noted rule in California

2021(People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 792-793 ; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 213 .) Even if there was prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant’s conviction will not be reversed “‘unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the misconduct.’” (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 403; accord, People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 932-933 .) 5 The Supreme Court in Chatman observed that where the prosecutor elicits inadmissible evidence but does not do so intentionally, this is not a question of prosecutorial misconduct, but

2008Q] A proximate cause of a death is a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the death would not have occurred.” (CALJIC former No. 8.55 (5th ed. 1988).) 11 The court noted that defense counsel had represented below that he was not going to “ ‘make any issue out of the proximate cause ....’” (People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 222 .) 12 Of course the intervening act may be so attenuated, due to the passage of a significant period of time, that a defendant’s act is no longer considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death, for “ ‘at so

2016On certiorari the Supreme *207 Court assumed the statute was unconstitutional, but held that the reasoning in Leon was "equally applicable to the present case." ( Id. at p. 349, 107 S.Ct. 1160 .) 16 Because the officer's reliance on the statute was "objectively reasonable," the court reversed for further proceedings. ( Id. at pp. 358, 361, 107 S.Ct. 1160 .) The court noted that the exception would not apply, and exclusion of evidence would be appropriate, if it appeared that (1) in passing the applicable statute, the legislature had "wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional

2016On certiorari the Supreme *207 Court assumed the statute was unconstitutional, but held that the reasoning in Leon was "equally applicable to the present case." ( Id. at p. 349, 107 S.Ct. 1160 .) 16 Because the officer's reliance on the statute was "objectively reasonable," the court reversed for further proceedings. ( Id. at pp. 358, 361, 107 S.Ct. 1160 .) The court noted that the exception would not apply, and exclusion of evidence would be appropriate, if it appeared that (1) in passing the applicable statute, the legislature had "wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional

2016On certiorari the Supreme *207 Court assumed the statute was unconstitutional, but held that the reasoning in Leon was "equally applicable to the present case." ( Id. at p. 349, 107 S.Ct. 1160 .) 16 Because the officer's reliance on the statute was "objectively reasonable," the court reversed for further proceedings. ( Id. at pp. 358, 361, 107 S.Ct. 1160 .) The court noted that the exception would not apply, and exclusion of evidence would be appropriate, if it appeared that (1) in passing the applicable statute, the legislature had "wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional

2016On certiorari the Supreme *207 Court assumed the statute was unconstitutional, but held that the reasoning in Leon was "equally applicable to the present case." ( Id. at p. 349, 107 S.Ct. 1160 .) 16 Because the officer's reliance on the statute was "objectively reasonable," the court reversed for further proceedings. ( Id. at pp. 358, 361, 107 S.Ct. 1160 .) The court noted that the exception would not apply, and exclusion of evidence would be appropriate, if it appeared that (1) in passing the applicable statute, the legislature had "wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional

2023The court described the leading case, Duprey v. Shane (1952) 39 Cal.2d 781 (Duprey), a case in which an employee nurse was injured on the job.

2023The court described the leading case, Duprey v. Shane (1952) 39 Cal.2d 781 (Duprey), a case in which an employee nurse was injured on the job.

2019(People v. Little, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380 .) The court noted defense counsel’s strategy was sound because without his client testifying, defense counsel introduced evidence to the jury of an alibi.

2019(People v. Little, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380 .) The court noted defense counsel’s strategy was sound because without his client testifying, defense counsel introduced evidence to the jury of an alibi.

2014The court stated: “Thus, one reason for defense counsel’s failure to object when the prosecutor said that she believed in defendant’s guilt may have been defense counsel’s concern that the jury would find him a hypocrite for complaining about the prosecutor’s argument (‘But I think his client is guilty’) when defense counsel himself had used a similar tactic, by expressing a belief in defendant’s assertion of innocence.” (People v. Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 972 .) Here, likewise, defense counsel could have had a sound tactical reason for failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument.

