sense standard in Oklahoma

2001In either of these situations, we believe the magistrate was presented with facts sufficient to justify issuance of the warrant for Pickens' arrest. ¶ 10 "The existence of probable cause is a common sense standard requiring facts sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is being committed." Mollett v. State, 1997 OK CR 28, ¶ 14 , 939 P.2d 1, 7 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 , 118 S.Ct. 859 , 139 L.Ed.2d 758 (1998), citing United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.1993).

2001In either of these situations, we believe the magistrate was presented with facts sufficient to justify issuance of the warrant for Pickens' arrest. ¶ 10 "The existence of probable cause is a common sense standard requiring facts sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is being committed." Mollett v. State, 1997 OK CR 28, ¶ 14 , 939 P.2d 1, 7 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 , 118 S.Ct. 859 , 139 L.Ed.2d 758 (1998), citing United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.1993).

2001In either of these situations, we believe the magistrate was presented with facts sufficient to justify issuance of the warrant for Pickens' arrest. 1 10 "The existence of probable cause is a common sense standard requiring facts sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is being committed." Mollett v. State, 1997 OK CR 28, ¶ 14 , 939 P.2d 1, 7 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 , 118 S.Ct. 859 , 189 L.Ed.2d 758 (1998), citing United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.1993).

2000"The existence of probable cause is a common sense standard requiring facts sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is being committed." Mollett v. State, 939 P.2d 1, 7 (Okl.Cr.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 , 118 S.Ct. 859 , 189 L.Ed.2d 758 (1998) quoting United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.1998).

2001In either of these situations, we believe the magistrate was presented with facts sufficient to justify issuance of the warrant for Pickens' arrest. ¶ 10 "The existence of probable cause is a common sense standard requiring facts sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is being committed." Mollett v. State, 1997 OK CR 28, ¶ 14 , 939 P.2d 1, 7 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 , 118 S.Ct. 859 , 139 L.Ed.2d 758 (1998), citing United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.1993).

1991In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 , 94 S.Ct. 2080 , 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974), the United States Supreme Court discussed the history of such forfeitures, both before and after the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.

1991In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 , 94 S.Ct. 2080 , 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974), the United States Supreme Court discussed the history of such forfeitures, both before and after the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.

1986Cf. Floyd v. State, 540 P.2d 1195 (Okl.Cr.1975) (availability of time credits against sentences for future crimes would provide a sense of immunity and an incentive to engage in criminal conduct).

1983It is hence a “clog” in the sense of the rule-prohibited “collateral advantage” to the lender. 1 Coursey v. Fairchild, supra. The burden it imposes by automatically accelerating the obligation on sale is not related to a specific security-impairing event.

1983It is hence a "clog" in the sense of the rule-prohibited "collateral advantage" to the lender. [1] Coursey v. Fairchild, supra. The burden it imposes by automatically accelerating the obligation on sale is not related to a specific security-impairing event.

1979As a result, “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).’ Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971).” A city ordinance prohibiting vagrancy was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Papachristou v. Jacksonville, supra. The ordinance provided in part that “ ‘persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic bever

1979As a result, “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).’ Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971).” A city ordinance prohibiting vagrancy was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Papachristou v. Jacksonville, supra. The ordinance provided in part that “ ‘persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic bever

1979As a result, “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).’ Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971).” A city ordinance prohibiting vagrancy was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Papachristou v. Jacksonville, supra. The ordinance provided in part that “ ‘persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic bever

1979As a result, “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).’ Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971).” A city ordinance prohibiting vagrancy was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Papachristou v. Jacksonville, supra. The ordinance provided in part that “ ‘persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic bever

1967This Court will adhere to the well-recognized and common sense rule as stated in Grimes v. State, Okl.Cr., 377 P.2d 847 : “The granting or denial of a motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the actions of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it appears that he acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” It does not appear that defendant was prejudiced in any manner in proceeding to trial, as defense counsel did an outstanding job of protecting his rights, and in. the. defense of the charge with which defendant was on trial.

1967“A defendant charged with a felony, who waits until a few days before trial to employ counsel, and then asks for postponement of the trial on the grounds of insufficient time to prepare for that trial has not used due diligence, and denial of his motion for continuance is not error.” See, Winegar, supra; and Smithey v. State, Okl.Cr., 385 P.2d 920 .

1917Fisher et al. v. Jansen, 128 Ill. 549 , 21 N. E. 598 .

1917Fisher et al. v. Jansen, 128 Ill. 549 , 21 N. E. 598 .