sense rule in Arkansas

2014That on the Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint, the court denies that motion and relies on the following caselaw: In Layman v. Bone, 333 Ark. 121 , 967 S.W.2d 561 (1998) the court stated: Rule 6(b)(2), any failure to file an answer on time could be referred to as a “mistake” in the sense that an error of some sort caused the failure to file on time.

2014That on the Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint, the court denies that motion and relies on the following caselaw: In Layman v. Bone, 333 Ark. 121 , 967 S.W.2d 561 (1998) the court stated: Rule 6(b)(2), any failure to file an answer on time could be referred to as a “mistake” in the sense that an error of some sort caused the failure to file on time.

2025Typically, such challenges arise in the criminal context, where the defendant claims that a statute fails to provide fair warning that his conduct is prohibited. 11 See Anderson v. State, 2017 Ark. 357, at 5 , 533 S.W.3d 64, 67 .

2025Typically, such challenges arise in the criminal context, where the defendant claims that a statute fails to provide fair warning that his conduct is prohibited. 11 See Anderson v. State, 2017 Ark. 357, at 5 , 533 S.W.3d 64, 67 .

2025Generally, a law is unconstitutionally vague “if it does not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and it is so vague and standardless that it allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Abraham v. Beck, 2015 Ark. 80, at 13 , 456 S.W.3d 744, 753 ; see also Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (“[T]he ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”).

2025Generally, a law is unconstitutionally vague “if it does not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and it is so vague and standardless that it allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Abraham v. Beck, 2015 Ark. 80, at 13 , 456 S.W.3d 744, 753 ; see also Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (“[T]he ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”).

2006In Serbian Eastern Orthodox for the United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich, supra, the Court noted: Whether or not there is room for “marginal civil court review” under the narrow rubrics of “fraud” or “collusion” when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, no “arbitrariness” exception — in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations — is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories

2006Id. at 713 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 .

2004Almost thirty years after Warren v. Chambers, supra, in the case of Wallace v. Driver, 61 Ark. 429 , 33 S.W. 641 (1896), we explained that while the land contiguous to water may change ownership where the change is gradual and imperceptible, “the true test ‘as to what is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is that, though the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on.’ ” Wallace v. Driver, 61 Ark. at 429 , 33 S.W. at 642 .

2004Almost thirty years after Warren v. Chambers, supra, in the case of Wallace v. Driver, 61 Ark. 429 , 33 S.W. 641 (1896), we explained that while the land contiguous to water may change ownership where the change is gradual and imperceptible, “the true test ‘as to what is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is that, though the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on.’ ” Wallace v. Driver, 61 Ark. at 429 , 33 S.W. at 642 .

2004Almost thirty years after Warren v. Chambers, supra, in the case of Wallace v. Driver, 61 Ark. 429 , 33 S.W. 641 (1896), we explained that while the land contiguous to water may change ownership where the change is gradual and imperceptible, “the true test ‘as to what is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is that, though the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on.’ ” Wallace v. Driver, 61 Ark. at 429 , 33 S.W. at 642 .

1994In Smith v. State, 303 Ark. 524 , 798 S.W.2d 94 (1990), we quoted with approval from United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), the statement that it is “not controlling” that a declarant’s statement was made in response to an inquiry, noting that is merely a factor a court must weigh in determining whether the testimony falls within the exception.

1994In Smith v. State, 303 Ark. 524 , 798 S.W.2d 94 (1990), we quoted with approval from United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), the statement that it is “not controlling” that a declarant’s statement was made in response to an inquiry, noting that is merely a factor a court must weigh in determining whether the testimony falls within the exception.

1994In Smith v. State, 303 Ark. 524 , 798 S.W.2d 94 (1990), we quoted with approval from United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), the statement that it is “not controlling” that a declarant’s statement was made in response to an inquiry, noting that is merely a factor a court must weigh in determining whether the testimony falls within the exception.

1990Appellants initially argue that medical doctors cannot as a matter of law be servants or employees in the sense required by the doctrine of respondeat superior and rely on Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481 , 228 S.W. 397 (1921), and Arkansas Midland R.R.

1990Appellants initially argue that medical doctors cannot as a matter of law be servants or employees in the sense required by the doctrine of respondeat superior and rely on Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481 , 228 S.W. 397 (1921), and Arkansas Midland R.R.

1990Corbin, C.J., concurs. 1 Because estoppel was not pled and because we believe the chancellor used the word only in the sense that the doctrine of laches is said to be “a species of estoppel,” see, e.g., Beshear v. Ahrens, 289 Ark. 57 , 709 S.W.2d 60 (1986), and Franklin v. Hempstead County Hunting Club, 216 Ark. 927 , 228 S.W.2d 65 (1950), we do not separately address the issue.

1990Corbin, C.J., concurs. 1 Because estoppel was not pled and because we believe the chancellor used the word only in the sense that the doctrine of laches is said to be “a species of estoppel,” see, e.g., Beshear v. Ahrens, 289 Ark. 57 , 709 S.W.2d 60 (1986), and Franklin v. Hempstead County Hunting Club, 216 Ark. 927 , 228 S.W.2d 65 (1950), we do not separately address the issue.

