sense rule in North Carolina

1917In the latter case, although that which is written cannot be aided by parol evidence, yet the terms arranged orally may be proved by parol, in which case they supplement the writing, and the whole constitutes one entire contract.” Commenting on that statement of the rule, we said in Evans v. Freeman, supra: “In such a case there is no violation of the familiar and elementary rule we have before mentioned, because in the sense of that rule the written contract is neither contradicted, added to, nor varied; but leaving it in full force and operation as it has been expressed by the parties in the

1913In the latter case, although that which is written cannot be aided by parol evidence, yet the terms arranged orally may be proved by parol, in which case they supplement the writing and the whole constitutes one entire contract." Commenting on this passage, in Evans v. Freeman , 142 N.C. 61 , we said: "In such a case there is no violation of the familiar and elementary rule we have before mentioned (against varying or contradicting a written agreement), because in the sense of that rule the written contract is neither contradicted, added to, nor varied; but leaving it in full force and operati

1988State v. Odom, 316 N.C. 306 , 341 S.E. 2d 332 (1986).

1988State v. Odom, 316 N.C. 306 , 341 S.E. 2d 332 (1986).

1982Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-487 , 95 L.Ed. at 1124 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 .

1982Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-487 , 95 L.Ed. at 1124 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 .

1970As stated in Croom v. Burgaw, 259 N.C. 60 , 129 S.E. 2d 586 : “A police officer duly appointed by a municipality is not an agent or servant of the city or town in the sense that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies.

1970As stated in Croom v. Burgaw, 259 N.C. 60 , 129 S.E. 2d 586 : “A police officer duly appointed by a municipality is not an agent or servant of the city or town in the sense that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies.

1957The Court said in In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591 , 27 S.E.2d 728 , 730: "The term presumption as connotating a presumption of law is generally used as indicative of a mandatory deduction which the law directs to be made, in the sense of a rule of law laid down by the Court, while a presumption of fact used in the sense of an inference is a deduction from the evidence, having its origin in the well recognized relation between certain facts in evidence and the ultimate question to be proven." In that case the Court quoted from Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410 , 171 N.W. 5

1957The Court said in In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591 , 27 S.E.2d 728 , 730: "The term presumption as connotating a presumption of law is generally used as indicative of a mandatory deduction which the law directs to be made, in the sense of a rule of law laid down by the Court, while a presumption of fact used in the sense of an inference is a deduction from the evidence, having its origin in the well recognized relation between certain facts in evidence and the ultimate question to be proven." In that case the Court quoted from Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410 , 171 N.W. 5

1957The Court said in In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591 , 27 S.E.2d 728 , 730: "The term presumption as connotating a presumption of law is generally used as indicative of a mandatory deduction which the law directs to be made, in the sense of a rule of law laid down by the Court, while a presumption of fact used in the sense of an inference is a deduction from the evidence, having its origin in the well recognized relation between certain facts in evidence and the ultimate question to be proven." In that case the Court quoted from Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410 , 171 N.W. 5

1957The Court said in In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591 , 27 S.E.2d 728 , 730: "The term presumption as connotating a presumption of law is generally used as indicative of a mandatory deduction which the law directs to be made, in the sense of a rule of law laid down by the Court, while a presumption of fact used in the sense of an inference is a deduction from the evidence, having its origin in the well recognized relation between certain facts in evidence and the ultimate question to be proven." In that case the Court quoted from Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410 , 171 N.W. 5

1917Free v. Hawkins, 1 Starkie, 361; Getto v. Binkert, 55 Kan., 617 ; Hill v. Gaw, 4 Pa. St., 493; Kincaid v. Higgins, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb.), 396; Moseley v. Hanford, 10 B. and C., 729 (109 Eng.

1916In support of their view they cited Parker v. Morrill, 98 N. C., 232 ; Meekins v. Newberry, 101 N. C., 17 ; Bank v. McElwee, 104 N. C., 305 , and especially relied on Moffitt v. Maness, 102 N. C., 457 , in which the Court, through Shepherd, J admonishes us that the rule against the admissibility of parol testimony to vary the terms of a written instrument has perhaps been relaxed too much, and that the farthest limit has been reached in admitting such testimony, beyond which it will not be safe to go.

