24 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2023Police Jury, 96-0543, p. 11 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 359, 367 (wherein this Court discussed a vagueness challenge to a non-criminal business regulation and held, quoting Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497 n. 7, that “[t]o sustain a challenge for vagueness, the opponent of the ordinance must prove that the ordinance is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform . . . to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard conduct is specified at all[.]”). 2013Therefore, to successfully challenge an ordinance as vague, “the opponent of the ordinance must prove that the ordinance is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform ... to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard conduct is specified at all.’ ” Id., p. 11, 684 So.2d at 367 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates, supra, 455 U.S. at 497, n. 7 , 102 S.Ct. at 1191, n. 7 ). | 4 | 5 |
Smolinski v. Taulligreen2 sentences1991Moreover, a party is only required to use reasonable caution, and his conduct is not negligent if, “by a common sense test, it is in accord with that of reasonably prudent persons faced with similar conditions and circumstances.” Dupas v. City of New Orleans, 354 So.2d 1311, 1313 (La.1978) (quoting Smolinski v. Taulli, 276 So.2d 286, 290 [La.1973]). 1990Moreover, a party is only required to use reasonable caution, and his conduct is not negligent if, "by a common sense test, it is in accord with that of reasonably prudent persons faced with similar conditions and circumstances." Dupas v. City of New Orleans, 354 So.2d 1311, 1313 (La. 1978) (quoting Smolinski v. Taulli, 276 So.2d 286, 290 (La.1973)). *86 In this case, the excluded testimony may have significantly influenced the jury's conclusion concerning whether Buckbee acted reasonably, or negligently, under the circumstances. | 2 | 4 |
Dupas v. City of New Orleansgreen2 sentences1991Moreover, a party is only required to use reasonable caution, and his conduct is not negligent if, “by a common sense test, it is in accord with that of reasonably prudent persons faced with similar conditions and circumstances.” Dupas v. City of New Orleans, 354 So.2d 1311, 1313 (La.1978) (quoting Smolinski v. Taulli, 276 So.2d 286, 290 [La.1973]). 1990Moreover, a party is only required to use reasonable caution, and his conduct is not negligent if, "by a common sense test, it is in accord with that of reasonably prudent persons faced with similar conditions and circumstances." Dupas v. City of New Orleans, 354 So.2d 1311, 1313 (La. 1978) (quoting Smolinski v. Taulli, 276 So.2d 286, 290 (La.1973)). *86 In this case, the excluded testimony may have significantly influenced the jury's conclusion concerning whether Buckbee acted reasonably, or negligently, under the circumstances. | 2 | 3 |
MED EXP. v. Evangeline Parish Police Jurygreen2 sentences2023Police Jury, 96-0543, p. 11 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 359, 367 (wherein this Court discussed a vagueness challenge to a non-criminal business regulation and held, quoting Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497 n. 7, that “[t]o sustain a challenge for vagueness, the opponent of the ordinance must prove that the ordinance is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform . . . to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard conduct is specified at all[.]”). 2013Therefore, to successfully challenge an ordinance as vague, “the opponent of the ordinance must prove that the ordinance is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform ... to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard conduct is specified at all.’ ” Id., p. 11, 684 So.2d at 367 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates, supra, 455 U.S. at 497, n. 7 , 102 S.Ct. at 1191, n. 7 ). | 1 | 3 |
Hastings v. Baton Rouge General Hospitalgreen2 sentences1995In Hastings, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated some acts of malpractice can be judged by a common sense standard. 1992Womack, Inc. v. House of Representatives, 509 So.2d 62, 65 (La.App. 1st Cir.) writs denied 513 So.2d 1208 and 513 So.2d 1211 (La.1987), quoting Hastings v. Baton Rouge General Hospital, 498 So.2d 713 (La.1986). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Boydgreen2 sentences2023In State v. Boyd, 97-0579, p. 3 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 1074, 1076 (citations omitted), in dicta, this Court, to lend guidance in reviewing a criminal statute on the basis of vagueness, held in pertinent part: “[T]he statute must not contain a standard so vague that the public is uncertain as to the proscribed conduct and the factfinder is unfettered by any legally fixed standards as to what is prohibited by the statute.” The Boyd Court emphasized “the fact that a statute’s terms are subjective and susceptible to interpretation does not render it vague,” and “[d]ue process requires only that 2023In State v. Boyd, 97-0579, p. 3 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 1074, 1076 (citations omitted), in dicta, this Court, to lend guidance in reviewing a criminal statute on the basis of vagueness, held in pertinent part: “[T]he statute must not contain a standard so vague that the public is uncertain as to the proscribed conduct and the factfinder is unfettered by any legally fixed standards as to what is prohibited by the statute.” The Boyd Court emphasized “the fact that a statute’s terms are subjective and susceptible to interpretation does not render it vague,” and “[d]ue process requires only that | 1 | 1 |
