noted defense in Connecticut

2025For example, in State v. Varszegi, 236 Conn. 266 , 673 A.2d 90 (1996), this court noted that the defense of necessity in the context of prison escapes required some external, natural force: ‘‘In 1 Hale P.C. 611 (1736), it was written that if a prison caught fire and a prisoner departed to save his life, the necessity to save his life excuseth the felony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, supra, 282 .

2025For example, in State v. Varszegi, 236 Conn. 266 , 673 A.2d 90 (1996), this court noted that the defense of necessity in the context of prison escapes required some external, natural force: ‘‘In 1 Hale P.C. 611 (1736), it was written that if a prison caught fire and a prisoner departed to save his life, the necessity to save his life excuseth the felony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, supra, 282 .

2017This court noted that the claim was "reviewable ... because it goes to the defendants' fundamental right to a fair trial." Id., at 740 , 444 A.2d 196 .

2017This court noted that the claim was "reviewable ... because it goes to the defendants' fundamental right to a fair trial." Id., at 740 , 444 A.2d 196 .

2017Id.

2017The court concluded that "[w]hen an otherwise qualified § 2254 petitioner can demonstrate that his current sentence was enhanced on the basis of a prior conviction that was obtained where there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the current sentence cannot stand and habeas relief is appropriate." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 404 , 121 S.Ct. 1567 ; see also Lebron v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 274 Conn. at 517, 876 A.2d 1178 (recognizing the Gideon exception as articulated in Lackawanna ).

2016Id., 496–97.

2011The court noted the standard applicable to terminations under § 17-112 (j) (3) (E): “The critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 261 , 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert, denied, 255 Conn. 934 , 767 A.2d 104 (2001).

2011The court noted the standard applicable to terminations under § 17-112 (j) (3) (E): “The critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 261 , 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert, denied, 255 Conn. 934 , 767 A.2d 104 (2001).

2011The court noted the standard applicable to terminations under § 17-112 (j) (3) (E): “The critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 261 , 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert, denied, 255 Conn. 934 , 767 A.2d 104 (2001).

2011The court noted the standard applicable to terminations under § 17-112 (j) (3) (E): “The critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 261 , 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert, denied, 255 Conn. 934 , 767 A.2d 104 (2001).

2011Before the court may terminate parental rights, it must find “by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [that the parent has] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some further date she can assume a responsible position in her child’s life.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 149 , 962 A.2d 81 (2009).

2011Before the court may terminate parental rights, it must find “by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [that the parent has] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some further date she can assume a responsible position in her child’s life.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 149 , 962 A.2d 81 (2009).

2011In addition, it alleged that the damage to their wall reduced the value of their property and diminished their quiet enjoyment of it. 5 General Statutes § 52-577 provides that “[n]o action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.” 6 The court noted that the doctrine of equable estoppel “ ‘rests on the misleading conduct of one party to the prejudice of the other’,” quoting Morris v. Costa, 174 Conn. 592, 599 , 392 A.2d 468 (1978).

2011In addition, it alleged that the damage to their wall reduced the value of their property and diminished their quiet enjoyment of it. 5 General Statutes § 52-577 provides that “[n]o action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.” 6 The court noted that the doctrine of equable estoppel “ ‘rests on the misleading conduct of one party to the prejudice of the other’,” quoting Morris v. Costa, 174 Conn. 592, 599 , 392 A.2d 468 (1978).

2009The defendant refers to State v. Gionfriddo, 154 Conn. 90 , 221 A.2d 851 (1966), in support of his claim that the court abused its discretion in denying his *833 motion for a mistrial.

2009The defendant refers to State v. Gionfriddo, 154 Conn. 90 , 221 A.2d 851 (1966), in support of his claim that the court abused its discretion in denying his *833 motion for a mistrial.

2008The tenant has the exclusive possession of his rooms, while the lodger has merely the use without the actual or exclusive possession, which remain in the lessor.” Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 267 , 85 A. 529 (1912). 9 We are aware that the insurer, in recovering from the defendant the amount it paid to Deveau, will retain the premium paid by her for the insurance coverage although it will not have sustained a monetary loss arising from the insurance coverage.

2008The tenant has the exclusive possession of his rooms, while the lodger has merely the use without the actual or exclusive possession, which remain in the lessor.” Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 267 , 85 A. 529 (1912). 9 We are aware that the insurer, in recovering from the defendant the amount it paid to Deveau, will retain the premium paid by her for the insurance coverage although it will not have sustained a monetary loss arising from the insurance coverage.

2008In DiLullo v. Joseph, supra, 259 Conn. 848 , the plaintiffs were the insured property owners and their insurer, Public Service Mutual Insurance Company. 6 The court did not explicitly find that the defendant was a social houseguest but impliedly found that he was a social guest by stating: “A guest, as distinguished from a boarder, is bound for no stipulated time.” The court noted that the analysis utilized in Wasko v. Manella, supra, 269 Conn. 527 , determined that “a social houseguest who negligently caused a fire was liable to the insurer which paid the claim for the insured loss.” The cour

2006Instead, the court noted that the inquiry must be confined to reference to judicial records "of the convicting court approaching the certainty of the record of conviction in a [state that defines burglary in the same manner as the act]." Id., at 23 , 125 S.Ct. 1254 .

2006Instead, the court noted that the inquiry must be confined to reference to judicial records "of the convicting court approaching the certainty of the record of conviction in a [state that defines burglary in the same manner as the act]." Id., at 23 , 125 S.Ct. 1254 .

2003Id., 601 .

1999The court acknowledged that under State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 525-26 , 668 A.2d 1288 (1995) (en banc), some type of inquiry into the defendant’s allegations was required, but it was unwilling to subpoena Williams or Brantle at that stage of the inquiry.

1999The court acknowledged that under State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 525-26 , 668 A.2d 1288 (1995) (en banc), some type of inquiry into the defendant’s allegations was required, but it was unwilling to subpoena Williams or Brantle at that stage of the inquiry.

1999As we noted in State v. Orhan, 52 Conn. App. 231, 243 , 726 A.2d 629 (1999), “[t]he controlling language from Troupe does not limit the identifying information that may be provided.

1999As we noted in State v. Orhan, 52 Conn. App. 231, 243 , 726 A.2d 629 (1999), “[t]he controlling language from Troupe does not limit the identifying information that may be provided.

1998In a factually unrelated case, Mullen v. Horton , 46 Conn. App. 759 , 772 , 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), an appellate court was faced with deciding whether it should adopt the doctrine of "apparent authority." The court noted that this doctrine had been adopted in other jurisdictions, but "because we are bound by Connecticut precedent . . . we conclude that the doctrine of apparent authority is inapplicable to this case." Here, absent controlling authority to the contrary, the court rejects, as applicable to the present case, the plaintiff's "public trust" arguments.

1998In a factually unrelated case, Mullen v. Horton , 46 Conn. App. 759 , 772 , 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), an appellate court was faced with deciding whether it should adopt the doctrine of "apparent authority." The court noted that this doctrine had been adopted in other jurisdictions, but "because we are bound by Connecticut precedent . . . we conclude that the doctrine of apparent authority is inapplicable to this case." Here, absent controlling authority to the contrary, the court rejects, as applicable to the present case, the plaintiff's "public trust" arguments.

1996In Leasing Service Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828 , 833 (CA 4, 1986) the court noted that the clause was on the reverse side of a two page fine print contract.

1993"If the parties submitted to the arbitrator the question of whether the claimant should be compensated a specific sum, then, by awarding a different sum, the arbitrator exceeds his power." Id. at 21 .