noted factors in Oregon

2025Id. at 488 (citing Trenary, 316 Or at 176 ).

2025Id. at 488 (citing Trenary, 316 Or at 176 ).

2025Id. at 488 (citing Trenary, 316 Or at 176 ).

2025Id. at 488 (citing Trenary, 316 Or at 176 ).

2025Cite as 373 Or 213 (2025) 221 Rule 602, as noted, sets out a “personal knowledge” requirement, but with a noted exception: “Subject to the provisions of [Rule 703], a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowl- edge of the matter.” Rule 703 in turn, together with Rule 702, describe special rules that govern the testimony of a qualified expert.

2025Cite as 373 Or 213 (2025) 221 Rule 602, as noted, sets out a “personal knowledge” requirement, but with a noted exception: “Subject to the provisions of [Rule 703], a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowl- edge of the matter.” Rule 703 in turn, together with Rule 702, describe special rules that govern the testimony of a qualified expert.

2022Id. at 615-16 .

2021The court reasoned that the two tests were actually equivalent: “[A] manufac- turer who would be negligent in marketing a given prod- uct, considering its risks, would necessarily be marketing a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase it.” Id. at 493 In a companion case to Phillips, Roach v. Kononen/ Ford Motor Co., 269 Or 457 , 525 P2d 125 (1974), the court had described seven factors that bear on a court’s inquiry as to the sufficiency of the evidence of liability under the reasonable-manufacturer test, which the court said required a balancing of the u

2021The court reasoned that the two tests were actually equivalent: “[A] manufac- turer who would be negligent in marketing a given prod- uct, considering its risks, would necessarily be marketing a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase it.” Id. at 493 In a companion case to Phillips, Roach v. Kononen/ Ford Motor Co., 269 Or 457 , 525 P2d 125 (1974), the court had described seven factors that bear on a court’s inquiry as to the sufficiency of the evidence of liability under the reasonable-manufacturer test, which the court said required a balancing of the u

2021The court reasoned that the two tests were actually equivalent: “[A] manufac- turer who would be negligent in marketing a given prod- uct, considering its risks, would necessarily be marketing a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase it.” Id. at 493 In a companion case to Phillips, Roach v. Kononen/ Ford Motor Co., 269 Or 457 , 525 P2d 125 (1974), the court had described seven factors that bear on a court’s inquiry as to the sufficiency of the evidence of liability under the reasonable-manufacturer test, which the court said required a balancing of the u

2021In McCathern, 332 Or at 75 , the court explained that, in Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 300 Or 24, 32 , 706 P2d 929 (1985), the court had construed ORS 30.920(3), requiring that subsections (1) 4 The court said in Roach, 269 Or at 464 : “Factors which should be considered by the court in balancing the utility of the risk against the magnitude of the risk are: “(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the public as a whole. “(2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. “(3) The

2021Id. at 484 .

2021In McCathern, 332 Or at 75 , the court explained that, in Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 300 Or 24, 32 , 706 P2d 929 (1985), the court had construed ORS 30.920(3), requiring that subsections (1) 4 The court said in Roach, 269 Or at 464 : “Factors which should be considered by the court in balancing the utility of the risk against the magnitude of the risk are: “(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the public as a whole. “(2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. “(3) The

2021In McCathern, 332 Or at 75 , the court explained that, in Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 300 Or 24, 32 , 706 P2d 929 (1985), the court had construed ORS 30.920(3), requiring that subsections (1) 4 The court said in Roach, 269 Or at 464 : “Factors which should be considered by the court in balancing the utility of the risk against the magnitude of the risk are: “(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the public as a whole. “(2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. “(3) The

2021In McCathern, 332 Or at 75 , the court explained that, in Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 300 Or 24, 32 , 706 P2d 929 (1985), the court had construed ORS 30.920(3), requiring that subsections (1) 4 The court said in Roach, 269 Or at 464 : “Factors which should be considered by the court in balancing the utility of the risk against the magnitude of the risk are: “(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the public as a whole. “(2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. “(3) The

2021The court noted that a standard of proof indicates to the factfinder “the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of [his or her] fac- tual conclusions.” Id. (internal quotation omitted; first alter- ation in original).

