ill.2d 399 , 12 Ill.Dec. 590 , 370 N.E.2d 213 (1977). "[A] trial court should take into account various factors, including the existence of an excuse for the failure to introduce the evidence at trial, e.g., whether it was inadvertence or calculated risk; whether the adverse party will be surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the new evidence; whether the evidence is of utmost importance to the movant's case; and whether there are the most cogent reasons to deny the request." Hollemb

2008Hollembaek, 137 Ill.App.3d at 778 , 92 Ill.Dec. 382 , 484 N.E.2d 1237 , citing Crothers v. La Salle Institute, 68 Ill.2d 399 , 12 Ill.Dec. 590 , 370 N.E.2d 213 (1977). "[A] trial court should take into account various factors, including the existence of an excuse for the failure to introduce the evidence at trial, e.g., whether it was inadvertence or calculated risk; whether the adverse party will be surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the new evidence; whether the evidence is of utmost importance to the movant's case; and whether there are the most cogent reasons to deny the request." Hollemb

2007Moore, 219 Ill. 2d at 490 , 848 N.E.2d at 1027 .

2007Moore, 219 Ill. 2d at 490 , 848 N.E.2d at 1027 .

2006Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 , 120 S.Ct. at 2061 , 147 L.Ed.2d at 58 .

2006Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 , 120 S.Ct. at 2061 , 147 L.Ed.2d at 58 .

2005Sepmeyer , 162 Ill. 2d at 255 , 642 N.E.2d at 1245 (relying on Board of Education of Normal School District v. Blodgett , 155 Ill. 441, 449 , 40 N.E. 1025 , 1027 (1895)).

2005Sepmeyer, 162 Ill. 2d at 255 , 642 N.E.2d at 1245 , relying on Board of Education of Normal School District v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 449 , 40 N.E. 1025 , 1027 (1895).