10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp.green2 sentences2014We discern no meaningful difference between the two terms — at least as they have been used in this particular context — and we understand them to reflect the same idea. 2 In Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137 ( 637 SE2d 14 ) (2006), this Court noted that a claim under the Fair Business Practices Act for consumer fraud requires proof of causation, see OCGA § 10-1-399 (a), and we held that proof of causation requires a showing of reasonable reliance. 281 Ga. at 141 (2) (‘When the alleged FBPA violation is a misrepresentation, the consumer must show that he exercised due diligence 2014We discern no meaningful difference between the two terms — at least as they have been used in this particular context — and we understand them to reflect the same idea. 2 In Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137 ( 637 SE2d 14 ) (2006), this Court noted that a claim under the Fair Business Practices Act for consumer fraud requires proof of causation, see OCGA § 10-1-399 (a), and we held that proof of causation requires a showing of reasonable reliance. 281 Ga. at 141 (2) (‘When the alleged FBPA violation is a misrepresentation, the consumer must show that he exercised due diligence | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Phillips v. State, 280 Ga. 728, 731 (2) ( 632 SE2d 131 ) (2006). 2007Phillips v. State, 280 Ga. 728, 731 (2) ( 632 SE2d 131 ) (2006). | 1 | 1 |
LaBanz v. Bank Southgreen2 sentences1997Id. "[U]pon hearing an improper verdict rendered, a litigant should not sit silently by, hoping to gain a retrial by failing to object." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) LaBanz v. Bank South, etc., 198 Ga.App. 79, 82 (1), 400 S.E.2d 357 (1990). "[O]nce the jury has dispersed the trial judge has no power either to add to or to take from their findings, and has not the power, by amendment or reformation, to supply substantial omissions or make substantial changes in the verdict as rendered by the jury.... 1997Id. "[U]pon hearing an improper verdict rendered, a litigant should not sit silently by, hoping to gain a retrial by failing to object." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) LaBanz v. Bank South, etc., 198 Ga.App. 79, 82 (1), 400 S.E.2d 357 (1990). "[O]nce the jury has dispersed the trial judge has no power either to add to or to take from their findings, and has not the power, by amendment or reformation, to supply substantial omissions or make substantial changes in the verdict as rendered by the jury.... | 1 | 1 |
First Union National Bank v. Boykingreen2 sentences1997Bank v. Boykin, 216 Ga.App. 732, 735 (1), 455 S.E.2d 406 (1995), this Court noted the rule that "since the jury dispersed before clarifying this substantive issue, the trial court lost authority to correct or otherwise amend the seemingly inconsistent verdict. [Cit.]" A new trial was not required, however, because the appellant had waived any challenge to the verdict by its failure to object. 1997Bank v. Boykin, 216 Ga.App. 732, 735 (1), 455 S.E.2d 406 (1995), this Court noted the rule that "since the jury dispersed before clarifying this substantive issue, the trial court lost authority to correct or otherwise amend the seemingly inconsistent verdict. [Cit.]" A new trial was not required, however, because the appellant had waived any challenge to the verdict by its failure to object. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Fulton County Department of Family & Children Servicesgreen2 sentences1976Brown v. Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children Services, 136 Ga. App. 308, 309 ( 220 SE2d 790 ), stated that "We quite agree with appellant's contention that the language of Code Ann. § 24A-1701 (a) is mandatory and that the time for the hearing must be set for a time not later than 10 days after the petition is filed." This statement was not the ratio decidendi as the court noted the requirement had been originally complied with and a continuance granted which was within the court's discretion. 1976Brown v. Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children Services, 136 Ga. App. 308, 309 ( 220 SE2d 790 ), stated that "We quite agree with appellant's contention that the language of Code Ann. § 24A-1701 (a) is mandatory and that the time for the hearing must be set for a time not later than 10 days after the petition is filed." This statement was not the ratio decidendi as the court noted the requirement had been originally complied with and a continuance granted which was within the court's discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Harper v. DeFreitasgreen2 sentences1973Furthermore, the concept of notice pleading derived from Section 8 of the Civil Practice Act and exemplified by such cases as Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67 (3) ( 166 SE2d 89 ) and Harper v. DeFreitas, 117 Ga. App. 236, 238 ( 160 SE2d 260 ) is not applicable here. 1973Furthermore, the concept of notice pleading derived from Section 8 of the Civil Practice Act and exemplified by such cases as Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67 (3) ( 166 SE2d 89 ) and Harper v. DeFreitas, 117 Ga. App. 236, 238 ( 160 SE2d 260 ) is not applicable here. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Kennedy
green
1 sentence1997(Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 251(1), 466 S.E.2d 1 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mitchell v. Erdmier
green
2 sentences1992The appellees rely upon the decision in Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335 ( 320 SE2d 163 ), for authority that the above noted exception is not viable. 1992The appellees rely upon the decision in Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335 ( 320 SE2d 163 ), for authority that the above noted exception is not viable. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Gibbons v. State
green
2 sentences1985Next, under “salutary effect (a)” of Gibbons , this court noted that the rule in Gibbons would protect “both the state and the defense” to a degree from “the erratic or unpredictable witness.” 248 Ga. at 864 . 1985Next, under "salutary effect (a)" of Gibbons , this court noted that the rule in Gibbons would protect "both the state and the defense" to a degree from "the erratic or unpredictable witness." 248 Ga. at 864 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett
green
2 sentences1983Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549 (1) ( 10 SE 435 ) (1889); Scott v. Scott, 192 Ga. 370 (1) ( 15 SE2d 416 ) (1941). 1983Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549 (1) ( 10 SE 435 ) (1889); Scott v. Scott, 192 Ga. 370 (1) ( 15 SE2d 416 ) (1941). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Scott v. Scott
neutral
2 sentences1983Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549 (1) ( 10 SE 435 ) (1889); Scott v. Scott, 192 Ga. 370 (1) ( 15 SE2d 416 ) (1941). 1983Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549 (1) ( 10 SE 435 ) (1889); Scott v. Scott, 192 Ga. 370 (1) ( 15 SE2d 416 ) (1941). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Barnes v. United States
green
1 sentence1981For centuries courts have instructed juries that an inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of stolen goods.” Id. at 843 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Bourn v. Herring
green
2 sentences1973Furthermore, the concept of notice pleading derived from Section 8 of the Civil Practice Act and exemplified by such cases as Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67 (3) ( 166 SE2d 89 ) and Harper v. DeFreitas, 117 Ga. App. 236, 238 ( 160 SE2d 260 ) is not applicable here. 1973Furthermore, the concept of notice pleading derived from Section 8 of the Civil Practice Act and exemplified by such cases as Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67 (3) ( 166 SE2d 89 ) and Harper v. DeFreitas, 117 Ga. App. 236, 238 ( 160 SE2d 260 ) is not applicable here. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.