2020As to the impact of the October 5 Miranda viola- tion, the court noted that the violation was “not especially ‘flagrant’ ” or coercive, compared to other cases where a later waiver was held to be involuntary; the officers had not used “flagrantly coercive tactics in an effort to elicit an incrimi- nating response.” Ward, 295 Or App at 651 .

2020Indeed, “defen- dant maintained his innocence throughout the exchange and made no patently inculpatory remarks.” Id.

2020Cite as 302 Or App 687 (2020) 705 understood as a final order.

2020At the time of the 2003 amend- ment, a delinquency adjudication order was appealable and 8 Before the amendment, ORS 419A.205(1) (2001), amended by Or Laws 2003, ch 396, § 29, provided that for “the purpose of being appealed * * * [a judgment is a] judgment finding a child to be within the jurisdiction of the court.” 9 In Salahub v. Montgomery Ward, 41 Or App 775, 784-85 , 599 P2d 1210 , rev den, 288 Or 249 (1979) (citing ORS 174.010), the court noted the rule that statutes of the same subject-matter passed during the same legislative session must be construed together “so that each may remain

2020At the time of the 2003 amend- ment, a delinquency adjudication order was appealable and 8 Before the amendment, ORS 419A.205(1) (2001), amended by Or Laws 2003, ch 396, § 29, provided that for “the purpose of being appealed * * * [a judgment is a] judgment finding a child to be within the jurisdiction of the court.” 9 In Salahub v. Montgomery Ward, 41 Or App 775, 784-85 , 599 P2d 1210 , rev den, 288 Or 249 (1979) (citing ORS 174.010), the court noted the rule that statutes of the same subject-matter passed during the same legislative session must be construed together “so that each may remain

2020At the time of the 2003 amend- ment, a delinquency adjudication order was appealable and 8 Before the amendment, ORS 419A.205(1) (2001), amended by Or Laws 2003, ch 396, § 29, provided that for “the purpose of being appealed * * * [a judgment is a] judgment finding a child to be within the jurisdiction of the court.” 9 In Salahub v. Montgomery Ward, 41 Or App 775, 784-85 , 599 P2d 1210 , rev den, 288 Or 249 (1979) (citing ORS 174.010), the court noted the rule that statutes of the same subject-matter passed during the same legislative session must be construed together “so that each may remain

2018In doing so, the court noted that the factors that we identified on review "may well aid in explaining how 'reasonable diligence' factors into a determination of an employer's constructive knowledge." Id.

2016The first was the public interest in “ensuring appropriate use of Cite as 360 Or 269 (2016) 277 force and, in particular, Tasers by law enforcement.” The second was the “public interest in having a safe, high qual- ity police department * * * that can effectively review its own actions and provide discipline, evaluation, and training for its officers.” The court found that the existence of the CRB was evidence of the second of those two competing interests and that the CRB had been created to balance and safe- guard “the public interest in competition here.” The court noted that the exception

2014As the Supreme Court observed in Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219 , 191 P3d 637 (2008), the rule of preservation “gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal.” In State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 548 , 258 P3d 1228 (2011), the court noted that the rule “also ensures fairness to opposing parties, by requiring that the positions of the parties are presented clearly to the initial tribunal” to avoid hampering the ability of those parties to meet an

2014As the Supreme Court observed in Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219 , 191 P3d 637 (2008), the rule of preservation “gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal.” In State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 548 , 258 P3d 1228 (2011), the court noted that the rule “also ensures fairness to opposing parties, by requiring that the positions of the parties are presented clearly to the initial tribunal” to avoid hampering the ability of those parties to meet an

2014As the Supreme Court observed in Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219 , 191 P3d 637 (2008), the rule of preservation “gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal.” In State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 548 , 258 P3d 1228 (2011), the court noted that the rule “also ensures fairness to opposing parties, by requiring that the positions of the parties are presented clearly to the initial tribunal” to avoid hampering the ability of those parties to meet an

