sense standard in Pennsylvania

2026“The rationale [for this rule] is evident: to sustain such a challenge, the complainant must prove that the enactment is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Id. at 495 n.7 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2010).

2017“The rationale [for this rule] is evident: to sustain such a challenge, the complainant must prove that the enactment is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Id. at 495 n.7 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2010).

2016The statement must be made at the time of the event or so shortly thereafter that the declarant would be unlikely to have the opportunity to decide to make a false statement." Harris' v, Toys "R" Us-Penn, Inc., 880 A.2d 1270, 1279 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 770 , 895 A.2d 1262 (2006).

2016The statement must be made at the time of the event or so shortly thereafter that the declarant would be unlikely to have the opportunity to decide to make a false statement." Harris' v, Toys "R" Us-Penn, Inc., 880 A.2d 1270, 1279 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 770 , 895 A.2d 1262 (2006).

1980In Commonwealth v. Brightwell, 486 Pa. 401 , 406 A.2d 503 (1979), Justice Nix, writing in support of affirmance by an equally divided court, articulated the common sense rule which ought to be applied in this and in similar cases. “[W]e know of no case,” he wrote, “wherein the right to a speedy trial has been violated when the cause for the delay has been properly attributable to the defendant.

1980In Commonwealth v. Brightwell, 486 Pa. 401 , 406 A.2d 503 (1979), Justice Nix, writing in support of affirmance by an equally divided court, articulated the common sense rule which ought to be applied in this and in similar cases. “[W]e know of no case,” he wrote, “wherein the right to a speedy trial has been violated when the cause for the delay has been properly attributable to the defendant.

1951The Connecticut rule relating to the propriety of a cross-complaint is succinctly stated in Puleo v. Goldberg, 129 Conn. 34 , 37: “The test is whether the transactions are distinct and independent or are connected in the sense that the claim under the cross-complaint is so related to that made in the complaint that consideration of the former is essential to a full adjudication of the parties’ rights as to the latter.” See, also, National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, 128 Conn. 307, 312 , and cases there cited.

1942Goldberg, 129 Conn. 34 .

2021I am further influenced that the common sense standard necessitates the buckling up a young child in a car seat since the Commonwealth’s EWOC statute is articulated with the intention of criminalizing conduct “producing or tending to produce a [c]ertain defined result.” Lynn, 114 A.3d at 828 (quoting Commonwealth v. Marlin, 305 A.2d 14, 18 (Pa. 1973)).

2021The Superior Court ruled that the issue had no merit even though the caller did not testify and thus, was not available for cross-examination, because there were sufficient indicia of reliability and the call was made almost contemporaneously with the occurrence of the event described by the caller. … In [ Cunningham, supra,] the Superior Court held that the present sense exception “does not require that the comments be made to another person also present at the scene, but may be made over the telephone.” The Court further stated that the present sense exception permits testimony concerning “c

2021The Superior Court ruled that the issue had no merit even though the caller did not testify and thus, was not available for cross-examination, because there were sufficient indicia of reliability and the call was made almost contemporaneously with the occurrence of the event described by the caller. … In [ Cunningham, supra,] the Superior Court held that the present sense exception “does not require that the comments be made to another person also present at the scene, but may be made over the telephone.” The Court further stated that the present sense exception permits testimony concerning “c

2017The premise of this argument defies the common sense inquiry for determining probable cause expounded in Gray, supra and Gates, supra. Even if the information in the affidavit was a day old, the issuing authority had the power to issue the warrant based on a reasonable belief that such information indicated Appellant was systematically dealing heroin per his involvement in a criminal enterprise.

2017The Commonwealth bears the burden of ____________________________________________ 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). -2- J-S32008-17 establishing that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

2017The Commonwealth bears the burden of ____________________________________________ 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). -2- J-S32008-17 establishing that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

2017The premise of this argument defies the common sense inquiry for determining probable cause expounded in Gray, supra and Gates, supra. Even if the information in the affidavit was a day old, the issuing authority had the power to issue the warrant based on a reasonable belief that such information indicated Appellant was systematically dealing heroin per his involvement in a criminal enterprise.

2016In Bugosh v. Allen Refractories Co; 932 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. 2007) the Superior Court stated the following regarding Rule 803(1): Pa.R.E. 803(1) defines the present sense exception as "[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." "The exception allows testimony concerning events observed by the declarant regardless of whether or not the declarant was excited.

2015Fernandez v. Tax Claim Bureau of Northampton County, 925 A.2d 207 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007).

2014Pruitt, 951 A.2d at 318 .

2001As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).

2001As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).

1980Moreover, it is well established that the paramount consideration in child custody proceedings is the best interest and welfare of the child: In re Davis, 237 Pa. Superior Ct. 516 , 352 A. 2d 78 (1975).

1980Moreover, it is well established that the paramount consideration in child custody proceedings is the best interest and welfare of the child: In re Davis, 237 Pa. Superior Ct. 516 , 352 A. 2d 78 (1975).

1980We agree with petitioner that a parental termination hearing should be bifurcated in the sense that the hearing court should consider the best interest of the child after it has made a threshold finding that the statutory requirements for termination have been met: Adoption of R.I., 468 Pa. 287 , 361 A. 2d 294 (1976).

1980We agree with petitioner that a parental termination hearing should be bifurcated in the sense that the hearing court should consider the best interest of the child after it has made a threshold finding that the statutory requirements for termination have been met: Adoption of R.I., 468 Pa. 287 , 361 A. 2d 294 (1976).

1978To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951).

1978To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951).

1976Second, the Ruhls candidly admit that their appearance at a hearing or view would normally waive any infirmities in notice 3 imparted to them, but they argue that they were misled by the notice because they were given the false impression that the proceedings were informal and attendance was not necessary because the notice of the impending proceedings was framed in the form of an invitation “to discuss the above matter if you wish.” Citing Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) and Smith v. Pa. P.U.C., 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 424 , 162 A.2d 80 (1960), the Ruhls urge us to consider that due p

1976Second, the Ruhls candidly admit that their appearance at a hearing or view would normally waive any infirmities in notice 3 imparted to them, but they argue that they were misled by the notice because they were given the false impression that the proceedings were informal and attendance was not necessary because the notice of the impending proceedings was framed in the form of an invitation “to discuss the above matter if you wish.” Citing Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) and Smith v. Pa. P.U.C., 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 424 , 162 A.2d 80 (1960), the Ruhls urge us to consider that due p