sense standard in Kansas

2002“Where 1st Amendment freedoms are not concerned, the rule is that a statute is unconstitutionally vague 'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” 160 Bankr. at 661 (citing *908 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 71 L.

1989In order to establish that legislation is unconstitutional on its face, the person challenging the legislation must establish that it is vague “ ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 29 L.

2002Ed. 2d 214 , 91 S. Ct. 1686 [1971], and Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 ).

1989In order to establish that legislation is unconstitutional on its face, the person challenging the legislation must establish that it is vague “ ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 29 L.

2001Because the present ordinance does not infringe upon explicit constitutional guarantees, such as freedom of speech, die ordinance should be upheld unless it ‘is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’ [Citation omitted.] The plaintiffs must establish that die ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, which means it must be demonstrated to be ‘ “invalid in toto■ — and therefore incapable of any valid application.” ’ [Citations omitted.] In order to establish that legislation is unconstitutional on its face, the person challenging die legislation must establish that it is vague ‘ “not

2001Because the present ordinance does not infringe upon explicit constitutional guarantees, such as freedom of speech, the ordinance should be upheld unless it `is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.' [Citation omitted.] The plaintiffs must establish that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, which means it must be demonstrated to be `"invalid in toto —and therefore incapable of any valid application."' [Citations omitted.] In order to establish that legislation is unconstitutional on its face, the person challenging the legislation must establish that it is vague `"not in th

1916The syllabus to Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 , reads: “When a traveler on a country highway comes to a railway-crossing with which he is familiar, knowing that a train is about due at that point and liable to pass at any time, it becomes his duty as an act of ordinary prudence to look and listen for its approach; and if the sense of sight be unavailing because of obstructions to the view, and the sense of hearing unavailing because of preventing noises, it becomes 'his duty, as a further act of ordinary prudence, to stop in order better to enable him to look and listen bef

1916The syllabus to Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 , reads: “When a traveler on a country highway comes to a railway-crossing with which he is familiar, knowing that a train is about due at that point and liable to pass at any time, it becomes his duty as an act of ordinary prudence to look and listen for its approach; and if the sense of sight be unavailing because of obstructions to the view, and the sense of hearing unavailing because of preventing noises, it becomes 'his duty, as a further act of ordinary prudence, to stop in order better to enable him to look and listen bef

2015That is the sense of the rule discussed, for example, in Collier, 263 Kan. 629 , Syl. ¶ 3.

2002“Where 1st Amendment freedoms are not concerned, the rule is that a statute is unconstitutionally vague 'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” 160 Bankr. at 661 (citing *908 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 71 L.

1997To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.” Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87 .

1916The syllabus to Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 , reads: “When a traveler on a country highway comes to a railway-crossing with which he is familiar, knowing that a train is about due at that point and liable to pass at any time, it becomes his duty as an act of ordinary prudence to look and listen for its approach; and if the sense of sight be unavailing because of obstructions to the view, and the sense of hearing unavailing because of preventing noises, it becomes 'his duty, as a further act of ordinary prudence, to stop in order better to enable him to look and listen bef

1916The syllabus to Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 , reads: “When a traveler on a country highway comes to a railway-crossing with which he is familiar, knowing that a train is about due at that point and liable to pass at any time, it becomes his duty as an act of ordinary prudence to look and listen for its approach; and if the sense of sight be unavailing because of obstructions to the view, and the sense of hearing unavailing because of preventing noises, it becomes 'his duty, as a further act of ordinary prudence, to stop in order better to enable him to look and listen bef

1916The syllabus to Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 , reads: “When a traveler on a country highway comes to a railway-crossing with which he is familiar, knowing that a train is about due at that point and liable to pass at any time, it becomes his duty as an act of ordinary prudence to look and listen for its approach; and if the sense of sight be unavailing because of obstructions to the view, and the sense of hearing unavailing because of preventing noises, it becomes 'his duty, as a further act of ordinary prudence, to stop in order better to enable him to look and listen bef

1916The syllabus to Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 , reads: “When a traveler on a country highway comes to a railway-crossing with which he is familiar, knowing that a train is about due at that point and liable to pass at any time, it becomes his duty as an act of ordinary prudence to look and listen for its approach; and if the sense of sight be unavailing because of obstructions to the view, and the sense of hearing unavailing because of preventing noises, it becomes 'his duty, as a further act of ordinary prudence, to stop in order better to enable him to look and listen bef

1916The syllabus to Railroad Co. v. Willey, 60 Kan. 819 , 58 Pac. 472 , reads: “When a traveler on a country highway comes to a railway-crossing with which he is familiar, knowing that a train is about due at that point and liable to pass at any time, it becomes his duty as an act of ordinary prudence to look and listen for its approach; and if the sense of sight be unavailing because of obstructions to the view, and the sense of hearing unavailing because of preventing noises, it becomes 'his duty, as a further act of ordinary prudence, to stop in order better to enable him to look and listen bef

1916App. 510 , 63 Pac. 458 .