sense test in Wisconsin

2024“The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience[?]” State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 424 , 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997). ¶21 The State argues that the vehicle search was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the collective knowledge of Chief Bauer and Officer Schuld. 8 No. 2023AP351-CR See State v. Gant, 2015 WI App 83, ¶12 , 365 Wis. 2d 510 , 872 N.W.2d 137 (under the collective knowledge doctrine, in deter

2024“The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience[?]” State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 424 , 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997). ¶21 The State argues that the vehicle search was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the collective knowledge of Chief Bauer and Officer Schuld. 8 No. 2023AP351-CR See State v. Gant, 2015 WI App 83, ¶12 , 365 Wis. 2d 510 , 872 N.W.2d 137 (under the collective knowledge doctrine, in deter

2020“The crucial question is whether the facts of the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or her training and experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13 . ¶10 Determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop is a common sense test that turns on the totality of the facts and circumstances.

2020“The crucial question is whether the facts of the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or 4 No. 2020AP489-CR her training and experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13 . ¶9 Whether an officer’s suspicion is reasonable is a common sense test that turns on the totality of the facts and circumstances.

2025“Reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances[,] … [with] the whole picture viewed together.” State v. Nimmer, 2022 WI 47 , ¶24, 402 Wis. 2d 416 , 975 N.W.2d 598 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶22 “The question of what constitutes reasonableness is a common sense test.” State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56 , 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).

2024“Reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances[,] … [with] the whole picture viewed together.” State v. Nimmer, 2022 WI 47 , ¶24, 402 Wis. 2d 416 , 975 N.W.2d 598 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶16 “The question of what constitutes reasonableness is a common sense test.” State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56 , 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).

2024“We accord great deference to the warrant-issuing [judicial official’s] determination of probable cause, and that determination will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are clearly insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶7 , 252 Wis. 2d 54 , 643 N.W.2d 437 . ¶13 “A finding of probable cause is a common sense test.” Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶23 .

2004The applicable probable cause standard is well established: "A finding of probable cause is a common sense test. 'The task... is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances . . ., including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶ 23 , 231 Wis. 2d 723 , 604 N.W.2d 517 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). ¶ 17.

2026State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 83-84 , 454 N.W.2d 763 ; Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13 .

2026State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 83-84 , 454 N.W.2d 763 ; Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13 .

2005It is a common sense test, not a technical determination, see County of Dane v. Sharpee , 154 Wis. 2d 515, 518 , 453 N.W.2d 508 , and does not require "`proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not[,]'" State v. Babbitt , 188 Wis. 2d 349, 357 , 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). ¶ 9 In their briefs, the County and Eagle appear to have different views of what "the facts of [the] case" are.

2005It is a common sense test, not a technical determination, see County of Dane v. Sharpee , 154 Wis. 2d 515, 518 , 453 N.W.2d 508 , and does not require "`proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not[,]'" State v. Babbitt , 188 Wis. 2d 349, 357 , 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). ¶ 9 In their briefs, the County and Eagle appear to have different views of what "the facts of [the] case" are.

2022Applying this common sense principle, the Seventh Circuit uses a "'sliding scale' approach" to determine the requisite quantum of suspicion: "if the crime being investigated is grave enough, the police can stop and 25 No. 2020AP878-CR frisk without as much suspicion as would be required in a less serious criminal case." Id.

2022Applying this common sense principle, the Seventh Circuit uses a "'sliding scale' approach" to determine the requisite quantum of suspicion: "if the crime being investigated is grave enough, the police can stop and 25 No. 2020AP878-CR frisk without as much suspicion as would be required in a less serious criminal case." Id.

2022The Seventh Circuit employed this approach in Rickmon, twice emphasizing "the dangerousness of the crime," 952 F.3d at 881–82, 884, and noting, "[w]e have repeatedly emphasized in our decisions that the inherent danger of gun violence sets shootings apart from other criminal activity." Id. at 883 (citing United States v. Burgess, 759 F.3d 708 , 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014)).

