noted rule in Florida

2018Kelly, 987 So. 2d at 1238 (citing Cooper, 634 So. 2d at 1075 ).

2018Kelly , 987 So.2d at 1238 (citing Cooper , 634 So. 2d at 1075 ).

2018Kelly, 987 So. 2d at 1238 (citing Cooper, 634 So. 2d at 1075 ).

2018Kelly , 987 So.2d at 1238 (citing Cooper , 634 So. 2d at 1075 ).

2006A party may assign almost any cause of action, with the noted exception of claims for personal injury, see and compare Selfridge ; Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla.App.1960); State Road Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15 , 2 So.2d 298 (1941); Notarian v. Plantation AMC Jeep, 567 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). . . . .

2006A party may assign almost any cause of action, with the noted exception of claims for personal injury, see and compare Selfridge ; Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla.App.1960); State Road Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15 , 2 So.2d 298 (1941); Notarian v. Plantation AMC Jeep, 567 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). . . . .

2006A party may assign almost any cause of action, with the noted exception of claims for personal injury, see and compare Selfridge ; Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla.App.1960); State Road Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15 , 2 So.2d 298 (1941); Notarian v. Plantation AMC Jeep, 567 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). . . . .

1994See and compare Selfridge; Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1960); State Road Dept. v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15 , 2 So.2d 298 (1941); Notarian v. Plantation AMC Jeep, 567 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

2006A party may assign almost any cause of action, with the noted exception of claims for personal injury, see and compare Selfridge ; Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla.App.1960); State Road Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15 , 2 So.2d 298 (1941); Notarian v. Plantation AMC Jeep, 567 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). . . . .

1994See and compare Selfridge; Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1960); State Road Dept. v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15 , 2 So.2d 298 (1941); Notarian v. Plantation AMC Jeep, 567 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

2005Francis v. Barton, 581 So.2d 583 (Fla.1991).

2005Francis v. Barton, 581 So.2d 583 (Fla.1991).

2019The court noted that rule 1.820(h) did not even require that a pleading be styled "motion for trial." Instead, the court interpreted the rule to "require[] some notice to the opposing party that its adversary is rejecting an arbitration award and renewing its demand for trial." Id.

2019In Steinberg, the appellant's attorney filed a notice setting a pretrial conference a mere four days after the arbitration decision was rendered, and in it, appellant "clearly indicated a desire to proceed to trial in the case." Id.

2018"Simply stated, proposals for settlement are not subject to the service requirements of rule 2.516 because the proposals do not meet rule 1.080(a)'s threshold requirement that they be 'filed in the action.' " Id. at 965 .

2014Similarly, in Tessier v. Pratt, 08-1268 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/13/09), 7 So.3d 768, 773 , this court noted that defense counsel did more than just attend a status conference, Despite verbal assertions that she believed the case was abandoned, she signed a case management order and made no formal motion to preserve her right to claim abandonment.

2013This court noted the rule “continues to set forth nineteen trauma service areas that are not coterminous with the boundaries of the seven regional domestic security task forces.” Id.

2012Specifically, the court stated, “To the extent that Standard Jury Instruction 3.3(a) instructs the jury that either ownership or right to control could give rise to dangerous instrumentality liability, we request that the Civil Standard Jury Instruction Committee consider whether, consistent with existing law, a revision to the jury instruction is necessary.” Id. at 66 n. 5 (emphasis added).

2011Id.

2010This court noted that rule 3.800(a) is “generally restricted to matters that can be established from the record without the need for any significant evidentiary proceedings” and that rule 3.800(a) proceedings are not intended to resolve factual disputes. 984 So.2d at 590 .

2009Instead, the rule may be used to correct and preserve for appeal any error in an order entered as a result of the sentencing process — that is, orders related to the sanctions imposed.” Jackson, 983 So.2d at 574 .

2008The court noted that the rule-based right to speedy trial was "not coextensive with the broader constitutional right to a speedy trial." Naveira, 873 So.2d at 308 .

2008Id. at 506-07 .

2007The court noted that defense counsel did not object to the testimony from various witnesses at the sentencing hearing, he cross-examined those witnesses extensively, and "the defendant was given a full opportunity to explain his position and call his own witnesses." Id.

2007Instead, it was intended to address the problems that arise from sentencing errors that "`are not immediately apparent at sentencing.'" Amendments, 761 So.2d at 1016 (quoting Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So.2d 1103, 1105 (Fla. 1996)).

2005This court noted that the factors set forth in Kozel were: “1) whether the attorney’s disobedience was willful, deliberate, or contumacious, rather than an act of neglect or inexperience; 2) whether the attorney has been previously sanctioned; 3) whether the client was personally involved in the act of disobedience; 4) whether the delay prejudiced the opposing party through undue expense, loss of evidence, or in some other fashion; 5) whether the attorney offered reasonable justification for noncompliance; and 6) whether the delay created significant problems of judicial administration.” Flori

2005This court noted that the factors set forth in Kozel were: “1) whether the attorney’s disobedience was willful, deliberate, or contumacious, rather than an act of neglect or inexperience; 2) whether the attorney has been previously sanctioned; 3) whether the client was personally involved in the act of disobedience; 4) whether the delay prejudiced the opposing party through undue expense, loss of evidence, or in some other fashion; 5) whether the attorney offered reasonable justification for noncompliance; and 6) whether the delay created significant problems of judicial administration.” Flori

2005In Silber , though, the court noted that the defense had been raised in the answer, early in the case, and that the plaintiff was aware of the failure to pay the tax but did nothing until the presentation of evidence was concluded. 526 So.2d at 978 .

2004Id.

2004Long ago this court noted that the test of the sufficiency of a complaint seeking relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act *381 "is not whether the complaint shows that the plaintiff will succeed in getting a declaration of rights in accordance with his theory and contention, but whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all." Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 210 So.2d 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968).

2004In Hialeah this court commented that the Declaratory Judgment Act should be liberally construed and administered and explained that an action properly brought under the act requires "a bona fide controversy, justiciable in the sense that it flows out of some definite and concrete assertion of right, and there should be involved the legal or equitable relations of parties having adverse interests with respect to which the declaration is sought." Id. at 753 .