noted rule in Kentucky

2022The Court, citing Green, explained despite perhaps not being formally characterized as “cross- examination,” the questioning of Anita afforded “substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement” and although Ohio law may have authorized objection by the prosecution, that did not happen, and defense counsel was not “significantly limited in any way in the scope or nature of his cross-examination.” Id. (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 166 ).

2019The Court also noted that immunity “frustrates the act’s purpose and intent, deprives many of its citizens of protection, and renders meaningless its pledge to safeguard all individuals from discrimination.” Id. 9 The Court of Appeals followed a similar analysis in the present case.

2017The test was reaffirmed in Wallace v. Wathen, 476 S.W.2d 829 , 831 n.2 (Ky. 1972) (citation omitted), where the Court explained: [The] test of fellow-employee immunity is whether each of the employees involved would have been entitled to workmen's compensation benefits for any disabling injury suffered in the accident.

2017In Jackson v. Hutchinson , 453 S.W.2d 269 , 270 (Ky. 1970), the Court held that the "test of fellow-employee immunity is whether each of the employees involved would have been entitled to workmen's compensation benefits for any disabling injury suffered in the accident." The Court noted that the test "leads to consistent application of the fellow-employee immunity rule." Id.

2017In Jackson v. Hutchinson , 453 S.W.2d 269 , 270 (Ky. 1970), the Court held that the "test of fellow-employee immunity is whether each of the employees involved would have been entitled to workmen's compensation benefits for any disabling injury suffered in the accident." The Court noted that the test "leads to consistent application of the fellow-employee immunity rule." Id.

2012The Court noted that the factors should not be applied mechanically; rather the central question is “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 301 , 107 S.Ct. 1134 .

2012The Court noted that the factors should not be applied mechanically; rather the central question is “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 301 , 107 S.Ct. 1134 .

2007The first prong of the test asks whether the defendant purposefully 13 W orld-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S . 286, 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) . 14 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U .S. at 291-92. 15 Wilson , 85 S .W.3d at 593 . 16 Id.

2007The first prong of the test asks whether the defendant purposefully 13 W orld-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S . 286, 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) . 14 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U .S. at 291-92. 15 Wilson , 85 S .W.3d at 593 . 16 Id.

2005In the Imes case, the court noted that the rule as adopted in Louisville Trust applies to cases “when an injury does not manifest itself immediately!.]” 784 F.2d at 758 .

1989In Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 723 S.W.2d 863 (1986), this Court noted the test for ineffective assistance of counsel was outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1989In Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 723 S.W.2d 863 (1986), this Court noted the test for ineffective assistance of counsel was outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1989In Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 723 S.W.2d 863 (1986), this Court noted the test for ineffective assistance of counsel was outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1983The holding in Brown is supported by a long line of cases beginning with Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 , 3 Dall. 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798).

1983The holding in Brown is supported by a long line of cases beginning with Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 , 3 Dall. 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798).

1983The court noted that the rule’s abrogation enables the Commonwealth to convict on less evidence than previously required and concluded that “allowing the Commonwealth to proceed with this advantage would violate Section 19 of our Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States, both of which forbid ex post facto laws.” Id. at 703 .

1983The court noted that the rule's abrogation enables the Commonwealth to convict on less evidence than previously required and concluded that "allowing the Commonwealth to proceed with this advantage would violate Section 19 of our Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States, both of which forbid ex post facto laws." Id. at 703 .