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12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mullis v. Southern Co. Services, Inc.green2 sentences1994We must apply the factors of Mullis v. Southern Co. Svcs., 250 Ga. 90, 94 (4) ( 296 SE2d 579 ) to the common sense analysis to determine what constitutes an “improvement to real property” within the meaning of OCGA § 9-3-51 (a). 1994We must apply the factors of Mullis v. Southern Co. Svcs., 250 Ga. 90, 94 (4) ( 296 SE2d 579 ) to the common sense analysis to determine what constitutes an “improvement to real property” within the meaning of OCGA § 9-3-51 (a). | 2 | 2 |
Coates v. City of Cincinnatigreen1 sentence2000Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 614 (91 SC 1686, 29 LE2d 214) (1971). | 1 | 1 |
Bowman v. Richardsongreen2 sentences1995See Bowman v. Richardson, 176 Ga.App. 864 , 338 S.E.2d 297 (1985) (requiring plaintiffs to show lack of knowledge of foreign substances "such as water on a ramp" to recover). 1995See Bowman v. Richardson, 176 Ga.App. 864 , 338 S.E.2d 297 (1985) (requiring plaintiffs to show lack of knowledge of foreign substances "such as water on a ramp" to recover). | 1 | 1 |
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. City of Atlantagreen2 sentences1994See generally Broadfoot, 195 Ga. App., supra at 299 (1); compare Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. City of Atlanta, 160 Ga. App. 396, 398 (1b) ( 287 SE2d 229 ) (gas line did not constitute improvement). 1994See generally Broadfoot, 195 Ga. App., supra at 299 (1); compare Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. City of Atlanta, 160 Ga. App. 396, 398 (1b) ( 287 SE2d 229 ) (gas line did not constitute improvement). | 1 | 1 |
Feldschneider v. Stategreen2 sentences1980I concur with what Judge Evans wrote in Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App. 745, 746 ( 195 SE2d 184 ): "It is provided in Code § 38-102 that 'presumptive evidence consists of inferences drawn by human experience from the connection of cause and effect, and observations of human conduct.’ Thus, jurors are entitled to use their own common sense as intelligent human beings on many questions. 1980I concur with what Judge Evans wrote in Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App. 745, 746 ( 195 SE2d 184 ): "It is provided in Code § 38-102 that 'presumptive evidence consists of inferences drawn by human experience from the connection of cause and effect, and observations of human conduct.’ Thus, jurors are entitled to use their own common sense as intelligent human beings on many questions. | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. Derrickgreen2 sentences1968In the case of Murray v. Derrick, 101 Ga. 113, 115 ( 28 SE 616 ) it is held: “The setting aside of the rule absolute was, under the circumstances, a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. 1968In the case of Murray v. Derrick, 101 Ga. 113, 115 ( 28 SE 616 ) it is held: “The setting aside of the rule absolute was, under the circumstances, a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. | 1 | 1 |
Fussell v. Stategreen2 sentences1942Fussell v. State, 93 Ga. 450, 455 ( 21 S. E. 97 ). 1942Fussell v. State, 93 Ga. 450, 455 ( 21 S. E. 97 ). | 1 | 1 |
Forbes v. Hallgreen1 sentence1935See Forbes v. Hall, 102 Ga. 47, 48, 49 (supra). | 1 | 1 |
Treat v. Pricegreen2 sentences1915The rule does not . apply where there is a bona fide dispute as to the amount actually due.” Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875, 883 ( 66 N. W. 834, 836 ). 1915The rule does not . apply where there is a bona fide dispute as to the amount actually due.” Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875, 883 ( 66 N. W. 834, 836 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lindsey v. Washington
green
2 sentences1983It is plainly to the substantial disadvantage of [appellants] to be deprived of all opportunity to receive [only] a sentence which would give them freedom from custody and control prior to the expiration of [their sentences.]” Lindsey, 301 U. S. at 401-402 , supra. Compare Bowler v. State, 145 Ga. App. 633 ( 244 SE2d 142 ) (1978) (holding that a statutory change from jury to judge sentencing without an increase in the severity of punishment prescribed is merely a change in the procedural “mode” of sentencing and may be constitutionally applied to crimes committed prior to its enactment). 1983It is plainly to the substantial disadvantage of [appellants] to be deprived of all opportunity to *73 receive [only] a sentence which would give them freedom from custody and control prior to the expiration of [their sentences.]" Lindsey, 301 U. S. at 401-402 , supra. Compare Bowler v. State, 145 Ga. App. 633 ( 244 SE2d 142 ) (1978) (holding that a statutory change from jury to judge sentencing without an increase in the severity of punishment prescribed is merely a change in the procedural "mode" of sentencing and may be constitutionally applied to crimes committed prior to its enactment). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Bowler v. State
green
2 sentences1983It is plainly to the substantial disadvantage of [appellants] to be deprived of all opportunity to *73 receive [only] a sentence which would give them freedom from custody and control prior to the expiration of [their sentences.]" Lindsey, 301 U. S. at 401-402 , supra. Compare Bowler v. State, 145 Ga. App. 633 ( 244 SE2d 142 ) (1978) (holding that a statutory change from jury to judge sentencing without an increase in the severity of punishment prescribed is merely a change in the procedural "mode" of sentencing and may be constitutionally applied to crimes committed prior to its enactment). 1983It is plainly to the substantial disadvantage of [appellants] to be deprived of all opportunity to *73 receive [only] a sentence which would give them freedom from custody and control prior to the expiration of [their sentences.]" Lindsey, 301 U. S. at 401-402 , supra. Compare Bowler v. State, 145 Ga. App. 633 ( 244 SE2d 142 ) (1978) (holding that a statutory change from jury to judge sentencing without an increase in the severity of punishment prescribed is merely a change in the procedural "mode" of sentencing and may be constitutionally applied to crimes committed prior to its enactment). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich
green
2 sentences1982“We have concluded that whether or not there is room for ‘marginal civil court review’ under the narrow rubrics of ‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, no ‘arbitrariness’ exception — in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations — is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, int 1982Where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into the religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them.” Milivojevich, supra, at p. 709 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Covington v. Rosenbusch
green
2 sentences1929Without undertaking to reconcile Covington v. Rosenbusch, 148 Ga. 459 ( 97 S. E. 78 ), in which it was held that the collection and appropriation to his own use of salary or wages by the assignor thereof under a salary assignment is “a wilful and malicious injury to property,” with Blocker v. Boswell, 109 Ga. 330 ( 34 S. E. 389 ), where it was held that a conversion of personal property which is ’ a basis of an action for trover is not an injury or damage to personal property in the sense of that clause of the constitution of this State conferring upon justices of the peace jurisdiction in cas 1929Without undertaking to reconcile Covington v. Rosenbusch, 148 Ga. 459 ( 97 S. E. 78 ), in which it was held that the collection and appropriation to his own use of salary or wages by the assignor thereof under a salary assignment is “a wilful and malicious injury to property,” with Blocker v. Boswell, 109 Ga. 330 ( 34 S. E. 389 ), where it was held that a conversion of personal property which is ’ a basis of an action for trover is not an injury or damage to personal property in the sense of that clause of the constitution of this State conferring upon justices of the peace jurisdiction in cas | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.