noted rule in Washington

2024Doyle again cites inapposite authority, primarily In re Welfare of Smith, 8 Wn.

2024Doyle again cites inapposite authority, primarily In re Welfare of Smith, 8 Wn.

2017The court easily concluded that the purported contract fell within the meaning ofa "written instrument" and held that under CR 10(c) "the contract does become part of the pleadings by simply attaching it " Id The court cautioned, however, that "exhibits that stretch the definition of a 'written instrument,' such as affidavits, are extrinsic evidence that may not be considered as part of the pleadings." |d at 205 (citing Rose v. Bartle. 871 F.2d 331 , 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)). 10 No. 73528-4-1/11 The City and WRJV nevertheless argue for an expansive view of the definition of "written instrument"

2016The court easily concluded that the purported contract fell within the meaning of a "written instrument" and held that under CR 10(c) "the contract does become part of the pleadings by simply attaching it. ..." Id The court cautioned, however, that "exhibits that stretch the definition of a 'written instrument,' such as affidavits, are extrinsic evidence that may not be considered as part of the pleadings." jd. at 205 (citing Rose v. Bartle. 871 F.2d 331 , 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)). 10 No. 73528-4-1/11 The City and WRJV nevertheless argue for an expansive view of the definition of "written instr

2017In re Marriage ofNordby, 41 Wn.

2015In re Marriage of Nordby, 41 Wn.

2015Id. at 171-72 .

2015Id. at 171-72 .

2014The evidentiary issue Kimball raised fell short of this exception In Cox v. General Motors Corp., 64 Wn.

2014The evidentiary issue Kimball raised fell short of this exception. ¶39 In Cox v. General Motors Corp., 64 Wn.

2014The court noted an exception for alleged errors necessarily "fatal to any right ofrecovery." Kimball, 18 Wn.2d at 653 .

2014The court noted an exception for alleged errors necessarily “fatal to any right of recovery.” Kimball, 18 Wn.2d at 653 .

2014Lay, 112 Wn.

2014Id. at 826 .

2009Id.

2009Id.

2003Id. at 822 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 . [1] It is possible article I, section 22 of our state constitution provides greater protection in this arena than does the sixth amendment to the federal constitution, based on the different language in the two provisions.

2003Id. at 822 .

2002This court noted the rule that "[i]mposition of a sentence which is not authorized by the SRA is a fundamental defect which may justify collateral relief." Breedlove, 138 Wash.2d at 304 , 979 P.2d 417 (citing Fleming, 129 Wash.2d at 533 , 919 P.2d 66 ; Moore, 116 Wash.2d at 33 , 803 P.2d 300 ; Carle, 93 Wash.2d at 33 , 604 P.2d 1293 ).

2002This court noted the rule that “[imposition of a sentence which is not authorized by the SRA [Sentencing Reform Act] is a fundamental defect which may justify collateral relief.” Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d at 304 (citing Fleming, 129 Wn.2d at 533 ; Moore, 116 Wn.2d at 33 ; Carle, 93 Wn.2d at 33 ).

2002Id.

2002Id.

2002This court noted the rule that "[i]mposition of a sentence which is not authorized by the SRA is a fundamental defect which may justify collateral relief." Breedlove, 138 Wash.2d at 304 , 979 P.2d 417 (citing Fleming, 129 Wash.2d at 533 , 919 P.2d 66 ; Moore, 116 Wash.2d at 33 , 803 P.2d 300 ; Carle, 93 Wash.2d at 33 , 604 P.2d 1293 ).

2002This court noted the rule that “[imposition of a sentence which is not authorized by the SRA [Sentencing Reform Act] is a fundamental defect which may justify collateral relief.” Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d at 304 (citing Fleming, 129 Wn.2d at 533 ; Moore, 116 Wn.2d at 33 ; Carle, 93 Wn.2d at 33 ).

2002This court noted the rule that "[i]mposition of a sentence which is not authorized by the SRA is a fundamental defect which may justify collateral relief." Breedlove, 138 Wash.2d at 304 , 979 P.2d 417 (citing Fleming, 129 Wash.2d at 533 , 919 P.2d 66 ; Moore, 116 Wash.2d at 33 , 803 P.2d 300 ; Carle, 93 Wash.2d at 33 , 604 P.2d 1293 ).

