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13 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1893–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coates v. City of Cincinnatigreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294 ("[W]here a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms." (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks and footnotes with citations omitted)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (holding an ordinance prohibiting, among other things, "conduct . . . annoying to persons passing by" to be "unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable s 2012See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294 ("[W]here a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms." (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks and footnotes with citations omitted)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (holding an ordinance prohibiting, among other things, "conduct . . . annoying to persons passing by" to be "unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable s | 1 | 3 |
Swindell v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.green2 sentences1937In the Buel Case we quoted a definition of “liquidated” from Swindell v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 230 F. 438, 442 , 144 C.C.A. 580 , as follows: “ ‘The word “liquidated,” in the sense of the rule relied on by counsel’ (with respect to accord and satisfaction) ‘signifies that the amount claimed has been ascertained and agreed on or fixed by operation of law.’” In the same case we said: “In the case at bar> it cannot be questioned that the parties agreed, by the policy, upon the amount of the indemnity. 1937In the Buel Case we quoted a definition of “liquidated” from Swindell v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 230 F. 438, 442 , 144 C.C.A. 580 , as follows: “ ‘The word “liquidated,” in the sense of the rule relied on by counsel’ (with respect to accord and satisfaction) ‘signifies that the amount claimed has been ascertained and agreed on or fixed by operation of law.’” In the same case we said: “In the case at bar> it cannot be questioned that the parties agreed, by the policy, upon the amount of the indemnity. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Largogreen1 sentence2024“We will not conclude that the [trial] court abused its discretion in admitting evidence pursuant to an exception or an exclusion to the hearsay rule unless the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Largo, 2012-NMSC-015, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.green2 sentences2012See Young, 427 U.S. at 59 n. 17, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (collecting cases that entertained facial overbreadth claims where expressive or communicative "conduct has required official approval under laws that delegated standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights"); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (involving an invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion); see also Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 629 , 100 S.Ct. 826 (noting that, following the Cantw 2012See Young, 427 U.S. at 59 n. 17, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (collecting cases that entertained facial overbreadth claims where expressive or communicative "conduct has required official approval under laws that delegated standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights"); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (involving an invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion); see also Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 629 , 100 S.Ct. 826 (noting that, following the Cantw | 1 | 1 |
Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294 ("[W]here a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms." (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks and footnotes with citations omitted)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (holding an ordinance prohibiting, among other things, "conduct . . . annoying to persons passing by" to be "unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable s 2012See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294 ("[W]here a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms." (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks and footnotes with citations omitted)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (holding an ordinance prohibiting, among other things, "conduct . . . annoying to persons passing by" to be "unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable s | 1 | 1 |
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environmentgreen2 sentences2012See Young, 427 U.S. at 59 n. 17, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (collecting cases that entertained facial overbreadth claims where expressive or communicative "conduct has required official approval under laws that delegated standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights"); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (involving an invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion); see also Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 629 , 100 S.Ct. 826 (noting that, following the Cantw 2012See Young, 427 U.S. at 59 n. 17, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (collecting cases that entertained facial overbreadth claims where expressive or communicative "conduct has required official approval under laws that delegated standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights"); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (involving an invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion); see also Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 629 , 100 S.Ct. 826 (noting that, following the Cantw | 1 | 1 |
State v. Casegreen2 sentences1999Rule 11-803(A) defines the present sense exception as “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” {6} Defendant contends that this testimony was inadmissible, relying on State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 718 , 676 P.2d 241, 245 (1984), because the shooter’s identity could not be verified by the witness. 1999Rule 11-803(A) defines the present sense exception as “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” {6} Defendant contends that this testimony was inadmissible, relying on State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 718 , 676 P.2d 241, 245 (1984), because the shooter’s identity could not be verified by the witness. | 1 | 1 |
Mathis v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.green2 sentences1979In Mathis v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 61 N.M. 330, 337 , 300 P.2d 482, 487 (1956), he wrote: * * * There is no standard fixed by law for measuring the value of human pain and suffering. 1979In Mathis v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 61 N.M. 330, 337 , 300 P.2d 482, 487 (1956), he wrote: * * * There is no standard fixed by law for measuring the value of human pain and suffering. | 1 | 1 |
