sense hearing in California

2020(People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 (Seijas).) The Fifth Amendment privilege embraces not only “answers that would in themselves support a conviction,” but also those that “would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a . . . crime.” (Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 (Hoffman); see People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 617 (Cudjo).) The privilege “must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure.” (Hoffman, at p. 486.) This protection is “confined to instances where the witness has reasonable c

1969It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, [Citation] and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken. ’ [Citation.] However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. ...” (Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1123 , 71 S.Ct. 814 ].) Hoffman and Malloy tell us to look to the setting in which the question

2015(People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 765 .) "[T]he void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way." (F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 234, 236 ].) Where, as here, the statute at issue does not involve First Amendment rights and implicates solely economic concerns, the

2015(People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 765 .) "[T]he void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way." (F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 234, 236 ].) Where, as here, the statute at issue does not involve First Amendment rights and implicates solely economic concerns, the

2015(Compare Quarterman v. Kefauver (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [holding it "does not encompass the urban backyard garden"] with Haworth v. Lira (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1362, 1371 [holding it "was not limited to ranchers or other commercial farmers"].) But the question in Haworth, "whether or not the statute applied to the noncommercial raising of livestock," differed from the question in Quarterman, which was "whether the Legislature intended the term 'lands . . . under cultivation or intended or used for the raising of livestock' to include a small urban backyard which contains a garden." (Qu

2015(Compare Quarterman v. Kefauver (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [holding it "does not encompass the urban backyard garden"] with Haworth v. Lira (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1362, 1371 [holding it "was not limited to ranchers or other commercial farmers"].) But the question in Haworth, "whether or not the statute applied to the noncommercial raising of livestock," differed from the question in Quarterman, which was "whether the Legislature intended the term 'lands . . . under cultivation or intended or used for the raising of livestock' to include a small urban backyard which contains a garden." (Qu

2015(Compare Quarterman v. Kefauver (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [holding it "does not encompass the urban backyard garden"] with Haworth v. Lira (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1362, 1371 [holding it "was not limited to ranchers or other commercial farmers"].) But the question in Haworth, "whether or not the statute applied to the noncommercial raising of livestock," differed from the question in Quarterman, which was "whether the Legislature intended the term 'lands . . . under cultivation or intended or used for the raising of livestock' to include a small urban backyard which contains a garden." (Qu

2015(Compare Quarterman v. Kefauver (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [holding it "does not encompass the urban backyard garden"] with Haworth v. Lira (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1362, 1371 [holding it "was not limited to ranchers or other commercial farmers"].) But the question in Haworth, "whether or not the statute applied to the noncommercial raising of livestock," differed from the question in Quarterman, which was "whether the Legislature intended the term 'lands . . . under cultivation or intended or used for the raising of livestock' to include a small urban backyard which contains a garden." (Qu

2015(People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 765 .) "[T]he void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way." (F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 234, 236 ].) Where, as here, the statute at issue does not involve First Amendment rights and implicates solely economic concerns, the

2015(People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 765 .) "[T]he void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way." (F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 234, 236 ].) Where, as here, the statute at issue does not involve First Amendment rights and implicates solely economic concerns, the

2020(Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030 ; see Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 266-267 .) Because this analysis is dependent on the particular circumstances, “[t]he question whether the [encroacher’s] conduct is so egregious as to be willful or whether the quantum of the 15 defendant’s negligence is so great as to justify an injunction is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Linthicum, at p. 267.) In contending the court abused its discretion, the Sprankleses suggest the Sullivans were negligent as a matter of law because they did not obtain a

2020(People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 (Seijas).) The Fifth Amendment privilege embraces not only “answers that would in themselves support a conviction,” but also those that “would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a . . . crime.” (Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 (Hoffman); see People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 617 (Cudjo).) The privilege “must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure.” (Hoffman, at p. 486.) This protection is “confined to instances where the witness has reasonable c

2020(People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 (Seijas).) The Fifth Amendment privilege embraces not only “answers that would in themselves support a conviction,” but also those that “would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a . . . crime.” (Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 (Hoffman); see People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 617 (Cudjo).) The privilege “must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure.” (Hoffman, at p. 486.) This protection is “confined to instances where the witness has reasonable c