2002This court noted the rule that “[imposition of a sentence which is not authorized by the SRA [Sentencing Reform Act] is a fundamental defect which may justify collateral relief.” Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d at 304 (citing Fleming, 129 Wn.2d at 533 ; Moore, 116 Wn.2d at 33 ; Carle, 93 Wn.2d at 33 ).

2002This court noted the rule that "[i]mposition of a sentence which is not authorized by the SRA is a fundamental defect which may justify collateral relief." Breedlove, 138 Wash.2d at 304 , 979 P.2d 417 (citing Fleming, 129 Wash.2d at 533 , 919 P.2d 66 ; Moore, 116 Wash.2d at 33 , 803 P.2d 300 ; Carle, 93 Wash.2d at 33 , 604 P.2d 1293 ).

2002This court noted the rule that “[imposition of a sentence which is not authorized by the SRA [Sentencing Reform Act] is a fundamental defect which may justify collateral relief.” Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d at 304 (citing Fleming, 129 Wn.2d at 533 ; Moore, 116 Wn.2d at 33 ; Carle, 93 Wn.2d at 33 ).

1997LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d at 899 .

1997LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d at 899 .

2026Id.

2026And in Kim, the court noted that the analysis in Beggs “guide[d] its analysis.” Kim, 185 Wn.2d at 542 .

2024The court noted that a claim of negligence does not accrue until there has been actual loss or damages, noting that “[t]he mere danger of future harm, unaccompanied by present damage, will not support a negligence action.” Id. at 219 .

2021And the court noted that this rule “applies not only to literal juvenile life without parole sentences but also to de facto juvenile life without parole sentences.” Id. at 81 (citing State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 437-39 , 387 P.3d 650 (2017)).

2021And the court noted that this rule “applies not only to literal juvenile life without parole sentences but also to de facto juvenile life without parole sentences.” Id. at 81 (citing State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 437-39 , 387 P.3d 650 (2017)).

2019The Court noted the violation "lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction." Id. at 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (citations omitted). *295 Thus, the presumption was inapplicable where there is a " 'give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power.' " Id. at 362 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 809, 90 S.Ct.

2019The Court noted the violation "lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction." Id. at 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (citations omitted). *295 Thus, the presumption was inapplicable where there is a " 'give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power.' " Id. at 362 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 809, 90 S.Ct.

2019App.477, 722 P.2d 872 (1986).

2019The Court noted the violation "lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction." Id. at 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (citations omitted). *295 Thus, the presumption was inapplicable where there is a " 'give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power.' " Id. at 362 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 809, 90 S.Ct.

2019The Court noted the violation "lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction." Id. at 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (citations omitted). *295 Thus, the presumption was inapplicable where there is a " 'give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power.' " Id. at 362 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 809, 90 S.Ct.

2019Id.

2019The Court noted the violation "lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction." Id. at 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (citations omitted). *295 Thus, the presumption was inapplicable where there is a " 'give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power.' " Id. at 362 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 809, 90 S.Ct.

2019The Court noted the violation "lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction." Id. at 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (citations omitted). *295 Thus, the presumption was inapplicable where there is a " 'give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power.' " Id. at 362 , 98 S.Ct. 663 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 , 809, 90 S.Ct.

2017Id. at 483 n.5.

2017Those statements are declarations that qualify as admissible hearsay under the noted exception. (c) Remoteness i. Menchaca 's prison threat In arguing that Menchaca' s prison threat was too remote in time, the State relies on Adamo, 120 Wash. 268 .

2017App. 742, 745 , 9 P.3d 927 (2000). 17 Id. at 747. 18 Id. at 749. 19 Id. at 750. 4 No. 75995-7-1/5 Although Develle's second amended complaint alleges "the parties entered into an arrangement in which" Dr. Poppleton "would conduct a Bilateral Parenting Evaluation Plan," her opening appellate brief20—consistent with her original complaint21— acknowledges the existence of a court order approving a bilateral parenting evaluation by Dr. Poppleton.

2017The mother sued the investigator, alleging that the investigator performed a negligent parenting evaluation.17 This court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that the investigator was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because she acted as an "arm of the court" in carrying out her court-ordered investigation.15 This court noted that immunity applied even though the investigator had no decision-making authority or capacity to affect her recommendations; the court retained sole responsibility for making parenting plan decisions.19 13 RCW 26.12.190(1). 14 RCW 26.12.1

2015The court noted that this test applies “even where preferred rights are affected.” Clark, 918 F.2d at 848 .