sense rule (Maine) · Go Syfert
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sense rule in Maine

7 Maine opinions name it 1 courts 1935–2014 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co.green
ned · 1983 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
1 sentence

1999See also Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D.Neb.1983); Connecticut Mut.

11
Mundy Ex Rel. Pamela v. Simmonsgreen
me · 1980 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
1 sentence

1983Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218, 222 (Me.1981); Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1980).

11
Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc.green
me · 1981 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
1 sentence

1983Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218, 222 (Me.1981); Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1980).

11
Johnson v. Laffoongreen
kyctapphigh · 1934 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975
2 sentences

1975In this sense the hearing may be labelled “quasi-judicial.” However, that the Executive Department is charged with conducting a hearing characterized as “quasi-judicial” because it complies with procedural due process requirements does not transform the Executive Department into “ . . .a court or vest . . . [it] with judicial functions contrary to the requirements of our Constitution as to the separation of powers of government.” Johnson v. Laffoon, 257 Ky. 156 , 77 S. W.2d 345, 350 (1934).

1975In this sense the hearing may be labelled “quasi-judicial.” However, that the Executive Department is charged with conducting a hearing characterized as “quasi-judicial” because it complies with procedural due process requirements does not transform the Executive Department into “ . . .a court or vest . . . [it] with judicial functions contrary to the requirements of our Constitution as to the separation of powers of government.” Johnson v. Laffoon, 257 Ky. 156 , 77 S. W.2d 345, 350 (1934).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Hoffman v. United States green
scotus · 1951
2 sentences

2014“However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.” Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814 .

2014“However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.” Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814 .

12014–2014
Akins v. Penobscot Indian green
ca1 · 1997
1 sentence

2001Id. at 487 .

12001–2001
Connally v. General Construction Co. green
scotus · 1926
2 sentences

1971As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 .” Coates v. City of Cincinnati, supra, 91 S.Ct. p. 1688.

1971As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 .” Coates v. City of Cincinnati, supra, 91 S.Ct. p. 1688.

11971–1971
Nickerson v. Bradbury neutral
· 1896
1 sentence

1935Nickerson v. Bradbury, 88 Me., 593, 34 A., 521 , quotes approvingly, touching the doctrine of admissible amendments, from Stevenson v. Mudgett, 10 N. H., 338, thus: “An amendment which changes the alleged date of a contract, or the sum to be paid, or any particular of the matter to be performed, or the time or manner of performance, changes, in one sense, the cause of the action; but it is not in this sense that the rule is to be understood.

11935–1935

Where else courts name it

OH 74 (1969–2026) WI 53 (1982–2026) NY 49 (1863–2023) IL 46 (1842–2026) CA 45 (1867–2024) TX 40 (1866–2025) PA 39 (1921–2026) FL 25 (1907–2019) LA 24 (1912–2023) CO 22 (1970–2025) NJ 22 (1951–2019) OR 20 (1946–2016) IA 19 (1889–2020) MS 19 (1873–2006) CT 18 (1913–2022) TN 17 (1882–2009) MI 17 (1890–2022) WA 17 (1894–2023) MO 15 (1896–1997) AR 15 (1912–2025) AL 14 (1859–2025) NM 13 (1893–2024) MD 13 (1964–2016) GA 12 (1915–2002) MA 11 (1977–2016) DE 11 (1924–2024) VA 11 (1902–2019) SC 10 (1882–2019) DC 10 (1970–2012) OK 10 (1917–2009) WV 9 (1893–2026) MT 9 (1935–2009) NC 9 (1901–1998) KS 9 (1914–2015) IN 8 (1894–2014) KY 8 (1936–2023) MN 7 (1971–2017) ME 7 (1935–2014) NE 5 (1912–1985) HI 5 (1970–2012) WY 4 (1988–2018) AZ 4 (1966–2014) NV 4 (2010–2020) ND 4 (1925–2011) VT 3 (1916–2022) UT 3 (1883–2007) RI 2 (1901–2011) SD 2 (1897–1951) AK 2 (1992–1992) PR 2 (1951–1972) NH 2 (1993–2014)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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