noted exception in Nebraska

2026The court noted this rule was consistent with the principle that custody deci- sions “will not be governed by the religious tenets or practices of parents absent a clear showing that the parent’s religious practices would be harmful to the child.” Id.

2017According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “occur” means “[t]o happen; to meet one’s eye; to be found or met with; to present 15 In re Estate of Harris, 379 Mont. 474 , 352 P.3d 20 (2015). 16 Id. 17 Id. at 477 , 352 P.3d at 23 . 18 Id. at 480 , 352 P.3d at 25 . 19 Clarke, supra note 3 . 20 State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 , 895 N.W.2d 710 (2017). - 677 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports IN RE ESTATE OF FUCHS Cite as 297 Neb. 667 itself; to appear; hence, to befall in due course; to take place; to arise.”21 The definitions in another dictionary are: “1: to be found or met wit

2017According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “occur” means “[t]o happen; to meet one’s eye; to be found or met with; to present 15 In re Estate of Harris, 379 Mont. 474 , 352 P.3d 20 (2015). 16 Id. 17 Id. at 477 , 352 P.3d at 23 . 18 Id. at 480 , 352 P.3d at 25 . 19 Clarke, supra note 3 . 20 State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 , 895 N.W.2d 710 (2017). - 677 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports IN RE ESTATE OF FUCHS Cite as 297 Neb. 667 itself; to appear; hence, to befall in due course; to take place; to arise.”21 The definitions in another dictionary are: “1: to be found or met wit

2017According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “occur” means “[t]o happen; to meet one’s eye; to be found or met with; to present 15 In re Estate of Harris, 379 Mont. 474 , 352 P.3d 20 (2015). 16 Id. 17 Id. at 477 , 352 P.3d at 23 . 18 Id. at 480 , 352 P.3d at 25 . 19 Clarke, supra note 3 . 20 State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 , 895 N.W.2d 710 (2017). - 677 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports IN RE ESTATE OF FUCHS Cite as 297 Neb. 667 itself; to appear; hence, to befall in due course; to take place; to arise.”21 The definitions in another dictionary are: “1: to be found or met wit

2017According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “occur” means “[t]o happen; to meet one’s eye; to be found or met with; to present 15 In re Estate of Harris, 379 Mont. 474 , 352 P.3d 20 (2015). 16 Id. 17 Id. at 477 , 352 P.3d at 23 . 18 Id. at 480 , 352 P.3d at 25 . 19 Clarke, supra note 3 . 20 State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 , 895 N.W.2d 710 (2017). - 677 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports IN RE ESTATE OF FUCHS Cite as 297 Neb. 667 itself; to appear; hence, to befall in due course; to take place; to arise.”21 The definitions in another dictionary are: “1: to be found or met wit

2017According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “occur” means “[t]o happen; to meet one’s eye; to be found or met with; to present 15 In re Estate of Harris, 379 Mont. 474 , 352 P.3d 20 (2015). 16 Id. 17 Id. at 477 , 352 P.3d at 23 . 18 Id. at 480 , 352 P.3d at 25 . 19 Clarke, supra note 3 . 20 State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 , 895 N.W.2d 710 (2017). - 677 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports IN RE ESTATE OF FUCHS Cite as 297 Neb. 667 itself; to appear; hence, to befall in due course; to take place; to arise.”21 The definitions in another dictionary are: “1: to be found or met wit

2013The Massachusetts court also discussed Durden v. The People, 192 Ill. 493 , 61 N.E. 316 (1901), and State v. Gossett, 11 Wash. App. 864 , 527 P.2d 91 (1974), both involving substi- tution of judges.

2013The Massachusetts court also discussed Durden v. The People, 192 Ill. 493 , 61 N.E. 316 (1901), and State v. Gossett, 11 Wash. App. 864 , 527 P.2d 91 (1974), both involving substi- tution of judges.