City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Commissiongreen2 sentences1993A tariff is "a published volume of rate schedules and general terms and conditions under which a product or service will be supplied." MGTC, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n of Wyoming, 735 P.2d 103 , 104 n. 1 (Wyo.1987) (citing 3 American Gas Association, Regulation of the Gas Industry, GL-158 (1981)). [29] See also City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 13 Ill.2d 607 , 150 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1958) (by authorizing automatic adjustment clause commission does not give up its right to initiate proceedings to determine the reasonableness of the utility's rates); Delmarva, 400 A.2d at 1152-53 (ex 1993A tariff is "a published volume of rate schedules and general terms and conditions under which a product or service will be supplied." MGTC, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n of Wyoming, 735 P.2d 103 , 104 n. 1 (Wyo.1987) (citing 3 American Gas Association, Regulation of the Gas Industry, GL-158 (1981)). [29] See also City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 13 Ill.2d 607 , 150 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1958) (by authorizing automatic adjustment clause commission does not give up its right to initiate proceedings to determine the reasonableness of the utility's rates); Delmarva, 400 A.2d at 1152-53 (ex | 1 | 1 |
Public Service Commission v. Delmarva Power & Light Co.green1 sentence1993A tariff is "a published volume of rate schedules and general terms and conditions under which a product or service will be supplied." MGTC, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n of Wyoming, 735 P.2d 103 , 104 n. 1 (Wyo.1987) (citing 3 American Gas Association, Regulation of the Gas Industry, GL-158 (1981)). [29] See also City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 13 Ill.2d 607 , 150 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1958) (by authorizing automatic adjustment clause commission does not give up its right to initiate proceedings to determine the reasonableness of the utility's rates); Delmarva, 400 A.2d at 1152-53 (ex | 1 | 1 |
MJ Womack, Inc. v. State House of Rep.green1 sentence1992Womack, Inc. v. House of Representatives, 509 So.2d 62, 65 (La.App. 1st Cir.) writs denied 513 So.2d 1208 and 513 So.2d 1211 (La.1987), quoting Hastings v. Baton Rouge General Hospital, 498 So.2d 713 (La.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Aetna Insurance Company, a Corporation v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., a Corporationgreen1 sentence1987See Hastings, 498 So.2d at 719-720 ; see also Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata, & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir.1968) (ruling that the same principles for establishing negligence apply to such professionals as physicians and architects); W. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hammond v. Grissom
green
2 sentences1994Hammond v. Grissom, 470 So.2d 1049 (Miss.1985). 1987Hammond v. Grissom, 470 So.2d 1049 (Miss.1985). | 2 | 1987–1994 |
Smith v. Goguen
green
2 sentences2023Such a provision simply has no core.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1249 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). 16 conduct clearly described in a statute cannot complain of the vagueness of the statute as applied to others. 2023Such a provision simply has no core.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1249 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). 16 conduct clearly described in a statute cannot complain of the vagueness of the statute as applied to others. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Coates v. City of Cincinnati
green
2 sentences2023The rationale is evident: to sustain such a challenge, the complainant must prove that the enactment is vague “‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). 2023The rationale is evident: to sustain such a challenge, the complainant must prove that the enactment is vague “‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Greenhouse v. CF KENNER ASSOCIATES LTD.
green
2 sentences2010Kenner Associates Limited Partnership, XXXX-XXXX, p. 7 (La.App. 4 *383 Cir. 11/10/98), 723 So.2d 1004 , 1008 this Court further explained that "the failure to submit expert testimony to prove the standard of care is a `fatal omission.'" Sizeler and Daly-Sublette note that the only exception that might apply to this rule is when a lay person can infer design negligence applying a common sense standard. 2010Kenner Associates Limited Partnership, 1998-0496, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/10/98), 723 So.2d 1004 , 1008 this Court further explained that “the failure to submit expert testimony to prove the standard of care is a ‘fatal omission.’ ” Sizeler and Daly-Sublette note that the only exception that might apply to this rule is when a lay person can infer design negligence applying a common sense standard. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Weaver v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp.