2014The court stated: “Thus, one reason for defense counsel’s failure to object when the prosecutor said that she believed in defendant’s guilt may have been defense counsel’s concern that the jury would find him a hypocrite for complaining about the prosecutor’s argument (‘But I think his client is guilty’) when defense counsel himself had used a similar tactic, by expressing a belief in defendant’s assertion of innocence.” (People v. Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 972 .) Here, likewise, defense counsel could have had a sound tactical reason for failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument.

2003The girl later recanted the allegations, and a physical examination was inconclusive, neither confirming nor ruling out molestation. *748 ( Id. at pp. 192-193, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 .) In affirming the dependency court's dismissal of the petition on the basis of insufficient evidence, the court noted the standard of review and stated "[o]ur review of the record ... does not persuade us that there was indisputable evidence of abuse." Absent such evidence, the child did not come within the provisions of section 300. ( Id. at p. 200, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 .) Interestingly, both the Department and respo

2003(Id. at pp. 192-193.) In affirming the dependency court’s dismissal of the petition on the basis of insufficient evidence, the court noted the standard of review and stated “[o]ur review of the record . . . does not persuade us that there was indisputable evidence of abuse.” Absent such evidence, the child did not come within the provisions of section 300. ( 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 200 .) Interestingly, both the Department and respondents argue that In re Joshua H., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th 1718 , supports their position.

2003The girl later recanted the allegations, and a physical examination was inconclusive, neither confirming nor ruling out molestation. *748 ( Id. at pp. 192-193, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 .) In affirming the dependency court's dismissal of the petition on the basis of insufficient evidence, the court noted the standard of review and stated "[o]ur review of the record ... does not persuade us that there was indisputable evidence of abuse." Absent such evidence, the child did not come within the provisions of section 300. ( Id. at p. 200, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 .) Interestingly, both the Department and respo

2003(Id. at pp. 192-193.) In affirming the dependency court’s dismissal of the petition on the basis of insufficient evidence, the court noted the standard of review and stated “[o]ur review of the record . . . does not persuade us that there was indisputable evidence of abuse.” Absent such evidence, the child did not come within the provisions of section 300. ( 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 200 .) Interestingly, both the Department and respondents argue that In re Joshua H., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th 1718 , supports their position.

1999Drawing extensively upon federal precedent, the court noted the principle that “the government may dispense with the warrant requirement in situations when ‘ “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable” ’ ” and how the operation of a probation system presented special needs of speed, deterrence, and deference to a separate administrative system. {Id. at pp. 77-78, quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 [ 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 ].) Following the approach of this court in In re Marcellus L

1999Drawing extensively upon federal precedent, the court noted the principle that “the government may dispense with the warrant requirement in situations when ‘ “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable” ’ ” and how the operation of a probation system presented special needs of speed, deterrence, and deference to a separate administrative system. {Id. at pp. 77-78, quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 [ 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 ].) Following the approach of this court in In re Marcellus L

1991The Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the corporation's motion to disqualify the former president's attorneys. ( Maruman Integrated Circuits, Inc. v. Consortium Co., supra, 166 Cal. App.3d at p. 451 .) The court noted that the rule against attorneys using client confidences in representing an adverse party can lead to disqualification, but not when an attorney-client relationship never existed between the party and the attorneys sought to be disqualified. (166 Cal. App.3d at pp. 447-449.) The court relied heavily on the reasoning of Cooke v. Sup

1991(Maruman Integrated Circuits, Inc. v. Consortium Co., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 451 .) The court noted that the rule against attorneys using client confidences in representing an adverse party can lead to disqualification, but not when an attorney-client relationship never existed between the party and the attorneys sought to be disqualified. (166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 447-449.) The court relied heavily on the reasoning of Cooke v. Superior Court, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 582 , in declining to adopt a rule that an attorney’s exposure to confidential and privileged information requires, as a matter o

