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11 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Teague v. Lanegreen1 sentence2016To borrow from the retroactivity lexicon applicable to criminal cases, rule 3.5 (c) is a “new rule” in the sense that the rule was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 296, 303 (1990), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sylvaingreen1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 434 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Braygreen1 sentence2016To borrow from the retroactivity lexicon applicable to criminal cases, rule 3.5 (c) is a “new rule” in the sense that the rule was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 296, 303 (1990), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sylvaingreen1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 434 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Ricci v. Venture Magazine, Inc.green2 sentences2010A judge in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts has described the fair and accuracy inquiry this way: “[Cjourts hearing defamation claims are to apply a common sense standard of expected lay interpretation of media reports of trials, rather than inquiring whether a report was strictly correct in defining legal charges and describing legal rulings.” Ricci v. Venture Magazine, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. 2010See note 11, supra. Howell has not alleged, however, that these statements were defamatory. [20] A judge in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts has described the fair and accuracy inquiry this way: "[C]ourts hearing defamation claims are to apply a common sense standard of expected lay interpretation of media reports of trials, rather than inquiring whether a report was strictly correct in defining legal charges and describing legal rulings." Ricci v. Venture Magazine, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Jewettgreen1 sentence2007“Where the evidence fairly raises the possibility of accident, the defendant is entitled, if he requests, to have the judge instruct the jury that the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the death was not accidental.” Commonwealth v. Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 370 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Central Coast Electric, Inc. v. Mendellgreen1 sentence2003Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to perfect its lien within the statutory deadlines because G.L.c. 254, §§4 and 8 do not extend to warranty work. 2 Although there appears to be no Massachusetts caselaw directly on point, other jurisdictions have established the common sense rule that warranty work does not generally extend the time for perfecting a mechanic’s lien. 3 See, e.g., Tym v. Ludwig, 538 N.W.2d 600, 604 (Wis.Ct.App. 1995) (warranty work or repair work related to original installation fails to extend time for filing lien); Manhattan Mall Co. v. Shult, 864 P.2d 1136, 1141 (Kan. 19 | 1 | 1 |
Manhattan Mall Co. v. Shultgreen1 sentence2003Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to perfect its lien within the statutory deadlines because G.L.c. 254, §§4 and 8 do not extend to warranty work. 2 Although there appears to be no Massachusetts caselaw directly on point, other jurisdictions have established the common sense rule that warranty work does not generally extend the time for perfecting a mechanic’s lien. 3 See, e.g., Tym v. Ludwig, 538 N.W.2d 600, 604 (Wis.Ct.App. 1995) (warranty work or repair work related to original installation fails to extend time for filing lien); Manhattan Mall Co. v. Shult, 864 P.2d 1136, 1141 (Kan. 19 | 1 | 1 |
Tym v. Ludwiggreen1 sentence2003Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to perfect its lien within the statutory deadlines because G.L.c. 254, §§4 and 8 do not extend to warranty work. 2 Although there appears to be no Massachusetts caselaw directly on point, other jurisdictions have established the common sense rule that warranty work does not generally extend the time for perfecting a mechanic’s lien. 3 See, e.g., Tym v. Ludwig, 538 N.W.2d 600, 604 (Wis.Ct.App. 1995) (warranty work or repair work related to original installation fails to extend time for filing lien); Manhattan Mall Co. v. Shult, 864 P.2d 1136, 1141 (Kan. 19 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gallisongreen1 sentence2001These cases are very materially different from the present; in each cited case the incidents joined for trial have a “temporal and schematic nexus,” Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659, 673 (1981), which is notably lacking in the case at bar. | 1 | 1 |
Ryan v. Stavrosgreen1 sentence1993As to actual use, “[a] judge must examine the nature of the occupancy in relation to the character of the land.” Kendall , 413 Mass, at 624, citing Ryan v. Stavros, 348 Mass. 251, 262 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
Kendall v. Selvaggiogreen1 sentence1993See the discussion in Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 623-624 (1992). *556 Passing, then, to the acts of the present defendant on the land — the crux — we conclude that, taking even an indulgent view, he failed to carry his burden of proving his “actual” or “exclusive” use in the sense of the doctrine of adverse possession. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Latimoregreen1 sentence1993It is apparent from our narrative that the judge did not err in holding that the Commonwealth’s evidence — the testimony of the wife combined with that of the police officers — made a case to be answered, a case for the jury, within the doctrine of the Latimore case (Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 [1979]), and, in the sense of the doctrine, that case did not “deteriorate” by reason of the defendant’s testimony. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bassettgreen1 sentence1992Compare Commonwealth v. Bassett, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 713, 719-720 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. DeMarygreen1 sentence1986See United States v. DeMary, 105 F. Supp. 6, 8 (N.D.W.Va. 1952). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Figueroa
green
1 sentence2007“Because proof of involuntary manslaughter requires proof of wanton or reckless conduct, . . . and because wanton or reckless conduct displays far greater indifference to likely harmful consequences than negligence or even gross negligence, ... the concept of accident in this sense is a defense to a charge of involuntary manslaughter.” Ibid. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich
green
1 sentence2001Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713 , the Supreme Court stated: We have concluded that... no ‘arbitrariness’ exceptionin the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulationsis consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Rogers v. United States
green
2 sentences1977Instead, where the privilege applies, it may be overcome only by either (1) a constitutionally adequate grant of immunity, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); or (2) a valid waiver of the privilege by the person who possesses it, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). 1977Instead, where the privilege applies, it may be overcome only by either (1) a constitutionally adequate grant of immunity, Kas-tigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); or (2) a valid waiver of the privilege by the person who possesses it, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Kastigar v. United States
green
2 sentences1977Instead, where the privilege applies, it may be overcome only by either (1) a constitutionally adequate grant of immunity, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); or (2) a valid waiver of the privilege by the person who possesses it, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). 1977Instead, where the privilege applies, it may be overcome only by either (1) a constitutionally adequate grant of immunity, Kas-tigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); or (2) a valid waiver of the privilege by the person who possesses it, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences1977In this sense the privilege is unlike the more limited protections of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable." See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 1977In this sense the privilege is unlike the more limited protections of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against searches and seizures that are “unreasonable.” See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.