green
1 sentence1994Weaver v. Valley Electric Membership Corp., 615 So.2d 1375 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
MGTC, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming
green
1 sentence1993A tariff is "a published volume of rate schedules and general terms and conditions under which a product or service will be supplied." MGTC, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n of Wyoming, 735 P.2d 103 , 104 n. 1 (Wyo.1987) (citing 3 American Gas Association, Regulation of the Gas Industry, GL-158 (1981)). [29] See also City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 13 Ill.2d 607 , 150 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1958) (by authorizing automatic adjustment clause commission does not give up its right to initiate proceedings to determine the reasonableness of the utility's rates); Delmarva, 400 A.2d at 1152-53 (ex | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Pittman Construction Company v. City of New Orleans
green
2 sentences1992App. 4th Cir.1965), application denied, 248 La. 434 , 179 So.2d 274 (1965)]: expert testimony is not always required to establish the standard of care for physicians, and if "lay persons can infer negligence" by applying "a common sense standard" in the case of physicians, then an architect's negligence may on occasion be established without reference to expert testimony [citations omitted]. 1992App. 4th Cir.1965), application denied, 248 La. 434 , 179 So.2d 274 (1965)]: expert testimony is not always required to establish the standard of care for physicians, and if "lay persons can infer negligence" by applying "a common sense standard" in the case of physicians, then an architect's negligence may on occasion be established without reference to expert testimony [citations omitted]. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Milton J. Womack, Inc. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE
green
1 sentence1992Womack, Inc. v. House of Representatives, 509 So.2d 62, 65 (La.App. 1st Cir.) writs denied 513 So.2d 1208 and 513 So.2d 1211 (La.1987), quoting Hastings v. Baton Rouge General Hospital, 498 So.2d 713 (La.1986). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Milton J. Womack, Inc. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE
green
1 sentence1992Womack, Inc. v. House of Representatives, 509 So.2d 62, 65 (La.App. 1st Cir.) writs denied 513 So.2d 1208 and 513 So.2d 1211 (La.1987), quoting Hastings v. Baton Rouge General Hospital, 498 So.2d 713 (La.1986). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Soniat v. Travelers Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1990It should also be noted that the primary basis for our finding in Soniat that La.R.S. 22:213B(7) was not preempted was the fact that it is part of the Insurance Code, whose stated purpose is to "regulate insurers and the insurance business." Soniat, 538 So.2d at 214 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Guillot v. Fisherman's Paradise, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988Guillot v. Fisherman's Paradise, Inc., 437 So.2d 840 (La. 1983); Smolinski v. Taulli, supra; A person (non parent) who has actually undertaken the control and supervision of a child has a duty to use reasonable care to protect the child from injury. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Ventresca
green
1 sentence1975No single statement or fact per se constituted probable cause, but the totality of the picture presented to the Magistrate, construed in accordance with the common sense rule of construction, approved by the United States [Supreme Court] in U. S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 108 , 85 Supreme Court Reporter 746 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 684 ], justified the judgment in issuing the order to search." We find these bills to be without merit. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Adams v. Morgan
neutral
1 sentence1968Adams v. Morgan et al., La.App., 173 So. 540 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Taylor v. Genuine Parts Company
green
1 sentence1968The degree of care to be exercised must always be commensurate with the foreseeable danger confronting the alleged wrongdoer. * * * ” In the recent case of Taylor v. Genuine Parts Company, La.App., 192 So.2d 241 (1966), we had occasion to review rather fully the law applicable to situations such as that presented here. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Simon v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company
neutral
1 sentence1962The Court there held that at such a crossing, it was a factual question "whether reasonable caution forbade his (plaintiff's) going forward in reliance on the sense of hearing, unaided by that of sight," 298 U.S. 101 , 54 S.Ct. 581 .'" In Simon v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, La.App. 3 Cir., 124 So.2d 646 , certiorari denied, this court affirmed an award in favor of a motorist driver who entered unto a railroad crossing when his view had been obstructed by high weeds negligently permitted by the railroad to grow in close proximity to the crossing. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans
green
2 sentences1956Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271 , 97 So. 440, 444 , 33 A.L.R. 260 , that “if the primary consideration for the enactment of an ordinance limiting the individual’s right to use his own property is a substantial consideration of public health, safety, comfort, or general welfare, considerations of taste and beauty may also enter in, and be not out of place.” In the course of the opinion the court commented: “Why should not the police power avail, as well to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of sight, as to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by *655 1956Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271 , 97 So. 440, 444 , 33 A.L.R. 260 , that “if the primary consideration for the enactment of an ordinance limiting the individual’s right to use his own property is a substantial consideration of public health, safety, comfort, or general welfare, considerations of taste and beauty may also enter in, and be not out of place.” In the course of the opinion the court commented: “Why should not the police power avail, as well to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of sight, as to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by *655 | 1 | 1956–1956 |
State v. Farrier
neutral
2 sentences1912Enc. p. 1100; State v. Farrier, 114 La. 579 , 38 South. 460 . [6] The next and last bill was to the act of the court in choosing as interpreter a person who had been summoned as a witness for the state, and had contributed to a fund for the prosecution of the accused. 1912Enc. p. 1100; State v. Farrier, 114 La. 579 , 38 South. 460 . [6] The next and last bill was to the act of the court in choosing as interpreter a person who had been summoned as a witness for the state, and had contributed to a fund for the prosecution of the accused. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.