1991The Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the corporation's motion to disqualify the former president's attorneys. ( Maruman Integrated Circuits, Inc. v. Consortium Co., supra, 166 Cal. App.3d at p. 451 .) The court noted that the rule against attorneys using client confidences in representing an adverse party can lead to disqualification, but not when an attorney-client relationship never existed between the party and the attorneys sought to be disqualified. (166 Cal. App.3d at pp. 447-449.) The court relied heavily on the reasoning of Cooke v. Sup

1991(Maruman Integrated Circuits, Inc. v. Consortium Co., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 451 .) The court noted that the rule against attorneys using client confidences in representing an adverse party can lead to disqualification, but not when an attorney-client relationship never existed between the party and the attorneys sought to be disqualified. (166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 447-449.) The court relied heavily on the reasoning of Cooke v. Superior Court, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 582 , in declining to adopt a rule that an attorney’s exposure to confidential and privileged information requires, as a matter o

1968Moreover, in the case relied upon by respondent the court noted that the rule was liberally interpreted because the petitioner entitled to relief "... was not a party to the proceedings in respondent court and therefore had no opportunity to there object on jurisdictional grounds...." ( Monterey Club v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal. App.2d 131, 143 .) Respondent urges that there is no proper procedure to attack the jurisdiction or proceeding in the municipal court.

1968Moreover, in the case relied upon by respondent the court noted that the rule was liberally interpreted because the petitioner entitled to relief “. . . ivas not a party to the proceedings in respondent court and therefore had no opportunity to there object on jurisdictional grounds. ...” (Monterey Club v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.2d 131, 143 .) Respondent urges that there is no proper procedure to attack the jurisdiction or proceeding in the municipal court.

2026The objection was overruled because the court found it was based on People v. Granado (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 317 (Granado) and “explains when a firearm is displayed . . . .” Defense counsel offered no further objection.

2026The court noted a challenge based on the gift clause might have merit if “the Legislature had undertaken to vote compensation retrospectively to the owners of diseased cattle destroyed prior to the enactment of the statute.” (Id. at p. 359.) Similarly, Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 (Heron) held the gift clause did not prohibit paying judgments (or paying for liability insurance) arising from a statute making public entities liable for 5 their employees’ negligent driving.

2025The questions included the following: “Is force applied against an object the same as force applied to a person?” In response, defense counsel urged the trial court to give a supplemental instruction based upon language taken from People v. Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242 (Garcia), overruled in part by People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 , 365, stating: “ ‘The force required for robbery must be more than the incidental touching necessary to take the property.’ ” However, the trial court noted that defense counsel’s proposed response would not answer the jury’s actual question about whether

2025At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted defense counsel had previously asked for a continuance to file a sentencing statement, which the court had “received” and “reviewed.” The court then invited input from the parties beyond what 4 Referring to People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 26 , in which force or fear is not used in a robbery until the perpetrator has already taken the property. 8. was included in the moving papers.

2025The questions included the following: “Is force applied against an object the same as force applied to a person?” In response, defense counsel urged the trial court to give a supplemental instruction based upon language taken from People v. Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242 (Garcia), overruled in part by People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 , 365, stating: “ ‘The force required for robbery must be more than the incidental touching necessary to take the property.’ ” However, the trial court noted that defense counsel’s proposed response would not answer the jury’s actual question about whether

2024In Miller v. Porter (Conn. 1968) 242 A.2d 744 , the Connecticut Supreme Court held the sudden emergency 15 doctrine did not apply where the defendant had no choice about how to act once the emergency arose.

2024(Id. at pp. 1010–1011.) Our Supreme Court in Baral analyzed how a trial court should proceed when a plaintiff pleads a “ ‘mixed cause of action,” ’ a term “frequently used to designate a count alleging both protected and unprotected activity.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 382 .) Baral considered and disapproved of a line of cases that held an anti-SLAPP motion “lies only to strike an entire count as pleaded in the compliant.” (Ibid.) The court noted that rule produced “anomalous results” when applied to a mixed cause of action because a plaintiff could frustrate the purposes of the anti-SLAP