1990Corbin, C.J., concurs. 1 Because estoppel was not pled and because we believe the chancellor used the word only in the sense that the doctrine of laches is said to be “a species of estoppel,” see, e.g., Beshear v. Ahrens, 289 Ark. 57 , 709 S.W.2d 60 (1986), and Franklin v. Hempstead County Hunting Club, 216 Ark. 927 , 228 S.W.2d 65 (1950), we do not separately address the issue.

1990Corbin, C.J., concurs. 1 Because estoppel was not pled and because we believe the chancellor used the word only in the sense that the doctrine of laches is said to be “a species of estoppel,” see, e.g., Beshear v. Ahrens, 289 Ark. 57 , 709 S.W.2d 60 (1986), and Franklin v. Hempstead County Hunting Club, 216 Ark. 927 , 228 S.W.2d 65 (1950), we do not separately address the issue.

1990Co. v. Pearson, 98 Ark. 399 , 135 S.W. 917 (1908).

1990Co. v. Pearson, 98 Ark. 399 , 135 S.W. 917 (1908).

1983In order to grant appellants' motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the search, it would have been necessary for the trial court to abandon the common sense rule laid down by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303 , 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977), in which the court quoted with approval the following excerpt from U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965): ...

1983In order to grant appellants’ motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the search, it would have been necessary for the trial court to abandon the common sense rule laid down by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303 , 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977), in which the court quoted with approval the following excerpt from U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965): ...

1983In order to grant appellants’ motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the search, it would have been necessary for the trial court to abandon the common sense rule laid down by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303 , 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977), in which the court quoted with approval the following excerpt from U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965): ...

1983In order to grant appellants’ motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the search, it would have been necessary for the trial court to abandon the common sense rule laid down by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303 , 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977), in which the court quoted with approval the following excerpt from U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965): ...

1974The statutory language at issue here fails to approach that goal and is void for vagueness. ” We are unable to relate the pertinency of this holding to the case here at issue, for, as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court, the provision was vague “not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” On the subject of what is obscene, appellant’s argument is contrary to what the United States Supreme Court said in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.

1971Under the majority opinion, if the warrant had named Perez, the appellant could have sent the officers back for another warrant, while he disposed of the contraband, by simply saying “my name is not Perez.” It is at this point in the procedure where the facts in the case at bar become important, and it is at this point where I still adhere to the common sense doctrine we announced in Easley v. State, 249 Ark. 405 , 459 S. W. 2d 410 .

1971Under the majority opinion, if the warrant had named Perez, the appellant could have sent the officers back for another warrant, while he disposed of the contraband, by simply saying “my name is not Perez.” It is at this point in the procedure where the facts in the case at bar become important, and it is at this point where I still adhere to the common sense doctrine we announced in Easley v. State, 249 Ark. 405 , 459 S. W. 2d 410 .

1961In McElroy v. State, 100 Ark. 301 , 140 S. W. 8 , where a witness testified that she recognized the voice of the person who called her husband out in the night and shot him, we held that it was a statement of a conclusion reached through the sense of hearing, and was not objectionable as a mere matter of opinion; and that it was for the jury to determine the weight to be given such testimony.

1961In McElroy v. State, 100 Ark. 301 , 140 S. W. 8 , where a witness testified that she recognized the voice of the person who called her husband out in the night and shot him, we held that it was a statement of a conclusion reached through the sense of hearing, and was not objectionable as a mere matter of opinion; and that it was for the jury to determine the weight to be given such testimony.

1961Also, it was held in Robinson v. State, 177 Ark. 534 , 7 S. W. 2d 5 , that testimony that deceased had been dragged sixteen feet from pool of blood was a statement of physical fact and was not error.

1961Also, it was held in Robinson v. State, 177 Ark. 534 , 7 S. W. 2d 5 , that testimony that deceased had been dragged sixteen feet from pool of blood was a statement of physical fact and was not error.

1912It is a well-recognized rule of evidence that the voice is a competent means of identification. 6 Enc. of Ev. 924; McElroy v. State, 101 Ark. 301 ; Commonwealth v. Hays, 138 Mass. 185 ; Stepp v. State, (Tex.) 20 S. W. 753 ; Price v. State (Tex.) 34 S. W. 622 ; Mahoney v. State, (Tex.) 98 S. W. 854 .

1912Walker v. State, 39 Ark. 221 .

1912It is a well-recognized rule of evidence that the voice is a competent means of identification. 6 Enc. of Ev. 924; McElroy v. State, 101 Ark. 301 ; Commonwealth v. Hays, 138 Mass. 185 ; Stepp v. State, (Tex.) 20 S. W. 753 ; Price v. State (Tex.) 34 S. W. 622 ; Mahoney v. State, (Tex.) 98 S. W. 854 .

1912It is a well-recognized rule of evidence that the voice is a competent means of identification. 6 Enc. of Ev. 924; McElroy v. State, 101 Ark. 301 ; Commonwealth v. Hays, 138 Mass. 185 ; Stepp v. State, (Tex.) 20 S. W. 753 ; Price v. State (Tex.) 34 S. W. 622 ; Mahoney v. State, (Tex.) 98 S. W. 854 .

1912It is a well-recognized rule of evidence that the voice is a competent means of identification. 6 Enc. of Ev. 924; McElroy v. State, 101 Ark. 301 ; Commonwealth v. Hays, 138 Mass. 185 ; Stepp v. State, (Tex.) 20 S. W. 753 ; Price v. State (Tex.) 34 S. W. 622 ; Mahoney v. State, (Tex.) 98 S. W. 854 .