2013The court noted that the rule is mandatory and that given the language of the rule, except for ministerial acts such as the taking of a verdict, the original judge should ordinarily be available throughout the process to “ensure the integrity of the trial process.” Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. at 214 , 485 N.E.2d at 170 .

2013The court noted that the rule is mandatory and that given the language of the rule, except for ministerial acts such as the taking of a verdict, the original judge should ordinarily be available throughout the process to “ensure the integrity of the trial process.” Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. at 214 , 485 N.E.2d at 170 .

2013The Massachusetts court also discussed Durden v. The People, 192 Ill. 493 , 61 N.E. 316 (1901), and State v. Gossett, 11 Wash. App. 864 , 527 P.2d 91 (1974), both involving substi- tution of judges.

2006Id. at 167 , 609 N.W.2d at 403 .

2006Id. at 167 , 609 N.W.2d at 403 .

2005Order 2-2543 (Mar. 11, 1974), cert. denied 300 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1974): “ ‘When there are two distinct injuries, one to a scheduled member and one to the body as a whole, even if both are incurred during the same accident, they may both be compensated for separately as long as the injury to the body *682 as a whole is not the result of the injury to the scheduled member. . . . [I]n determining the loss of wage earning capacity, all injuries, including scheduled injuries, must be considered.

2002As a reviewing court, we must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time,” indulging a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Horne, 895 F.2d at 499 , quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2002As a reviewing court, we must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time,” indulging a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Horne, 895 F.2d at 499 , quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2002As a reviewing court, we must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time,” indulging a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Horne, 895 F.2d at 499 , quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2002Prior to the Nebraska Supreme Court’s opinion in Schafersman v. Agland Coop, supra, the Nebraska Supreme Court had adhered to a different standard for the admissibility of expert testimony and reaffirmed the standard set forth in Frye v. United States, supra. As such, prior to the court’s opinion in *776 Schafersman v. Agland Coop, supra, expert testimony in Nebraska concerning a novel form of expertise was admissible if the principle, technique, or process upon which the opinion was based was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.

1999Indeed, as the Court recognized, had the trial court in Lockhart made the appropriate ruling concerning the disputed evidence, "the trial judge would presumably have allowed the prosecutor an opportunity to offer [additional] evidence." 488 U.S. at 42 , 109 S.Ct. 285 .

1999Indeed, as the Court recognized, had the trial court in Lockhart made the appropriate ruling concerning the disputed evidence, "the trial judge would presumably have allowed the prosecutor an opportunity to offer [additional] evidence." 488 U.S. at 42 , 109 S.Ct. 285 .

1993The court noted the exception “ ‘where a relationship exists or has developed between an injured plaintiff and agents of the municipality creating a duty to perform a mandated act for the benefit of particular persons or class of persons.’ ” Id. at 285 , 669 P.2d at 457 .

1993The court noted the exception “ ‘where a relationship exists or has developed between an injured plaintiff and agents of the municipality creating a duty to perform a mandated act for the benefit of particular persons or class of persons.’ ” Id. at 285 , 669 P.2d at 457 .

1989The court noted an exception to the general rule announced in a prior case, Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535 , 91 N.E. 7 (1910), where it ruled that a real estate mortgage executed while a building was under construction was entitled to equal priority with claims of the materialmen and laborers who had, without prior obligations, furnished material and labor after execution of the mortgage and with full knowledge of its purpose and effect.

1989The court noted an exception to the general rule announced in a prior case, Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535 , 91 N.E. 7 (1910), where it ruled that a real estate mortgage executed while a building was under construction was entitled to equal priority with claims of the materialmen and laborers who had, without prior obligations, furnished material and labor after execution of the mortgage and with full knowledge of its purpose and effect.

1988The court noted rule 15(c), and agreed with Professor Moore’s explanation of the general rule: “If the original pleading gives fair notice of the general fact situation out of which the claim or defense arises, an amendment which merely makes more specific what has already been alleged generally, or which changes the legal theory of the action, will relate back even though the statute of limitations has run in the interim.” 288 F.2d at 42 , citing 3 J.