noted rule in Alabama

2026But the Court also noted the presumption of guilt when the defendant is indicted and that "a defendant must overcome this presumption by proof." 879 So. 2d at 534 .

2026But the Court also noted the presumption of guilt when the defendant is indicted and that "a defendant must overcome this presumption by proof." 879 So. 2d at 534 .

1997"In Christian v. State, 502 So.2d 868 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), this Court noted that error resulting from the prosecutor's improper comments as to the defendant's failure to testify may be cured by prompt instructions by the trial court, and we wrote the following: "`As it appears that our Supreme Court still adheres to the principle that the effects of such improper remarks can be cured by prompt instructions, we must determine if the curative instructions in this case were sufficient.

1989In Christian v. State, 502 So.2d 868 (Ala. Cr.App.1986), this Court noted that error resulting from the prosecutor’s improper comments as to the defendant’s failure to testify may be cured by prompt instructions by the trial court, and we wrote the following: “As it appears that our Supreme Curt still adheres to the principle that the effects of such improper remarks can be cured by prompt instructions, we must determine if the curative instructions in this case were sufficient.

1997In Whitt [v. State, 370 So.2d 736 (Ala. 1979)], the court stated that "we will consider the circumstances of each case on its own, considering the type of remark, whether reply in kind or not, whether promptly objected to, and the appropriateness of the trial judge's instructions." The court went on to suggest: "`"[A]t a minimum the trial judge must sustain the objection, and should then promptly and vigorously give appropriate instructions to the jury.

1989In Whitt [v. State, 370 So.2d 736 (Ala.1979)], the court stated that ‘we will consider the circumstances of each case on its own, considering the type of remark, whether reply in kind or not, whether promptly objected to, and the appropriateness of the trial judge’s instructions.’ The court went on to suggest: “ ‘[A]t a minimum the trial judge must sustain the objection, and should then promptly and vigorously give appropriate instructions to the jury.

1957Office of London v. Mitchell, 186 Ala. 420 , 65 So. 143 , this Court noted that the principle declared in the Thornton case, supra, was contrary to the generally recognized rule and gave a liberal interpretation to a clause without that feature referred to above, annulling all contracts on property situated outside the prescribed territory. * * * ” The opinion then continues as follows “It is a hard rule in any case where insured makes such a contract in ignorance of any limitation on the territory of a general agent.

1957Office of London v. Mitchell, 186 Ala. 420 , 65 So. 143 , this Court noted that the principle declared in the Thornton case, supra, was contrary to the generally recognized rule and gave a liberal interpretation to a clause without that feature referred to above, annulling all contracts on property situated outside the prescribed territory. * * * ” The opinion then continues as follows “It is a hard rule in any case where insured makes such a contract in ignorance of any limitation on the territory of a general agent.

2024This Court also noted that defense counsel stated in an affidavit "that knowledge of juror R.R.'s arrest history would have prompted him to ask further questions and to seriously consider challenging him for cause or exercising a peremptory strike." 196 So. 3d at 371 .

2010See also Wise v. Siegel, 527 So.2d 1281, 1282 (Ala.1988); Williams v. Williams, 910 So.2d 1284 , 1287 n. 5 (Ala.Civ.App.2005).

2010“When affirming a similar instruction in McWhorter [v. State, 781 So.2d 257 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) ], this Court noted that the instruction did not inform the jury that the court had already made a determination on the voluntariness of the defendant’s statements to police.

2007The Court noted that the standard announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), "recognizes that `certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been "harmless" in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial.'" Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

2007The Court noted that the standard announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), "recognizes that `certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been "harmless" in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial.'" Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

2007The Court noted that the standard announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), "recognizes that `certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been "harmless" in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial.'" Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

2007The Court noted that the standard announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), "recognizes that `certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been "harmless" in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial.'" Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

2007The Court noted that the standard announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), "recognizes that `certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been "harmless" in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial.'" Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

2007The Court noted that the standard announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), "recognizes that `certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been "harmless" in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial.'" Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

2004In Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall , 481 So.2d 1126 , 1129-30 (Ala. 1985), this Court noted that "an exception to the foregoing general rule [requiring expert testimony] has been recognized where the want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of the average layman and thus requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it." The Court noted that this exception has generally been applied in cases of res ipsa loquitur, cases where the injury complained of is in no way connected to the condition of which the plaintiff complains, and cases where the plain

2004In Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall , 481 So.2d 1126 , 1129-30 (Ala. 1985), this Court noted that "an exception to the foregoing general rule [requiring expert testimony] has been recognized where the want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of the average layman and thus requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it." The Court noted that this exception has generally been applied in cases of res ipsa loquitur, cases where the injury complained of is in no way connected to the condition of which the plaintiff complains, and cases where the plain

2004Lindsey v. Patterson, supra. See also Hill v. Hill, 739 So.2d 501 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (reversing a postminority-educational-support award where the trial court failed to place a time restriction on the parent's support obligation); Thompson v. Thompson, 689 So.2d 885 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (the trial court erred in not placing temporal restrictions on a postminority-educational-support obligation).