2020(Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030 ; see Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 266-267 .) Because this analysis is dependent on the particular circumstances, “[t]he question whether the [encroacher’s] conduct is so egregious as to be willful or whether the quantum of the 15 defendant’s negligence is so great as to justify an injunction is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Linthicum, at p. 267.) In contending the court abused its discretion, the Sprankleses suggest the Sullivans were negligent as a matter of law because they did not obtain a

2020(Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030 ; see Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 266-267 .) Because this analysis is dependent on the particular circumstances, “[t]he question whether the [encroacher’s] conduct is so egregious as to be willful or whether the quantum of the 15 defendant’s negligence is so great as to justify an injunction is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Linthicum, at p. 267.) In contending the court abused its discretion, the Sprankleses suggest the Sullivans were negligent as a matter of law because they did not obtain a

2020(Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030 ; see Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 266-267 .) Because this analysis is dependent on the particular circumstances, “[t]he question whether the [encroacher’s] conduct is so egregious as to be willful or whether the quantum of the 15 defendant’s negligence is so great as to justify an injunction is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Linthicum, at p. 267.) In contending the court abused its discretion, the Sprankleses suggest the Sullivans were negligent as a matter of law because they did not obtain a

2020(Hansen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030 ; see Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 266-267 .) Because this analysis is dependent on the particular circumstances, “[t]he question whether the [encroacher’s] conduct is so egregious as to be willful or whether the quantum of the 15 defendant’s negligence is so great as to justify an injunction is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Linthicum, at p. 267.) In contending the court abused its discretion, the Sprankleses suggest the Sullivans were negligent as a matter of law because they did not obtain a

2016What is important is whether the testimony or any other evidence convinces you, not just the number of witnesses who testify about a certain point.” The Courts of Appeal have explained that CALCRIM No. 302 is a common sense instruction not to determine truth by counting the number of witnesses who testified to a particular point: “[CALCRIM No. 302 and its counterpart, CALJIC No. 2.22, both] emphasize that it is the convincing force of testimony, not the number of witnesses that is of critical importance. . . . [B]oth instruct that the number of witnesses, by itself, is not the determining fact

2013Co. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 137, 150 [applying last antecedent rule, which usually applies to statutes, to contracts as well].) The last antecedent rule is the common sense presumption that the tail should not wag the dog in sentence construction, i.e., qualifiers apply to words and phrases immediately preceding them, as distinct from words and phrases more remote.

2013To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.‖ (Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479 , 486–487, italics added; accord, Blackburn v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 428–429; Warford v. Medeiros, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045 .) 25 ―The substance and scope of the particularized inquiry will, of course, vary with the circumstances peculiar to the

2010(See People v. Burgess (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 36, 41 [ 338 P.2d 524 ].) A telephone is an electronic device that aids a person’s auditory perception, so a person who makes an annoying or harassing call to a 911 dispatcher has committed the crime in the dispatcher’s presence.

2010(See People v. Burgess (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 36, 41 [ 338 P.2d 524 ].) A telephone is an electronic device that aids a person’s auditory perception, so a person who makes an annoying or harassing call to a 911 dispatcher has committed the crime in the dispatcher’s presence.

2010(Johanson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1216 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 42 ].) Under section 836, the term “presence” does not require physical proximity but, rather, the crime must be apparent to the officer’s senses; the same interpretation applies to arrests by citizens. {Ibid.) The “senses” include the sense of hearing, so a public offense may be committed in an officer’s presence when his auditory perception is effected by an electronic device, such as an electronic wire worn by an undercover officer.

2010(Johanson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1216 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 42 ].) Under section 836, the term “presence” does not require physical proximity but, rather, the crime must be apparent to the officer’s senses; the same interpretation applies to arrests by citizens. {Ibid.) The “senses” include the sense of hearing, so a public offense may be committed in an officer’s presence when his auditory perception is effected by an electronic device, such as an electronic wire worn by an undercover officer.

2010The only real jurisdictional question is . . . does the best interests of the child require that a guardian be appointed?” (Guardianship of Smith (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 686, 691-692 [ 306 P.2d 86 ].) C.

2010The only real jurisdictional question is . . . does the best interests of the child require that a guardian be appointed?” (Guardianship of Smith (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 686, 691-692 [ 306 P.2d 86 ].) C.