17 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1882–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2005See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 503-04 (1982) (ordinance regulating sale of drug paraphernalia not vague, in part because village attorney issued guidelines to businesses affected by ordinance). -8- In the absence of any articulable standards from the City, we must conclude that the ordinance is vague “not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 2001The rationale for this requirement is that “to sustain such a challenge, the complainant must prove that the enactment is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495, n. 7 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 . (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)). | 2 | 2 |
Coates v. City of Cincinnatigreen2 sentences2005In the absence of any articulable standards from the City, we must conclude that the ordinance is vague “not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Coates v. City of Cincin nati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). 2005In the absence of any articulable standards from the City, we must conclude that the ordinance is vague “not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Coates v. City of Cincin nati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). | 1 | 3 |
State Ex Rel. Cihlar v. Crawfordgreen1 sentence2009Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Gannon v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000See Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663 , 724 A.2d 43 , 46 n. 3 (1999) (recognizing that the Maryland "Law of the Land” Clause is the equivalent to the federal due process clauses, and stating that "United States Supreme Court cases on the subject therefore are ‘practically direct authorit[y]’ for the meaning of the Maryland provision”) (citing Northampton Corp. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 278 Md. 677, 686 , 366 A.2d 377, 382 (1976)); Meads v. North Carolina Dep’t of Agric., Food & Drug Protection Div., 349 N.C. 656 , 509 S.E.2d 165, 175 (1998) (stating that the "Law of the Land” Clause co | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Gorczykgreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000See Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663 , 724 A.2d 43 , 46 n. 3 (1999) (recognizing that the Maryland "Law of the Land” Clause is the equivalent to the federal due process clauses, and stating that "United States Supreme Court cases on the subject therefore are ‘practically direct authorit[y]’ for the meaning of the Maryland provision”) (citing Northampton Corp. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 278 Md. 677, 686 , 366 A.2d 377, 382 (1976)); Meads v. North Carolina Dep’t of Agric., Food & Drug Protection Div., 349 N.C. 656 , 509 S.E.2d 165, 175 (1998) (stating that the "Law of the Land” Clause co | 1 | 1 |
Meads v. North Carolina Department of Agriculturegreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martingreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000See Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663 , 724 A.2d 43 , 46 n. 3 (1999) (recognizing that the Maryland "Law of the Land” Clause is the equivalent to the federal due process clauses, and stating that "United States Supreme Court cases on the subject therefore are ‘practically direct authorit[y]’ for the meaning of the Maryland provision”) (citing Northampton Corp. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 278 Md. 677, 686 , 366 A.2d 377, 382 (1976)); Meads v. North Carolina Dep’t of Agric., Food & Drug Protection Div., 349 N.C. 656 , 509 S.E.2d 165, 175 (1998) (stating that the "Law of the Land” Clause co | 1 | 1 |
State v. Statengreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that " ‘due process of law’ and the 'law of the land' are synonymous phrases”); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to 'due process of law.’ ”); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, 'the law of the land' is another expression for the ‘due process of law;’ and is of equivalent import.”); Owens v. Rain’s Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) (" ‘No freeman shall be diss | 1 | 1 |
Kittrell v. Kittrellgreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that " ‘due process of law’ and the 'law of the land' are synonymous phrases”); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to 'due process of law.’ ”); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, 'the law of the land' is another expression for the ‘due process of law;’ and is of equivalent import.”); Owens v. Rain’s Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) (" ‘No freeman shall be diss 2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that " ‘due process of law’ and the 'law of the land' are synonymous phrases”); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to 'due process of law.’ ”); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, 'the law of the land' is another expression for the ‘due process of law;’ and is of equivalent import.”); Owens v. Rain’s Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) (" ‘No freeman shall be diss | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis | 1 | 1 |
Northampton Corp. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commissiongreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis | 1 | 1 |