Buel v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.green2 sentences1977Co., 32 N.M. 34, 44 , 250 P. 635, 638 (1926) quotes the following: “The word ‘liquidated,’ in the sense of the rule relied on by counsel” (with respect to accord and satisfaction) “signifies that the amount claimed has been ascertained and agreed on or fixed by operation of law.” The court held that the general rule applies only to claims that are both liquidated and undisputed. 1977Co., 32 N.M. 34, 44 , 250 P. 635, 638 (1926) quotes the following: “The word ‘liquidated,’ in the sense of the rule relied on by counsel” (with respect to accord and satisfaction) “signifies that the amount claimed has been ascertained and agreed on or fixed by operation of law.” The court held that the general rule applies only to claims that are both liquidated and undisputed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Imperial
green
1 sentence2024There Was No Error in the Admission of Koburi’s Statements During the 911 Call as a Present Sense Impression or an Excited Utterance {17} Defendant next argues that even if Koburi’s statements were nontestimonial, the metropolitan court erred in admitting the first one and one-half minutes of Koburi’s 911 call under the present sense exception to the hearsay rule and the second two-and-one- half minute segment under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. {18} “We review a [trial] court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Imperial, 2017-NMCA-040, ¶ 14 , 3 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Cantwell v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2012See Young, 427 U.S. at 59 n. 17, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (collecting cases that entertained facial overbreadth claims where expressive or communicative "conduct has required official approval under laws that delegated standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights"); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (involving an invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion); see also Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 629 , 100 S.Ct. 826 (noting that, following the Cantw 2012See Young, 427 U.S. at 59 n. 17, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (collecting cases that entertained facial overbreadth claims where expressive or communicative "conduct has required official approval under laws that delegated standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights"); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (involving an invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion); see also Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 629 , 100 S.Ct. 826 (noting that, following the Cantw | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America
green
2 sentences2006The Court struck down the statute after concluding that it “intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.” Id. at 119 , 73 S.Ct. 143 . {15} A third case dealing with the right of an ecclesiastical organization to freely choose its leaders and structure is Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 , 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), where the Supreme Court rejected the Gonzalez “arbitrariness” reference in a passage that directly addresses the qu 2006The Court struck down the statute after concluding that it “intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.” Id. at 119 , 73 S.Ct. 143 . {15} A third case dealing with the right of an ecclesiastical organization to freely choose its leaders and structure is Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 , 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), where the Supreme Court rejected the Gonzalez “arbitrariness” reference in a passage that directly addresses the qu | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich
green
2 sentences2006The Court struck down the statute after concluding that it “intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.” Id. at 119 , 73 S.Ct. 143 . {15} A third case dealing with the right of an ecclesiastical organization to freely choose its leaders and structure is Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 , 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), where the Supreme Court rejected the Gonzalez “arbitrariness” reference in a passage that directly addresses the qu 2006The Court struck down the statute after concluding that it “intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.” Id. at 119 , 73 S.Ct. 143 . {15} A third case dealing with the right of an ecclesiastical organization to freely choose its leaders and structure is Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 , 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), where the Supreme Court rejected the Gonzalez “arbitrariness” reference in a passage that directly addresses the qu | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State Trust & Savings Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co.
green
2 sentences1990This determination makes State Trust & Savings Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co., 30 N.M. 566 , 240 P. 469 (1925), controlling on this question; the common sense rule that the party winning the net award should be considered to have prevailed requires that the Montoyas be awarded the attorney’s fees. 1990This determination makes State Trust & Savings Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co., 30 N.M. 566 , 240 P. 469 (1925), controlling on this question; the common sense rule that the party winning the net award should be considered to have prevailed requires that the Montoyas be awarded the attorney’s fees. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Miller v. Prince Street Elevator Co.
green
2 sentences1964In Miller v. Prince Street Elevator Co., 41 N.M. 330 , 68 P.2d 663 , it was held that “liquidated,” in the sense of the rule that payment of a lesser sum is a discharge of the remainder where the amount in dispute is unliquidated but is not where it is liquidated, means that the amount claimed has been ascertained and agreed upon by the parties or fixed by operation of law. 1964In Miller v. Prince Street Elevator Co., 41 N.M. 330 , 68 P.2d 663 , it was held that “liquidated,” in the sense of the rule that payment of a lesser sum is a discharge of the remainder where the amount in dispute is unliquidated but is not where it is liquidated, means that the amount claimed has been ascertained and agreed upon by the parties or fixed by operation of law. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Hough v. Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1893The question is, “Who, within the sense of the rule, or upon grounds of public policy, are to be deemed fellow servants in the same common ■adventure or undertaking?” Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213 . | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.