1916In support of their view they cited Parker v. Morrill, 98 N. C., 232 ; Meekins v. Newberry, 101 N. C., 17 ; Bank v. McElwee, 104 N. C., 305 , and especially relied on Moffitt v. Maness, 102 N. C., 457 , in which the Court, through Shepherd, J admonishes us that the rule against the admissibility of parol testimony to vary the terms of a written instrument has perhaps been relaxed too much, and that the farthest limit has been reached in admitting such testimony, beyond which it will not be safe to go.

1916In support of their view they cited Parker v. Morrill, 98 N. C., 232 ; Meekins v. Newberry, 101 N. C., 17 ; Bank v. McElwee, 104 N. C., 305 , and especially relied on Moffitt v. Maness, 102 N. C., 457 , in which the Court, through Shepherd, J admonishes us that the rule against the admissibility of parol testimony to vary the terms of a written instrument has perhaps been relaxed too much, and that the farthest limit has been reached in admitting such testimony, beyond which it will not be safe to go.

1916In support of their view they cited Parker v. Morrill, 98 N. C., 232 ; Meekins v. Newberry, 101 N. C., 17 ; Bank v. McElwee, 104 N. C., 305 , and especially relied on Moffitt v. Maness, 102 N. C., 457 , in which the Court, through Shepherd, J admonishes us that the rule against the admissibility of parol testimony to vary the terms of a written instrument has perhaps been relaxed too much, and that the farthest limit has been reached in admitting such testimony, beyond which it will not be safe to go.

1913Cobb v. Clegg , 137 N.C. 153 ; Walker v. Cooper , 150 N.C. 129 ; Typewriter Co. v. Hardware Co. , 143 N.C. 97 ; Evans v. Freeman , 142 N.C. 61 ; Walker v. Venters , 148 N.C. 388 ; Basnight v. Jobbing Co., ibid. , 350; Woodson v. Beck , 151 N.C. 144 .

1913Cobb v. Clegg , 137 N.C. 153 ; Walker v. Cooper , 150 N.C. 129 ; Typewriter Co. v. Hardware Co. , 143 N.C. 97 ; Evans v. Freeman , 142 N.C. 61 ; Walker v. Venters , 148 N.C. 388 ; Basnight v. Jobbing Co., ibid. , 350; Woodson v. Beck , 151 N.C. 144 .

1913Cobb v. Clegg , 137 N.C. 153 ; Walker v. Cooper , 150 N.C. 129 ; Typewriter Co. v. Hardware Co. , 143 N.C. 97 ; Evans v. Freeman , 142 N.C. 61 ; Walker v. Venters , 148 N.C. 388 ; Basnight v. Jobbing Co., ibid. , 350; Woodson v. Beck , 151 N.C. 144 .

1913Cobb v. Clegg , 137 N.C. 153 ; Walker v. Cooper , 150 N.C. 129 ; Typewriter Co. v. Hardware Co. , 143 N.C. 97 ; Evans v. Freeman , 142 N.C. 61 ; Walker v. Venters , 148 N.C. 388 ; Basnight v. Jobbing Co., ibid. , 350; Woodson v. Beck , 151 N.C. 144 .

1913Cobb v. Clegg , 137 N.C. 153 ; Walker v. Cooper , 150 N.C. 129 ; Typewriter Co. v. Hardware Co. , 143 N.C. 97 ; Evans v. Freeman , 142 N.C. 61 ; Walker v. Venters , 148 N.C. 388 ; Basnight v. Jobbing Co., ibid. , 350; Woodson v. Beck , 151 N.C. 144 .

1901As to that, it seems to us that, without reciting and discussing the numerous cases cited us, the proceedings since lYth July, 1900, as they stood corrected and amended at November Term, 1900, have been substantially in compliance with the statute, and that being so, the common sense rule, and the one in conformity with The Code system, is stated by Eaiecloth, J., in Grant v. Burgwyn, 79 N. C., 513 , as follows: “Where, in a proceeding by attachment, it appears from the whole record that the provisions of the statute have been substantially *353 complied with., the action will not be dismissed