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5 Hawaii opinions name it 1 courts 1970–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coates v. City of Cincinnatigreen2 sentences2010The Court explained that "the ordinance [was] vague, not in the sense that it require[d] a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct [was] specified at all" inasmuch as "[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others." Id. 2010The Court explained that “the ordinance [was] vague, not in the sense that it require[d] a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct [was] specified at all” inasmuch as “[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Claim of Kurash v. Franklin Stores Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1970In Kurash v. Franklin Stores Corporation, 12 A.D. 2d 368 , 211 N.Y.S. 2d 838 , lv. to app. den., 174 N.E. 2d 925 (1961), the court stated that “where there seems a reasonable basis for a difference in medical opinion on the cause of death, * * * there has been a tendency to sustain the presumption * * * where the medical record would be open to a finding either way,” and held: “Here we have a medical record which is sufficient to re-enforce the presumption of accident; and the Board was not bound to hold that the medical opinion the other way must be treated as ‘substantial evidence to the con 1970In Kurash v. Franklin Stores Corporation, 12 A.D. 2d 368 , 211 N.Y.S. 2d 838 , lv. to app. den., 174 N.E. 2d 925 (1961), the court stated that “where there seems a reasonable basis for a difference in medical opinion on the cause of death, * * * there has been a tendency to sustain the presumption * * * where the medical record would be open to a finding either way,” and held: “Here we have a medical record which is sufficient to re-enforce the presumption of accident; and the Board was not bound to hold that the medical opinion the other way must be treated as ‘substantial evidence to the con | 2 | 1970–1970 |
Claim of Weisel v. National Transportation Co.
neutral
2 sentences1970In Kurash v. Franklin Stores Corporation, 12 A.D. 2d 368 , 211 N.Y.S. 2d 838 , lv. to app. den., 174 N.E. 2d 925 (1961), the court stated that “where there seems a reasonable basis for a difference in medical opinion on the cause of death, * * * there has been a tendency to sustain the presumption * * * where the medical record would be open to a finding either way,” and held: “Here we have a medical record which is sufficient to re-enforce the presumption of accident; and the Board was not bound to hold that the medical opinion the other way must be treated as ‘substantial evidence to the con 1970In Kurash v. Franklin Stores Corporation, 12 A.D. 2d 368 , 211 N.Y.S. 2d 838 , lv. to app. den., 174 N.E. 2d 925 (1961), the court stated that “where there seems a reasonable basis for a difference in medical opinion on the cause of death, * * * there has been a tendency to sustain the presumption * * * where the medical record would be open to a finding either way,” and held: “Here we have a medical record which is sufficient to re-enforce the presumption of accident; and the Board was not bound to hold that the medical opinion the other way must be treated as ‘substantial evidence to the con | 2 | 1970–1970 |
Del Rio Ex Rel. Del Rio v. Crake
green
2 sentences2012As noted supra, "the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is not for legislative determination, but is vested in the judiciary, and a statute cannot survive constitutional challenge based on legislative declaration alone.” Del Rio, 87 Hawai'i at 304 , 955 P.2d at 97 . 2012As noted, "Administrative agencies may hear and determine, or ascertain facts and decide by the application of rules of law to the ascertained facts, and even determine the facts upon which their jurisdiction depends, and the power exercised by them is not judicial in the sense of a violation of the principle of separation of powers, but is administrative or quasi-judicial." Id. [34] As noted supra, "the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is not for legislative determination, but is vested in the judiciary, and a statute cannot survive constitutional challenge based on legislati | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Connally v. General Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1972As a result, `men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.' Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 *368 L.Ed. 322." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). 1972As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 .” Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.