2022The Seventh Circuit employed this approach in Rickmon, twice emphasizing "the dangerousness of the crime," 952 F.3d at 881–82, 884, and noting, "[w]e have repeatedly emphasized in our decisions that the inherent danger of gun violence sets shootings apart from other criminal activity." Id. at 883 (citing United States v. Burgess, 759 F.3d 708 , 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014)).

2022The Seventh Circuit employed this approach in Rickmon, twice emphasizing "the dangerousness of the crime," 952 F.3d at 881–82, 884, and noting, "[w]e have repeatedly emphasized in our decisions that the inherent danger of gun violence sets shootings apart from other criminal activity." Id. at 883 (citing United States v. Burgess, 759 F.3d 708 , 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014)).

2022The Seventh Circuit employed this approach in Rickmon, twice emphasizing "the dangerousness of the crime," 952 F.3d at 881–82, 884, and noting, "[w]e have repeatedly emphasized in our decisions that the inherent danger of gun violence sets shootings apart from other criminal activity." Id. at 883 (citing United States v. Burgess, 759 F.3d 708 , 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014)).

2020In making this determination, there must be “articulable facts” in the record that when “taken together with rational inferences from those facts” and “viewed objectively,” allow for an officer to reasonably conclude “that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Matthews, 2011 WI App 92, ¶11 , 334 Wis. 2d 455 , 799 N.W.2d 911 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 30 ).

2020In making this determination, there must be “articulable facts” in the record that when “taken together with rational inferences from those facts” and “viewed objectively,” allow for an officer to reasonably conclude “that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Matthews, 2011 WI App 92, ¶11 , 334 Wis. 2d 455 , 799 N.W.2d 911 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 30 ).

2026“The determination of reasonableness is a common sense test” that “is determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.” Id., ¶13; State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶22 , 241 Wis. 2d 631 , 623 N.W.2d 106 (“Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” (citation omitted)).

2026“The determination of reasonableness is a common sense test” that “is determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.” Id., ¶13; State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶22 , 241 Wis. 2d 631 , 623 N.W.2d 106 (“Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” (citation omitted)).

2024“The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience[?]” State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 424 , 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997). ¶21 The State argues that the vehicle search was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the collective knowledge of Chief Bauer and Officer Schuld. 8 No. 2023AP351-CR See State v. Gant, 2015 WI App 83, ¶12 , 365 Wis. 2d 510 , 872 N.W.2d 137 (under the collective knowledge doctrine, in deter

2024“The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience[?]” State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 424 , 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997). ¶21 The State argues that the vehicle search was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the collective knowledge of Chief Bauer and Officer Schuld. 8 No. 2023AP351-CR See State v. Gant, 2015 WI App 83, ¶12 , 365 Wis. 2d 510 , 872 N.W.2d 137 (under the collective knowledge doctrine, in deter

2024“We accord great deference to the warrant-issuing [judicial official’s] determination of probable cause, and that determination will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are clearly insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶7 , 252 Wis. 2d 54 , 643 N.W.2d 437 . ¶13 “A finding of probable cause is a common sense test.” Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶23 .

2024“We accord great deference to the warrant-issuing [judicial official’s] determination of probable cause, and that determination will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are clearly insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶7 , 252 Wis. 2d 54 , 643 N.W.2d 437 . ¶13 “A finding of probable cause is a common sense test.” Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶23 .

2024“Reasonable suspicion requires that a police officer possess specific and articulable facts that warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶21 , 294 Wis. 2d 1 , 717 N.W.2d 729 . “‘[I]f any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, 5 No. 2023AP1826-CR notwithstanding the existence of other innocent inferences that could be drawn, the officers have the right to temporarily detain the individual for the purpose of inquiry.’” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]hat constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under al

2024“Reasonable suspicion requires that a police officer possess specific and articulable facts that warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶21 , 294 Wis. 2d 1 , 717 N.W.2d 729 . “‘[I]f any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, 5 No. 2023AP1826-CR notwithstanding the existence of other innocent inferences that could be drawn, the officers have the right to temporarily detain the individual for the purpose of inquiry.’” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]hat constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under al

2007State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 519 , 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973). ¶ 13 The determination of reasonableness is a common sense test.

2007State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 519 , 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973). ¶ 13 The determination of reasonableness is a common sense test.