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13 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Smithgreen1 sentence1996The Board acknowledges that its recommendation of probation for negligent misappropriation is more lenient than the sanction imposed in prior cases of misappropriation, but it has made its recommendation as an “exercis[e] [of its] ... broad discretion in handing out discipline,” see Matter of Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979), and that the above noted factors present “extensive mitigating circumstances.” We agree with the Board that the disciplinary system should be flexible enough to accommodate alternative sanctions in cases where there are mitigating circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Stowgreen1 sentence1996In re Stow, 633 A.2d 782, 785-86 (D.C.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1988See Jones v. United States, 512 A.2d 253, 257-258 (D.C.1986); Tuckson v. United States, 364 A.2d 138, 142 (D.C.1976). | 1 | 1 |
Tuckson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1988See Jones v. United States, 512 A.2d 253, 257-258 (D.C.1986); Tuckson v. United States, 364 A.2d 138, 142 (D.C.1976). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Earl Cookgreen2 sentences1982The court's instruction fully comported with the definition of disfigurement set forth in Cook, supra at 199 , 462 F.2d at 303 , where the court noted that a violation of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-506, "requires permanence of injury or disfigurement in some *26 appreciable form " (emphasis added). 1982The court’s instruction fully comported with the definition of disfigurement set forth in Cook, supra at 199 , 462 F.2d at 303 , where the court noted that a violation of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-506, “requires permanence of injury or disfigurement in some appreciable form” (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ralph D. Smith and Thelma Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., a Body Corporate
green
2 sentences1989Id. at 95, 469 F.2d at 106 . 1988Id. 152 U.S.App.D.C. at 95, 469 F.2d at 106 . | 2 | 1988–1989 |
Donald Saucier v. Elliot M. Katz and in Defense of Animals
red
1 sentence2005The Court noted that the privilege is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
New York v. Quarles
green
2 sentences2003The Court noted that the exception was a narrow one, id. at 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 and that its availability “does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.” Id. at 656 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ; cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“actual motivations” or “subjective intentions” of police officers “play no role” in determination of probable cause under Fourth Amendment). 2003The Court noted that the exception was a narrow one, id. at 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 and that its availability “does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.” Id. at 656 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ; cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“actual motivations” or “subjective intentions” of police officers “play no role” in determination of probable cause under Fourth Amendment). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Whren v. United States
green
2 sentences2003The Court noted that the exception was a narrow one, id. at 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 and that its availability “does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.” Id. at 656 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ; cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“actual motivations” or “subjective intentions” of police officers “play no role” in determination of probable cause under Fourth Amendment). 2003The Court noted that the exception was a narrow one, id. at 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 and that its availability “does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.” Id. at 656 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ; cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“actual motivations” or “subjective intentions” of police officers “play no role” in determination of probable cause under Fourth Amendment). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Winters v. United States
green
2 sentences1996The government suggested taking a partial verdict, continuing deliberations "until the end of the day," and resuming deliberations the next day without an anti-deadlock instruction under Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530 (D.C.1974). 1996The government suggested taking a partial verdict, continuing deliberations “until the end of the day,” and resuming deliberations the next day without an anti-deadlock instruction under Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530 (D.C.1974). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Government Employees Insurance v. Group Hospitalization Medical Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992The court noted that waiver in insurance law requires “an actual intention to relinquish an existing right, benefit, or advantage, with knowledge, either actual or constructive, of its existence, or such conduct as to warrant an inference of such intention to relinquish.” Id., citing 16B Appleman, INSURANCE Law and PRACTICE § 9085 (1981). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Carson v. United States
green
2 sentences1990The Carson court concluded that prior decisions indicated that the crime was more than a general intent crime but less than a specific intent crime, id., and, by analogy to our equating of the terms “evil intent” and “malice” in other contexts, see United States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208 (D.C.1975) (manslaughter requires malice or “evil design”), held that the “something more [required by the cruelty to children statute] would seem to be malice.” Carson, supra, 556 A.2d at 1078 . 6 Finally, the court noted that the standard of general intent with malice advances the essential purpose of the st 1990The Carson court concluded that prior decisions indicated that the crime was more than a general intent crime but less than a specific intent crime, id., and, by analogy to our equating of the terms “evil intent” and “malice” in other contexts, see United States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208 (D.C.1975) (manslaughter requires malice or “evil design”), held that the “something more [required by the cruelty to children statute] would seem to be malice.” Carson, supra, 556 A.2d at 1078 . 6 Finally, the court noted that the standard of general intent with malice advances the essential purpose of the st | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Bradford
green
1 sentence1990The Carson court concluded that prior decisions indicated that the crime was more than a general intent crime but less than a specific intent crime, id., and, by analogy to our equating of the terms “evil intent” and “malice” in other contexts, see United States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208 (D.C.1975) (manslaughter requires malice or “evil design”), held that the “something more [required by the cruelty to children statute] would seem to be malice.” Carson, supra, 556 A.2d at 1078 . 6 Finally, the court noted that the standard of general intent with malice advances the essential purpose of the st | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Earl Thomas
green
1 sentence1990The Carson court concluded that prior decisions indicated that the crime was more than a general intent crime but less than a specific intent crime, id., and, by analogy to our equating of the terms “evil intent” and “malice” in other contexts, see United States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208 (D.C.1975) (manslaughter requires malice or “evil design”), held that the “something more [required by the cruelty to children statute] would seem to be malice.” Carson, supra, 556 A.2d at 1078 . 6 Finally, the court noted that the standard of general intent with malice advances the essential purpose of the st | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Lottie R. Seganish and Daniel Seganish v. District of Columbia Safeway Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988Id. 152 U.S.App.D.C. at 95, 469 F.2d at 106 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1986The court noted an exception, however, where the circumstances of a case dictate that a private party “ ‘must be regarded as having acted as an “instrument” or agent of the state.’ ” 424 A.2d at 117 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2048 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). 1986The court noted an exception, however, where the circumstances of a case dictate that a private party “ ‘must be regarded as having acted as an “instrument” or agent of the state.’ ” 424 A.2d at 117 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2048 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
United States v. Lima
green
1 sentence1986The court noted an exception, however, where the circumstances of a case dictate that a private party “ ‘must be regarded as having acted as an “instrument” or agent of the state.’ ” 424 A.2d at 117 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2048 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Davis v. Alaska
green
2 sentences1986Id. at 317-19 , 94 S.Ct. at 1110-11 . 1986Id. at 317-19 , 94 S.Ct. at 1110-11 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
United States v. Engram
green
1 sentence1977In Engram, supra at 492 n. 6, this court noted that defense counsel had not requested discovery pursuant to Super.Ct.Cr.R. 16. 5 .D.C.Code 1973, § 14-305, provides that a witness may be impeached by a prior conviction of a felony or a criminal offense involving dishonesty or false statement. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.