2014As the Supreme Court observed in Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219 , 191 P3d 637 (2008), the rule of preservation “gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal.” In State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 548 , 258 P3d 1228 (2011), the court noted that the rule “also ensures fairness to opposing parties, by requiring that the positions of the parties are presented clearly to the initial tribunal” to avoid hampering the ability of those parties to meet an

2013We hold that, when a party chooses to enumerate the elements on which an expert will testify, even though a general assertion would otherwise satisfy the rule, the enumeration must give notice of all elements on which the expert may testify.” Id. (emphasis in original); accord Piskorski v. Ron Tonkin Toyota, Inc., 179 Or App 713, 718 , 41 P3d 1088 (2002); Stotler v. MTD Products, Inc., 149 Or App 405 , 409 n 3, 943 P2d 220 (1997).

2013We hold that, when a party chooses to enumerate the elements on which an expert will testify, even though a general assertion would otherwise satisfy the rule, the enumeration must give notice of all elements on which the expert may testify.” Id. (emphasis in original); accord Piskorski v. Ron Tonkin Toyota, Inc., 179 Or App 713, 718 , 41 P3d 1088 (2002); Stotler v. MTD Products, Inc., 149 Or App 405 , 409 n 3, 943 P2d 220 (1997).

2013In Saunders , the court noted the rule that, ordinarily, a defendant has the right of confrontation. 14 Or at 304 .

2008The court noted the factors listed in Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 823 P2d 956 (1991), that bear on our exercise of discretion: “ ‘[T]he competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the particular case; how the error came to the court’s attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requiring preservation of error have been served in the case in another way, i.e., whether the trial court was, in some manner, presented with both sides of the issue and given an opportunity to correct any error.’ ” 343 O

2008The court noted the factors listed in Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 823 P2d 956 (1991), that bear on our exercise of discretion: “ ‘[T]he competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the particular case; how the error came to the court’s attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requiring preservation of error have been served in the case in another way, i.e., whether the trial court was, in some manner, presented with both sides of the issue and given an opportunity to correct any error.’ ” 343 O

2008The court noted the factors listed in Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 823 P2d 956 (1991), that bear on our exercise of discretion: “ ‘[T]he competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the particular case; how the error came to the court’s attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requiring preservation of error have been served in the case in another way, i.e., whether the trial court was, in some manner, presented with both sides of the issue and given an opportunity to correct any error.’ ” 343 O

2008The court commented that the factors that may be significant in this case are: “(1) defendant’s apparent encouragement of the judge’s choice; (2) the role of the concurrent, permissible 36-month probationary sentence; (3) the possibility that defendant made a strategic choice not to object to the sentence; and (4) the interest of the judicial system in avoiding unnecessary repetitive sentencing proceedings, as well as its interest in requiring preservation of error.” 343 Or at 523 .

2006Id.

2004Id.

2003Id. at 106-13 .

2000The court noted that the privilege and doctrine have been treated as interrelated in *479 other jurisdictions 2 and suggested that the Legislative Commentary to OEC 503 invokes the work-product doctrine by stating that the privilege applies to “an expert who is hired to assist in rendering legal advice or to help in the planning and conduct of litigation, but not one employed to testify as a witness.” Id., quoting Legislative Commentary to OEC 503, reprinted in Laird C.

1997Similarly, OEC 105 does not require that a motion for a limiting instruction be made at a specific time. [1] In his brief, defendant provides: "The narrow question presented in this Assignment of Error is, therefore, whether Ms. Klingbeil's testimony relating to BWS satisfied the requirements of State v. O'Key [, 321 Or. 285 , 899 P.2d 663 (1995)]". [2] 1.

1997Similarly, OEC 105 does not require that a motion for a limiting instruction be made at a specific time. [1] In his brief, defendant provides: "The narrow question presented in this Assignment of Error is, therefore, whether Ms. Klingbeil's testimony relating to BWS satisfied the requirements of State v. O'Key [, 321 Or. 285 , 899 P.2d 663 (1995)]". [2] 1.