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10 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Collins v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.green2 sentences2021In Collins, the Court noted that the privilege applies in “legislative, judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings and other acts of the State.” 211 W. 2021Va. at 461 , 566 S.E.2d at 598 (Internal citation omitted). 7 In addition to parties who participate in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, this Court has found that the litigation privilege applies to expert and fact witnesses. 8 Similarly, the Court has found that the litigation privilege applies to attorneys. | 1 | 1 |
University of Texas v. Camenischgreen1 sentence2020This is because “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Taylor v. Janesgreen2 sentences2010Taylor v. Janes, 225 W.Va. 329, 335 , 693 S.E.2d 82, 88 (2010) (citing Yeager v. U.S., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2360 , 2367 n. 4, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009)). 10 . 2010Taylor v. Janes, 225 W.Va. 329, 335 , 693 S.E.2d 82, 88 (2010) (citing Yeager v. U.S., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2360 , 2367 n. 4, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009)). 10 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences2013In relying upon Fahy , the court reiterated that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710-11 . 2013In relying upon Fahy , the court reiterated that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710-11 . | 3 | 1994–2013 |
Yeager v. United States
green
2 sentences2010Taylor v. Janes, 225 W.Va. 329, 335 , 693 S.E.2d 82, 88 (2010) (citing Yeager v. U.S., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2360 , 2367 n. 4, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009)). 10 . 2010Taylor v. Janes, 225 W.Va. 329, 335 , 693 S.E.2d 82, 88 (2010) (citing Yeager v. U.S., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2360 , 2367 n. 4, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009)). 10 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Fredeking v. Tyler
green
2 sentences2010In syllabus point 1 of Fredeking v. Tyler, 224 W.Va. 1 , 680 S.E.2d 16 (2009), this Court noted that the standard of review with respect to an order granting or denying a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, after trial, is de novo. 2010In syllabus point 1 of Fredeking v. Tyler, 224 W.Va. 1 , 680 S.E.2d 16 (2009), this Court noted that the standard of review with respect to an order granting or denying a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, after trial, is de novo. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
McDowell v. Dye
green
2 sentences2007In Hopkins v. Grubb, 160 W.Va. 71 , 230 S.E.2d 470 (1977), this Court noted that the standard for gross negligence in the operation of an automobile had been enunciated by the Virginia Supreme Court in McDowell v. Dye, 193 Va. 390 , 69 S.E.2d 459 (1952). 2007In Hopkins v. Grubb, 160 W.Va. 71 , 230 S.E.2d 470 (1977), this Court noted that the standard for gross negligence in the operation of an automobile had been enunciated by the Virginia Supreme Court in McDowell v. Dye, 193 Va. 390 , 69 S.E.2d 459 (1952). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hopkins v. Grubb
green
2 sentences2007In Hopkins v. Grubb, 160 W.Va. 71 , 230 S.E.2d 470 (1977), this Court noted that the standard for gross negligence in the operation of an automobile had been enunciated by the Virginia Supreme Court in McDowell v. Dye, 193 Va. 390 , 69 S.E.2d 459 (1952). 2007In Hopkins v. Grubb, 160 W.Va. 71 , 230 S.E.2d 470 (1977), this Court noted that the standard for gross negligence in the operation of an automobile had been enunciated by the Virginia Supreme Court in McDowell v. Dye, 193 Va. 390 , 69 S.E.2d 459 (1952). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997In setting aside a jury verdict for the employee, this Court noted that requirement (B) had not been satisfied because, inter alia, the evidence indicated that the employer had instructed its workers to turn the system off before entering the area to clean up spillage. 185 W.Va. at 640, 408 S.E.2d at 392. [1] In Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc. 185 W.Va. 88 , 405 S.E.2d 15 (1990), however, this Court commented that the Legislature's effort to narrow the parameters of civil liability in W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) had actually broadened the concept of such liability. 1997In setting aside a jury verdict for the employee, this Court noted that requirement (B) had not been satisfied because, inter alia, the evidence indicated that the employer had instructed its workers to turn the system off before entering the area to clean up spillage. 185 W.Va. at 640, 408 S.E.2d at 392. [1] In Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc. 185 W.Va. 88 , 405 S.E.2d 15 (1990), however, this Court commented that the Legislature's effort to narrow the parameters of civil liability in W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) had actually broadened the concept of such liability. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
National Mutual Insurance v. McMahon & Sons, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995In syllabus point 8 of National Mutual Insurance v. McMahon & Sons, 177 W.Va. 734 , 356 S.E.2d 488 (1987), this Court held: “With respect to insurance contracts, the doctrine of reasonable expectations is that the objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.” In that case, this Court noted that the doctrine of reasonable expectations is limited to instances in which the policy language is ambiguous. 177 W.Va. at 1995In syllabus point 8 of National Mutual Insurance v. McMahon & Sons, 177 W.Va. 734 , 356 S.E.2d 488 (1987), this Court held: “With respect to insurance contracts, the doctrine of reasonable expectations is that the objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.” In that case, this Court noted that the doctrine of reasonable expectations is limited to instances in which the policy language is ambiguous. 177 W.Va. at | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.