14 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1859–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, Secretary of Commercegreen2 sentences1979A claim under Rule 54(b) is an allegation indicating the existence of a cause of action in the sense of a claim "that facts exist which . . . are recognized as entitling the claimant to judicial action in vindication of a right or in remedying a wrong." Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 249, 254 , 209 F.2d 802, 807 (1954). 1979A claim under Rule 54(b) is an allegation indicating the existence of a cause of action in the sense of a claim "that facts exist which . . . are recognized as entitling the claimant to judicial action in vindication of a right or in remedying a wrong." Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 249, 254 , 209 F.2d 802, 807 (1954). | 2 | 2 |
NHS MANAGEMENT, LLC v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2025Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2863 (3d ed. 2012) (stating that the analogous portion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "is limited to cases in which the present judgment is based on the prior judgment in the sense of claim or issue preclusion"); NHS Mgmt., LLC v. Wright, 24 So. 3d 1153, 1156 (Ala. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Ray Marshall v. Board Of Education, Bergenfield, New Jerseygreen1 sentence2025App. 2009) (citing Marshall v. Board of Educ. of Bergenfield, N.J., 575 F.2d 417, 424 (3d Cir. 1978), which quoted 11 C. | 1 | 1 |
Greenfield v. Powellyellow2 sentences2025The test as to what is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is that, although the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on.' " 12 CL-2024-0677 Greenfield v. Powell, 218 Ala. 397, 399-400 , 118 So. 556, 558 (1928) (quoting 9 C.J. 2025The test as to what is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is that, although the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on.' " 12 CL-2024-0677 Greenfield v. Powell, 218 Ala. 397, 399-400 , 118 So. 556, 558 (1928) (quoting 9 C.J. | 1 | 1 |
Valentine v. Wattersgreen1 sentence2011This Court has stated “that an exception to the general requirement that a plaintiff present expert testimony in support of a legal-malpractice claim occurs where a legal-service provider’s want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be understood by a layperson and requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.” Valentine v. Watters, 896 So.2d 385, 394 (Ala.2004). | 1 | 1 |
Elmore v. Fieldsgreen2 sentences2008See also Elmore v. Fields, 153 Ala. 345, 351 , 45 So. 66, 67 (1907) (“Here, we have an agent charged with a tort [trespass], setting up by plea that he was acting for and in behalf of the state, and the authorities hold that he has no authority to act for the state in the commission of a tort.”). 2008See also Elmore v. Fields, 153 Ala. 345, 351 , 45 So. 66, 67 (1907) (“Here, we have an agent charged with a tort [trespass], setting up by plea that he was acting for and in behalf of the state, and the authorities hold that he has no authority to act for the state in the commission of a tort.”). | 1 | 1 |
Finnell v. Pittsgreen2 sentences2008Confining review to that issue, in Finnell v. Pitts, 222 Ala. 290, 293 , 132 So. 2, 4 (1930), this Court stated: “If in the promotion of the state’s business its officers without authority of law apply private property to the state’s enterprises, they are guilty of the same nature of wrong, as if they were acting as agents of a private corporation.” We lose the sense of the exception if we take it beyond the context of intentional conduct, such as the taking of property as was the case in Pitts , one of the early cases in which it was recognized. 2008Confining review to that issue, in Finnell v. Pitts, 222 Ala. 290, 293 , 132 So. 2, 4 (1930), this Court stated: “If in the promotion of the state’s business its officers without authority of law apply private property to the state’s enterprises, they are guilty of the same nature of wrong, as if they were acting as agents of a private corporation.” We lose the sense of the exception if we take it beyond the context of intentional conduct, such as the taking of property as was the case in Pitts , one of the early cases in which it was recognized. | 1 | 1 |
Manchester Sawmills Co. v. A. L. Arundel Co.green2 sentences1995Arundel Co., 197 Ala. 505, 508 , 73 So. 24, 26 (1916). 1995Arundel Co., 197 Ala. 505, 508 , 73 So. 24, 26 (1916). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
School District No. 5 v. James Lundgren, D/B/A Pacific Construction Company
green
2 sentences1979Although that "claim" refers to a set of facts giving rise to legal rights in the claimant, *690 and not mere legal theories of recovery based upon those facts, Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969), nevertheless it requires a cause of action, School District No. 5 v. Lundgren, 259 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1958), the underlying factual basis for recovery of which could have been separately enforced. 1978Although that “claim” refers to a set of facts giving rise to legal rights in the claim ant, and not mere legal theories of recovery based upon those facts, Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969), nevertheless it requires a cause of action, School District No. 5 v. Lundgren, 259 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1958), the underlying factual basis for recovery of which could have been separately enforced. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