State v. Trustyred1 sentence2000Interestingly, although North Carolina "reserves the right" to expand the meaning of the state provision beyond the protections guaranteed in the federal Constitution, it has not done so with regard to privacy or "procreational rights." Moreover, my research into Maryland law has uncovered no case holding that a separate right of privacy even exists in Maryland, or that the procreational rights receive greater sanctuary under the Maryland Declaration of Rights than the federal Constitution. [12] See, e.g., State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tenn.1996), overruled on other grounds by, State v | 1 | 1 |
Owens and Others v. Rain's Lesseegreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that " ‘due process of law’ and the 'law of the land' are synonymous phrases”); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to 'due process of law.’ ”); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, 'the law of the land' is another expression for the ‘due process of law;’ and is of equivalent import.”); Owens v. Rain’s Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) (" ‘No freeman shall be diss | 1 | 1 |
Blake v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that " ‘due process of law’ and the 'law of the land' are synonymous phrases”); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to 'due process of law.’ ”); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, 'the law of the land' is another expression for the ‘due process of law;’ and is of equivalent import.”); Owens v. Rain’s Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) (" ‘No freeman shall be diss | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Waste Management, Inc. v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences2009An inquiry into cause in fact is not metaphysical; it is, rather, “a common sense analysis of the facts that lay persons can undertake as competently as the most experienced judges.” Waste Mgmt., 15 S.W.3d at 430 . 2009Courts often determine cause in fact using the “but for” test: “[t]he defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant’s conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it.” Id. (quoting W. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Burkhart
green
1 sentence2005Finally, the City argues that Entertainment Resources may not challenge the ordinance as facially vague because the Fantasy Video store was clearly within the purview of the ordinance: Burkhart, 58 S.W.3d at 699 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Anthony
green
1 sentence2001In those less egregious cases, “[a] violator may be subjected to cross-examination about the incident ... [and][a] jury could be instructed to consider the violation of the sequestration order in assessing the witnesses’ testimony.” Anthony, 836 S.W.2d at 605 ; see also Mayes, No. 01C01-9806-CR-00265, 1999 WL 771011 , at *3. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Railroad v. Harris
green
2 sentences2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that "`due process of law' and the `law of the land' are synonymous phrases"); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to `due process of law.'"); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import."); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) ("`No freeman shall be disseis 2000Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 704 , 43 S.W. 115, 120 (1897) (stating that " ‘due process of law’ and the 'law of the land' are synonymous phrases”); Knox v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 202, 207 (1877) ("The law of the land, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, has been held to be equivalent in meaning to 'due process of law.’ ”); State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233 , 244 (1869) ("The phrase, 'the law of the land' is another expression for the ‘due process of law;’ and is of equivalent import.”); Owens v. Rain’s Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106, 107 (1818) (" ‘No freeman shall be diss | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Burns
green
1 sentence2000Interestingly, although North Carolina "reserves the right" to expand the meaning of the state provision beyond the protections guaranteed in the federal Constitution, it has not done so with regard to privacy or "procreational rights." Moreover, my research into Maryland law has uncovered no case holding that a separate right of privacy even exists in Maryland, or that the procreational rights receive greater sanctuary under the Maryland Declaration of Rights than the federal Constitution. [12] See, e.g., State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tenn.1996), overruled on other grounds by, State v | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Nance v. State
green
2 sentences1987The proper interpretation of the rule on sequestration of witnesses is set out in Nance v. State, 210 Tenn. 328 , 358 S.W.2d 327 (1962): “Since probably the beginning of time in the trial of cases witnesses have been sequestered by order of the court on motion of counsel on either side. 1987The proper interpretation of the rule on sequestration of witnesses is set out in Nance v. State, 210 Tenn. 328 , 358 S.W.2d 327 (1962): “Since probably the beginning of time in the trial of cases witnesses have been sequestered by order of the court on motion of counsel on either side. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hawk v. Jim Hawk Chevrolet-Buick, Inc.
