noted rule in Alaska

2006After discussing Strand's figures and adopting them subject to minor changes, the court noted that its analysis "resulted] in excess income somewhere in the neighborhood of $20,000 that could be attributable to the intangible components of the business.” Moreover, when Blanton’s counsel asked whether the "interim profits that Dr. Fort-son earned from the business during the separation period [were] not a marital asset,” Judge Gleason replied, "I think that's implicit in my ruling.... [I]n terms of her income ... that's her income, and post-separation earnings were not included in this division

2006Id. at 887 ; accord Money v. Money, 852 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Alaska 1993). 29 . 955 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1998). 30 .

2002In finding no duty, the court noted that the violation of school rules did not increase the risk of an accident; indeed, the risk existed regardless of any school rule: "With or without rules, neither [the school board nor the district] has any duty to members of the driving public to keep their student ... off the public highways with his automobile during school hours." Id. at 921 . 124 The Indiana Court of Appeals followed Ange in Wickey v. Sparks, 642 N.E.2d 262 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

1991The court noted that the rule precluding a lawyer from performing the roles of both a witness and an advocate “is fully applicable to deputy district attorneys and proscribes a single deputy’s acting as both trial prosecutor and material trial witness on behalf of the prosecution.” Id., 150 Cal.Rptr. at 172 .

1991The court noted that the rule precluding a lawyer from performing the roles of both a witness and an advocate “is fully applicable to deputy district attorneys and proscribes a single deputy’s acting as both trial prosecutor and material trial witness on behalf of the prosecution.” Id., 150 Cal.Rptr. at 172 .

1982In affirming a jury verdict in favor of the insured’s beneficiary, the court noted that the clause could reasonably be read “to indicate an intention that the exclusion provided for would end when the insured had safely descended from the plane.” Id. 319 P.2d at 389 .

1982In affirming a jury verdict in favor of the insured’s beneficiary, the court noted that the clause could reasonably be read “to indicate an intention that the exclusion provided for would end when the insured had safely descended from the plane.” Id. 319 P.2d at 389 .

1982In that case, the jury could not have determined the plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity from just knowing the nature of his injury (injured ankle) and his occupation (attorney). 432 P.2d at 617 . *1342 In Morrison , this court emphasized Nes-bett’s holding “that impairment of earning capacity is the permanent diminution of the ability to earn money.” 516 P.2d at 404 (emphasis in original).