Perma Research and Development Company v. The Singer Company
green
2 sentences1979Although that "claim" refers to a set of facts giving rise to legal rights in the claimant, *690 and not mere legal theories of recovery based upon those facts, Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969), nevertheless it requires a cause of action, School District No. 5 v. Lundgren, 259 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1958), the underlying factual basis for recovery of which could have been separately enforced. 1978Although that “claim” refers to a set of facts giving rise to legal rights in the claim ant, and not mere legal theories of recovery based upon those facts, Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969), nevertheless it requires a cause of action, School District No. 5 v. Lundgren, 259 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1958), the underlying factual basis for recovery of which could have been separately enforced. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
BOARD OF WATER AND SEWER COM'RS OF CITY OF MOBILE v. McDonald
green
1 sentence2013The court then quoted “the sense of the rule” from a leading treatise: “ ‘As long as defendant is fully apprised of the claim arising from specified conduct and has fully prepared to defend the action against him, his ability to protect himself will not be prejudicially affected if a new plaintiff is added, and he should not be permitted to invoke a limitations defense.’ ” Id. (quoting 6 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Yorden v. Flaste
green
1 sentence2001Del.1974, 374 F.Supp. 516 . [[Image here]] ‘We find no reason to determine whether the facts would or would not support adverse possession of defendant, as we are of the opinion that the amendment was properly allowed even if it worked to avoid the statute of limitation .... [[Image here]] “6 Wright & Miller, supra, puts the sense of the rule in the following: “‘As long as defendant is fully apprised of the claim arising from specified conduct and has fully prepared to defend the action against him, his ability to protect himself will not be prej-udicially affected if a new plaintiff is added, | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Robertson
neutral
1 sentence1987What is common or ordinary diligence, or the lack of it, is more frequently a question of fact than of law.” 84 Ala. 489, 491 , 4 So. 728 , 729 (1888). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hubbard v. State
green
2 sentences1958Charge 46 is adapted from charge 5 in Hubbard v. State, 10 Ala.App. 47 , 64 So. 633, 634 , but is materially altered by the omission of the second predicate, viz., “and defendant retorted by using the character of the insult to- the deceased.” This omission (which was needful to fit evidence here, since Metcalf was not shown to have used opprobrious or abusive language in addressing Mulkin) alters the sense of the instruction from its context in the Hubbard case so as to make it appear that a verbal insult by Mulkin followed by an assault by Mulkin would justify Metcalf in defending himself “a 1958Charge 46 is adapted from charge 5 in Hubbard v. State, 10 Ala.App. 47 , 64 So. 633, 634 , but is materially altered by the omission of the second predicate, viz., “and defendant retorted by using the character of the insult to- the deceased.” This omission (which was needful to fit evidence here, since Metcalf was not shown to have used opprobrious or abusive language in addressing Mulkin) alters the sense of the instruction from its context in the Hubbard case so as to make it appear that a verbal insult by Mulkin followed by an assault by Mulkin would justify Metcalf in defending himself “a | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Bagley v. Bagley
neutral
1 sentence1948That rule relates only to jurisdiction proper — that is, of subject-matter and person.” 206 Ala. 232 , 89 So. 580 . | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Thompson v. Hunt
neutral
1 sentence1920And it is provided by statute: “Upon the final settlement, any item of ac•count included in any previous settlement may be re-examined; but its allowance in the previous settlement is presumptive evidence of its ■correctness.” Code 1907, § 2685; Bentley v. Dailey, S7 Ala. 406, 6 South. 274 ; Thompson v. Hunt, 22 Ala. 517 . [3] While the settlement made by Mrs. Rich is final in the sense that she was relieved of the trust, it is not a final settlement of the estate in the sense that it will bar the complainant’s right to remove the administration into a court of equity; nor is it final in the - | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Lincoln v. Smith
green
1 sentence1859I. 68; State v. Peckham, 3 ib. 293; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290 ; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Verm. 328 ; Sante v. State, 2 Clarke, (Iowa,) 165; State v. Gurney, 37 Maine, 149. | 1 | 1859–1859 |
State v. Wheeler
green
1 sentence1859I. 68; State v. Peckham, 3 ib. 293; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290 ; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Verm. 328 ; Sante v. State, 2 Clarke, (Iowa,) 165; State v. Gurney, 37 Maine, 149. | 1 | 1859–1859 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.