green
2 sentences1981The ‘added peril’ doctrine — in the sense of a doctrine that a needlessly dangerous method of doing the employee’s active work takes him outside the range of compensation protection — is of no current importance.” In the recent decision of Hawk v. Jim Hawk Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1979), the Supreme Court of Iowa was asked to determine the continued validity of the so-called “unusual and rash act doctrine” which is kin to the “added risk doctrine.” After noting that this doctrine had been repeatedly distinguished, rejected, or abandoned in most jurisdictions, the Court conclu 1981The rationale of the Court, in the seven to two opinion, was that “[¿judicial engrafting of the unusual and rash act doctrine to workers’ compensation law distorts the statute by inserting a defense which ... is barely distinguishable from the admittedly inapplicable rules of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.” Id. at 91 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Air Mod Corporation v. Newton
green
1 sentence1973The following factors must be present before a false statement in an employment will bar benefits: (1) The employee must have knowingly and wil-fully made a false representation as to his physical condition. (2) The employer must have relied upon the false representation and this reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring. (3) There must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury.” See also Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961); Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434 (Del.1965); Volunteers of America of Madison v. Industrial Commiss | 1 | 1973–1973 |
General Motors Corporation v. Hargis
green
1 sentence1973The following factors must be present before a false statement in an employment will bar benefits: (1) The employee must have knowingly and wil-fully made a false representation as to his physical condition. (2) The employer must have relied upon the false representation and this reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring. (3) There must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury.” See also Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961); Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434 (Del.1965); Volunteers of America of Madison v. Industrial Commiss | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Volunteers of America of Madison, Inc. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1973The following factors must be present before a false statement in an employment will bar benefits: (1) The employee must have knowingly and wil-fully made a false representation as to his physical condition. (2) The employer must have relied upon the false representation and this reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring. (3) There must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury.” See also Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961); Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434 (Del.1965); Volunteers of America of Madison v. Industrial Commiss 1973The following factors must be present before a false statement in an employment will bar benefits: (1) The employee must have knowingly and wil-fully made a false representation as to his physical condition. (2) The employer must have relied upon the false representation and this reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring. (3) There must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury.” See also Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961); Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434 (Del.1965); Volunteers of America of Madison v. Industrial Commiss | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Martin Company v. Carpenter
green
1 sentence1973The following factors must be present before a false statement in an employment will bar benefits: (1) The employee must have knowingly and wil-fully made a false representation as to his physical condition. (2) The employer must have relied upon the false representation and this reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring. (3) There must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury.” See also Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961); Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434 (Del.1965); Volunteers of America of Madison v. Industrial Commiss | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Diamond Coal Co. v. Jackson
green
1 sentence1961The effect of the injury on the sense of hearing is the test or measure of the compensation to be awarded.” In the light of the statutory provision with reference to loss of hearing in both ears and the hereinabove quoted construction placed thereon in Diamond Coal Company v. Jackson, supra, the allegation as to the injury causing the loss of hearing in the left ear was “sufficient to advise the employer of the nature of the claim so that he may be prepared to meet it,” to wit, for a loss of hearing. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Dobson
green
1 sentence1957In the early case of Knoxville Iron Co. v. Dobson, 75 Tenn. 367 , at pages 377, 378, the rule was announced as follows: “We also bold to tbe doctrine that a servant who is in a position of authority over the other servants so as to compel their obedience, is not in the sense of the rule a fellow-servant in a common employment, but represents the master, who is in general liable for his negligence. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Todd v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co.
green
1 sentence1941P.] Railroad [Co.], 135 Tenn., 92 , at page 101, 185 S. W., 62 , L. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Bejach v. Colby
green
1 sentence1926Todd v. Railroad, supra. *698 But the ■ defendant in the instant ease argues tha't the Supreme Court has uprooted this exception by its opinion in the case of Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn., 686 , where it is said; “We do not think that it was intended by the language used to lay down the rule that negligence on the part of the plaintiff, if gross, would bar his right to recovery, though it did not directly produce the injury or contribute to it. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Satterwhite
neutral
1 sentence1915Railroad v. Satterwhite, 112 Tenn., 185, 204 , 79 S. W., 106 , 111. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| United States v. Rauscher green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Martin v. McKinney green | 1 | 1882–1882 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.