2004Lindsey v. Patterson , supra. See also Hill v. Hill , 739 So.2d 501 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (reversing a postminority-educational-support award where the trial court failed to place a time restriction on the parent's support obligation); Thompson v. Thompson , 689 So.2d 885 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997) (the trial court erred in not placing temporal restrictions on a postminority-educational-support obligation).

2004Lindsey v. Patterson, supra. See also Hill v. Hill, 739 So.2d 501 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (reversing a postminority-educational-support award where the trial court failed to place a time restriction on the parent's support obligation); Thompson v. Thompson, 689 So.2d 885 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (the trial court erred in not placing temporal restrictions on a postminority-educational-support obligation).

2004Lindsey v. Patterson , supra. See also Hill v. Hill , 739 So.2d 501 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (reversing a postminority-educational-support award where the trial court failed to place a time restriction on the parent's support obligation); Thompson v. Thompson , 689 So.2d 885 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997) (the trial court erred in not placing temporal restrictions on a postminority-educational-support obligation).

2004Lindsey v. Patterson, supra. See also Hill v. Hill, 739 So.2d 501 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (reversing a postminority-educational-support award where the trial court failed to place a time restriction on the parent's support obligation); Thompson v. Thompson, 689 So.2d 885 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (the trial court erred in not placing temporal restrictions on a postminority-educational-support obligation).

2004Lindsey v. Patterson , supra. See also Hill v. Hill , 739 So.2d 501 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (reversing a postminority-educational-support award where the trial court failed to place a time restriction on the parent's support obligation); Thompson v. Thompson , 689 So.2d 885 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997) (the trial court erred in not placing temporal restrictions on a postminority-educational-support obligation).

2004In Holt v. Godsil , 447 So.2d 191 (Ala. 1984), this Court stated that a plaintiff who is a medical expert qualified to evaluate the appropriate standard of care need not present additional expert testimony in support of his or her claim.

2003At this juncture, we must point out that in Safeco Insurance Cos. v. Blackmon, 851 So.2d 532 (Ala.Civ.App.2002), this court noted that a claim seeking benefits for coronary-artery disease allegedly caused, in part, by work-related stress was more in the nature of an occupational disease than an injury or a nonaccidental injury.

2003At this juncture, we must point out that in Safeco Insurance Cos. v. Blackmon , 851 So.2d 532 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002), this court noted that a claim seeking benefits for coronary-artery disease allegedly caused, in part, by work-related stress was more in the nature of an occupational disease than an injury or a nonaccidental injury.

1997In holding that the instruction in that particular case did not constitute plain error, this court noted that the standard announced in Cage , had been overruled, see Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), but even if it had not been overruled, the error would not have constituted plain error, because the mere use of the term "moral certainty" did not make the charge unconstitutional under Cage .

1997In holding that the instruction in that particular case did not constitute plain error, this court noted that the standard announced in Cage , had been overruled, see Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), but even if it had not been overruled, the error would not have constituted plain error, because the mere use of the term "moral certainty" did not make the charge unconstitutional under Cage .

1989However, the court noted that this presumption would not be unconstitutional "if its legal effect were properly explained." Id. at 654 .

1985King , 456 So.2d at 82 .

1965In Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124 Me. 299 , 128 A. 285 , 38 A.L.R. 1306 , the court noted the rule that where land borders on the ocean, there exists no way of necessity even over a grantor’s land, although such passage by water may not be as convenient as a passage by land.

1965In Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124 Me. 299 , 128 A. 285 , 38 A.L.R. 1306 , the court noted the rule that where land borders on the ocean, there exists no way of necessity even over a grantor’s land, although such passage by water may not be as convenient as a passage by land.

1952This Court has cited the Thornton case, supra, and given its approval in a formal way in Royal Exchange Assur. of London v. Almon, 202 Ala. 374 , 80 So. 456 ; Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins.

1952This Court has cited the Thornton case, supra, and given its approval in a formal way in Royal Exchange Assur. of London v. Almon, 202 Ala. 374 , 80 So. 456 ; Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins.

1948In the case of In re Taylor’s Estate, 61 Nev. 68 , 114 P.2d 1086 , 135 A.L.R. 580 , the Nevada court appears to place a contrary ruling upon the interpretation of their statute to the effect that a repeal or repudiation of the common law was intended.

1948In the case of In re Taylor’s Estate, 61 Nev. 68 , 114 P.2d 1086 , 135 A.L.R. 580 , the Nevada court appears to place a contrary ruling upon the interpretation of their statute to the effect that a repeal or repudiation of the common law was intended.

1943To like effect also are Kidd v. Horry, C.C., 28 F. 773 , and Francis v. Flinn, 118 U.S. 385 , 6 S.Ct. 1148 , 30 *604 L.Ed. 165.

1943To like effect also are Kidd v. Horry, C.C., 28 F. 773 , and Francis v. Flinn, 118 U.S. 385 , 6 S.Ct. 1148 , 30 *604 L.Ed. 165.